{"title":"非殖民化哲学","authors":"Dylan B. Futter","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2023.2248410","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractIn its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy. Notes1 Matolino Citation2020, p. 215.2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay Citation2015 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213.3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel Citation2013 and Tobi Citation2020. See also Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini Citation2015.4 See wa Thiong’o Citation1986; Hountondji Citation1995; and Táíwò Citation2019. See also Wiredu Citation1998, pp. 17 and 22.5 Mitova Citation2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe Citation2015 and Etieyibo Citation2016.6 wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe Citation2015.7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka Citation1990, p. 44.9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 ff.10 Cf. Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11 Matolino Citation2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.12 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 58 and Ramose Citation2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (Citation1998, p. 17).13 See Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr Citation1968.15 Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 3 and 14.16 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (Citation2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu Citation1984, p. 34 and Eze Citation2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.18 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 17.19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (Citation2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26).20 Emmanuel Citation2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (Citation2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.21 Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22 Wiredu Citation1998; Citation2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter Citation2023.23 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu Citation2004, p. 4.24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada Citation2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen Citation2010.27 But see Eze Citation2001.28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51.30 See Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998, p. 4.32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu Citation1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.36 Cf. Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37 See Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter Citation2016a.39 See Metz Citation2007 and Ramose Citation2007. See also Futter Citation2016b.40 See Hadot Citation1995; Citation2002.41 Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze Citation2001 and the responses by Jones Citation2001 and Matolino Citation2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada Citation2020, p. 7).44 Lear Citation1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. My research is supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decolonising Philosophy\",\"authors\":\"Dylan B. Futter\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/05568641.2023.2248410\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractIn its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy. Notes1 Matolino Citation2020, p. 215.2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay Citation2015 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213.3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel Citation2013 and Tobi Citation2020. See also Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini Citation2015.4 See wa Thiong’o Citation1986; Hountondji Citation1995; and Táíwò Citation2019. See also Wiredu Citation1998, pp. 17 and 22.5 Mitova Citation2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe Citation2015 and Etieyibo Citation2016.6 wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe Citation2015.7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka Citation1990, p. 44.9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 ff.10 Cf. Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11 Matolino Citation2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.12 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 58 and Ramose Citation2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (Citation1998, p. 17).13 See Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr Citation1968.15 Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 3 and 14.16 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (Citation2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu Citation1984, p. 34 and Eze Citation2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.18 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 17.19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (Citation2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26).20 Emmanuel Citation2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (Citation2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.21 Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22 Wiredu Citation1998; Citation2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter Citation2023.23 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu Citation2004, p. 4.24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada Citation2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen Citation2010.27 But see Eze Citation2001.28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51.30 See Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998, p. 4.32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu Citation1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.36 Cf. Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37 See Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter Citation2016a.39 See Metz Citation2007 and Ramose Citation2007. See also Futter Citation2016b.40 See Hadot Citation1995; Citation2002.41 Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze Citation2001 and the responses by Jones Citation2001 and Matolino Citation2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada Citation2020, p. 7).44 Lear Citation1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. 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引用次数: 7
摘要
在试图消除“西方知识”的自命不凡的过程中,认识论的去殖民化运动继承了苏格拉底的工作,苏格拉底试图说服那些认为自己聪明但实际上并不聪明的人,他们其实并不聪明。然而,在恢复和提升本土思想体系的决心中,非殖民化似乎与这项工作背道而驰,因为它总是会腐蚀传统的信仰。非殖民化既表达了苏格拉底哲学的精神,又与之相矛盾。注1 Matolino Citation2020,第215.2页。我有时使用“去殖民化”一词作为“去殖民化运动”和相关短语的简称;背景会让你明白这一点。关于殖民主义的错误,参见Pillay Citation2015和Matolino Citation2020,第213.3页。关于知识灭绝,参见Grosfoguel Citation2013和Tobi Citation2020。参见Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141-142,以及更普遍的Valentini Citation2015.4参见wa Thiong 'o Citation1986;Hountondji Citation1995;和Táíwò Citation2019。参见Wiredu Citation1998,第17和22.5页。Mitova Citation2020,第191页。参见Mbembe Citation2015和Etieyibo Citation2016.6和Thiong 'o Citation1986, p. 87,由Mbembe Citation2015.7改写,柏拉图,苏格拉底的道歉,38a和passim8柏拉图,《理想国》第七卷,537页后。更多关于询问和超然的关系,见第6节。关于哲学与传统信仰之间的冲突,也见Oruka Citation1990,第44.9页。这种说法与Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 off .10的分析是一致的参见Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11。Matolino Citation2020, p. 221。我使用“知识分子”一词是指在文中定义的意义上的“与思想有关”参见Wiredu Citation2002,第58页和Ramose Citation2016。对Wiredu来说,去殖民化意味着“摆脱非洲哲学思想中源自我们殖民历史的所有不当影响”(Citation1998,第17页)参见《Emmanuel Citation2019》第1-3页。在经济学上,我对自由贸易或保护主义的优点不持立场普鲁塔克,《老卡托的一生》,22,和Nasr Citation1968.15。Emmanuel Citation2019,第3和14.16页。参见Wiredu Citation2002,第17和20页。也见Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404-405.17。我并不是说非洲哲学要等同于传统信仰,只是说它必须从传统信仰开始。正如Wiredu所指出的那样,去殖民化寻求恢复非洲“真实面貌的哲学遗产”(Citation2002,第58页);他还谈到了“把自己带到一个有利的位置,以观察非洲思想材料的真实面貌”(同上)。参见Wiredu Citation1984,第34页和Eze Citation2001,第207页。可以肯定的是,调和知识所有权的历史叙述与哲学自我反省的要求的困难是本文的主要关注点见Wiredu Citation2002,第17.19页。见Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017,第51页。同样,Eze评论说“理论……应该能够从一个地方流向另一个地方,正是因为没有一种文化或探究传统垄断了知识的生产”(Citation2001, p. 209)。再比较一下Wiredu的说法,即“当代非洲哲学家有责任在公共信仰之下进行深入研究,尽可能地找到其潜在的原因”(Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26)《Emmanuel Citation2019》第4页。另见Etieyibo 2016和Matolino Citation2020,第213页。法农的作品,试图“将黑人从殖民环境中萌芽的复杂武器库中解放出来”(Citation2008, p. 14),当然是具有开创性的Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22;引文2002,第56页。关于Wiredu关于非殖民化立场的详细讨论,见Futter Citation2023.23。见Wiredu Citation2002,第54和58页。另见Wiredu Citation2004,第4.24页根据Emmanuel的说法,在Wiredu的叙述中“没有仅仅因为非洲的起源就给予非洲思想特权”(同上,第8页)。我不相信这是真的,因为文本中给出了原因。当然,Wiredu致力于在非洲思想被挖掘出来之后对其进行批判性评价,详见下文第6节。另见Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26如上所述,在我看来,非殖民化致力于将非洲哲学描述为民族哲学。当然,这意味着不同的(见Agada Citation2020)关于民族哲学的恢复和重新定义,以回应Paulin Hountondji的著名批评,见Hallen Citation2010.27但见Eze Citation2001.28根据普鲁塔克,卡托认为苏格拉底是“作为一个强大的喋喋不休的人,他试图尽其所能,通过废除其国家的习俗,成为他国家的暴君,并通过引诱他的同胞们发表与法律相悖的意见”(《老加图的生平》,23)Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017,第51.30页参见Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998,第4页。 参见柏拉图,《斐多篇》65d-66a和《理想国》514a-517c和wa Thiong 'o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34我在本节稍后讨论了主张祖先方法的想法这些问题,稍微重新定义一下,借用自Wiredu Citation1998,第23页。在理论和论证的层面上也可以提出类似的问题参见Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37参见Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38关于这一点的进一步讨论,参见Futter Citation2016a.39参见Metz Citation2007和Ramose Citation2007。参见Futter Citation2016b.40参见Hadot Citation1995;Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43我在这里绕过哲学普遍论者和特殊论者之间的争论。参见Eze Citation2001和Jones Citation2001和Matolino Citation2015的回应。再比较一下Hountondji的主张:“如果哲学必须算作哲学,那么任何地方的哲学都必须带有批判性和分析性的印记(引自《Agada Citation2020》,第7页)。李尔引文,1998,第5页。我要感谢《哲学论文》的两位匿名审稿人,他们的评论帮助我改进了这篇论文。我的研究得到了南非国家研究基金会的支持。
AbstractIn its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy. Notes1 Matolino Citation2020, p. 215.2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay Citation2015 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213.3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel Citation2013 and Tobi Citation2020. See also Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini Citation2015.4 See wa Thiong’o Citation1986; Hountondji Citation1995; and Táíwò Citation2019. See also Wiredu Citation1998, pp. 17 and 22.5 Mitova Citation2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe Citation2015 and Etieyibo Citation2016.6 wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe Citation2015.7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka Citation1990, p. 44.9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 ff.10 Cf. Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11 Matolino Citation2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.12 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 58 and Ramose Citation2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (Citation1998, p. 17).13 See Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr Citation1968.15 Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 3 and 14.16 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (Citation2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu Citation1984, p. 34 and Eze Citation2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.18 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 17.19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (Citation2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26).20 Emmanuel Citation2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (Citation2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.21 Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22 Wiredu Citation1998; Citation2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter Citation2023.23 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu Citation2004, p. 4.24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada Citation2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen Citation2010.27 But see Eze Citation2001.28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51.30 See Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998, p. 4.32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu Citation1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.36 Cf. Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37 See Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter Citation2016a.39 See Metz Citation2007 and Ramose Citation2007. See also Futter Citation2016b.40 See Hadot Citation1995; Citation2002.41 Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze Citation2001 and the responses by Jones Citation2001 and Matolino Citation2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada Citation2020, p. 7).44 Lear Citation1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. My research is supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa.
期刊介绍:
Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.