基于基础的区别:平等法的争议起点

IF 0.1 Q4 LAW
Colleen Sheppard
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去五年中,加拿大最高法院继续努力解决宪法平等和歧视的含义。在这方面,有一项明确的协商一致意见,即法院应遵循两步检验来评估违反《加拿大权利和自由宪章》第15(1)条的情况。首先,法院必须确定基于理由的区别,其次,确定这种区别是否违反实质平等。虽然测试的两个部分都存在相互关联的概念和背景挑战,但本文侧重于法院如何应用第15条平等分析的第一步。最近的判例法揭示了一个严重分裂的法院。首先,关于是否可以将基于理由的区别理解为不可避免地嵌入立法计划的根本分歧是明显的。其次,大法官们在证明不利影响歧视的紧迫性上存在分歧。法律上的技术性问题、比较国集团的手续以及对强加给政府任何积极权利义务的恐惧,掩盖了法律不成比例影响的关键方面。第三,将不利影响与无意歧视联系起来,可能会忽视对法律和政策效果差异的实际了解的重要性。最后,交织性的复杂现实虽然得到了一些法官的承认,但仍然处于平等权利原则的边缘。虽然平等分析的第二步更直接地涉及对实质性不平等的背景现实的评估,但确保法院达到分析的这一阶段是至关重要的,并且它不会被狭隘和形式主义的方法所打断,阻挠或阻碍,以确定基于理由的区别。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Grounds-Based Distinctions: Contested Starting Points in Equality Law
Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to grapple with the meaning of constitutional equality and discrimination. In this regard, there is a clear consensus that the Court should follow a two-step test to assess violations of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the Court must identify a grounds-based distinction and, second, determine whether the distinction violates substantive equality. While both parts of the test present interconnected conceptual and contextual challenges, this article focuses on how the Court has applied the first step of the section 15 equality analysis. Recent case law reveals a deeply divided Court. First, fundamental differences are apparent with respect to whether grounds-based distinctions may be understood as inextricably embedded in legislative schemes. Second, the justices diverge on the exigencies of proving adverse impact discrimination. Legal technicalities, comparator group formalities, and fear of imposing any positive rights obligations on governments obscure critical dimensions of the disproportionate effects of law. Third, the association of adverse impact with unintentional discrimination risks overlooking the importance of the actual knowledge of disparities in the effects of laws and policies. Finally, the complex realities of intersectionality, while recognized by some justices, continue to remain on the periphery of equality rights doctrine. While the second step of the equality analysis engages more directly with an assessment of the contextual realities of substantive inequality, it is critical to ensure that courts reach this stage of the analysis and that it is not cut short, thwarted, or obstructed by narrow and formalistic approaches to identifying grounds-based distinctions.
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CiteScore
0.70
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7
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