{"title":"基于基础的区别:平等法的争议起点","authors":"Colleen Sheppard","doi":"10.3138/cjwl.2023.06.12","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to grapple with the meaning of constitutional equality and discrimination. In this regard, there is a clear consensus that the Court should follow a two-step test to assess violations of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the Court must identify a grounds-based distinction and, second, determine whether the distinction violates substantive equality. While both parts of the test present interconnected conceptual and contextual challenges, this article focuses on how the Court has applied the first step of the section 15 equality analysis. Recent case law reveals a deeply divided Court. First, fundamental differences are apparent with respect to whether grounds-based distinctions may be understood as inextricably embedded in legislative schemes. Second, the justices diverge on the exigencies of proving adverse impact discrimination. Legal technicalities, comparator group formalities, and fear of imposing any positive rights obligations on governments obscure critical dimensions of the disproportionate effects of law. Third, the association of adverse impact with unintentional discrimination risks overlooking the importance of the actual knowledge of disparities in the effects of laws and policies. Finally, the complex realities of intersectionality, while recognized by some justices, continue to remain on the periphery of equality rights doctrine. While the second step of the equality analysis engages more directly with an assessment of the contextual realities of substantive inequality, it is critical to ensure that courts reach this stage of the analysis and that it is not cut short, thwarted, or obstructed by narrow and formalistic approaches to identifying grounds-based distinctions.","PeriodicalId":44818,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Women and the Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Grounds-Based Distinctions: Contested Starting Points in Equality Law\",\"authors\":\"Colleen Sheppard\",\"doi\":\"10.3138/cjwl.2023.06.12\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to grapple with the meaning of constitutional equality and discrimination. In this regard, there is a clear consensus that the Court should follow a two-step test to assess violations of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the Court must identify a grounds-based distinction and, second, determine whether the distinction violates substantive equality. While both parts of the test present interconnected conceptual and contextual challenges, this article focuses on how the Court has applied the first step of the section 15 equality analysis. Recent case law reveals a deeply divided Court. First, fundamental differences are apparent with respect to whether grounds-based distinctions may be understood as inextricably embedded in legislative schemes. Second, the justices diverge on the exigencies of proving adverse impact discrimination. Legal technicalities, comparator group formalities, and fear of imposing any positive rights obligations on governments obscure critical dimensions of the disproportionate effects of law. Third, the association of adverse impact with unintentional discrimination risks overlooking the importance of the actual knowledge of disparities in the effects of laws and policies. Finally, the complex realities of intersectionality, while recognized by some justices, continue to remain on the periphery of equality rights doctrine. While the second step of the equality analysis engages more directly with an assessment of the contextual realities of substantive inequality, it is critical to ensure that courts reach this stage of the analysis and that it is not cut short, thwarted, or obstructed by narrow and formalistic approaches to identifying grounds-based distinctions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44818,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Canadian Journal of Women and the Law\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Canadian Journal of Women and the Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.2023.06.12\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Journal of Women and the Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.2023.06.12","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Grounds-Based Distinctions: Contested Starting Points in Equality Law
Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to grapple with the meaning of constitutional equality and discrimination. In this regard, there is a clear consensus that the Court should follow a two-step test to assess violations of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the Court must identify a grounds-based distinction and, second, determine whether the distinction violates substantive equality. While both parts of the test present interconnected conceptual and contextual challenges, this article focuses on how the Court has applied the first step of the section 15 equality analysis. Recent case law reveals a deeply divided Court. First, fundamental differences are apparent with respect to whether grounds-based distinctions may be understood as inextricably embedded in legislative schemes. Second, the justices diverge on the exigencies of proving adverse impact discrimination. Legal technicalities, comparator group formalities, and fear of imposing any positive rights obligations on governments obscure critical dimensions of the disproportionate effects of law. Third, the association of adverse impact with unintentional discrimination risks overlooking the importance of the actual knowledge of disparities in the effects of laws and policies. Finally, the complex realities of intersectionality, while recognized by some justices, continue to remain on the periphery of equality rights doctrine. While the second step of the equality analysis engages more directly with an assessment of the contextual realities of substantive inequality, it is critical to ensure that courts reach this stage of the analysis and that it is not cut short, thwarted, or obstructed by narrow and formalistic approaches to identifying grounds-based distinctions.