正视意向性的问题

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Angela Mendelovici, David Bourget
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们区分了不同的“关于性”问题:解释意向性的日常现象的“难”问题,以及关于民间心理学的假设、在心脑科学中调用的表征概念和心理语言的密集性(带“s”)的三组不那么具有挑战性的“容易”问题。意向性的问题尤其困难,就像现象意识的困难问题一样,使用当前的方法没有明确的解决方案。我们认为,心理表征的自然主义理论并没有解决难题——要么他们只是想解决简单的问题,要么他们的主张只是在毫无辩护的和初步的不可信的假设下帮助解决意向性问题,其结果是难题被简化为简单问题的某种组合。我们提供了一个积极的说明,说明正确地面对意向性问题所需要的东西。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Facing up to the problem of intentionality
Abstract We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended and prima facie implausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality.
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CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
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