naïve现实主义何去何从?——我

IF 1.6 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI:10.1111/phpe.12180

Alex Byrne, E. J. Green

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引用次数: 0

摘要

不同的作者对naïve现实主义有着微妙的不同描述。我们梳理了主要的理论，认为幻觉为naïve现实主义及其主要对手具象主义提供了最好的证明。根据naïve现实主义，幻觉从不涉及感知错误。我们评估了威廉·费什(William Fish)和比尔·布鲁尔(Bill Brewer)两位解释明显感知错误的主要尝试，并得出结论认为他们失败了。另一种主要的尝试在一篇配套论文中进行了评估，该论文也概述了另一种代表性的描述。

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Whither naïve realism? – I

Abstract Different authors offer subtly different characterizations of naïve realism. We disentangle the main ones and argue that illusions provide the best proving ground for naïve realism and its main rival, representationalism. According to naïve realism, illusions never involve perceptual error. We assess two leading attempts to explain apparent perceptual error away, from William Fish and Bill Brewer, and conclude that they fail. Another leading attempt is assessed in a companion paper, which also sketches an alternative representational account.

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来源期刊

Philosophical Perspectives PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量