谁在管理AEA?

IF 11.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Kevin D. Hoover, Andrej Svorenčík
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引用次数: 1

摘要

美国经济协会的领导结构是用一个传记数据库记录的,该数据库涵盖了1950年至2019年美国经济协会办公室的每一位官员和落选候选人。分析的重点是教育和就业的机构从属关系。该结构具有很强的分层性。少数机构主导着领导层,而且随着时间的推移,它们的主导地位明显变得更强。研究人员大致探讨了两种解释:机构主导地位是基于学术成就的,或者是基于自我延续的特权。网络效应可能解释了增加浓度的动态也进行了研究。(jel a11, b29, b30, z13)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Who Runs the AEA?
The leadership structure of the American Economic Association is documented using a biographical database covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional affiliations by education and employment. The structure is strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored: that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing concentration are also investigated. (JEL A11, B29, B30, Z13)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
17.80
自引率
0.80%
发文量
49
期刊介绍: Commencing in 1969, the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) serves as a vital resource for economists, offering a means to stay informed about the extensive literature in the field. Each JEL issue features commissioned, peer-reviewed survey and review articles, book reviews, an annotated bibliography categorizing new books by subject, and an annual index of dissertations from North American universities.
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