Towards Intelligence Accountability as a virtue

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the conceptualisation of accountability in the Intelligence Studies literature, distinguishing between accountability as a mechanism and a virtue, and questions the predominant emphasis on the former. The mechanism approach encounters two significant challenges: the functionalist solutions to accountability issues and the overarching focus on oversight bodies. Consequently, the literature ignores its own realisations of the importance of beliefs and perceptions within the services. I propose a novel approach to studying intelligence accountability by integrating insights from the Institutional Logics literature and Bourdieu’s political sociology to address these issues. AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank the members of the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and the participants at the 2022 DPSA Conference and the ISA 2023 Annual Convention for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Many thanks also to the Carlsberg Foundation for supporting this work and to the INTELHUB research group, as well as Kira Vrist Rønn, Chiara De Franco, Vincent Keating, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Leigh and Wegge, “Intelligence and Oversight,” 1.2. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability,”; and Mulgan, Holding Power to Account.3. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability.”4. For a broader discussion on the need for a new research agenda for the study of intelligence, see e.g., Ben Jaffel and Larsson, “Why Do We Need a New Research Agenda for the Study of Intelligence?”; and Bean, de Werd and Ivan, “Critical Intelligence Studies.”5. For an examination of the domains of political science, public administration, constitutional law, and business administration, see Bovens, Schillemans and Goodin, ‘Public Accountability’.6. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,”7. Ibid.8. Political science, public administration, international relations, social psychology, constitutional law, and business administration.9. For a thorough description of the emergence of accountability, see Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability.”’.10. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,”, 915.11. Bovens, Schillemans and Goodin, “Public Accountability.”12. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, 9.13. Müller-Wille, “Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence,” 101.14. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability,” 451.15. Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence accountability and the role of public interest groups,” 144.16. Greenwood and Huisman, Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence Services.17. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,” 949.18. Bovens, Schillemans and Goodin, “Public Accountability,” 8. See also Koppell, “Pathologies of Accountability”; and Considine, “The End of the Line?”19. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,” 950.20. Friedrich, “Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,” 20.21. In the debate on the nature of administrative responsibility, another prominent voice, Herman Finer, took the contrary position and argued for the obedience to the government of the day to be the highest virtue of civil servants. His arguments can be found in Finer, ‘Better Government Personnel’.22. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,” 950.23. Bovens, Schillemans and Goodin, ‘Public Accountability’.24. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,” 955–956.25. University of Southern Denmark, Bliv Informations-kompetent! [Become Information Literate!].26. Academic Search Premier, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science Complete.27. Digital National Security Archive, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, Military Database, Periodicals Index Online, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global, Politics Collection, Social Science Database, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts.28. Aldrich, ‘US-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism’; and Ott, ‘Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight’.29. For different methods of selection of samples see Snyder, ‘Literature review as a research methodology’.30. For examples, see Cepik, ‘Intelligence and Security Services’; Rogers and Mawdsley, ‘Restoring Public Trust and Confidence’; Hughes, ‘The evolution of historical scholarship’; Lefebvre, ‘Croatia and the Development of a Democratic Intelligence System’; Foley, ‘The expansion of intelligence agency mandates’; Krishnan, ‘The Future of U.S. Intelligence Outsourcing’; Alford, ‘Bill C-59 and the Former Bill C-22’; Boer, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence’; Scott, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence’; and Sammonds, ‘The Slow March’.31. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability,” 947.32. See Blakeley and Raphael, ‘Accountability, denial and the future-proofing of British torture’ for an account of executive accountability for intelligence conduct.33. A Pearl Growing Search is a literature-search strategy building on the information already available. In other words, articles already identified as useful for one’s purpose (pearls) are used to identify other relevant articles through the list of references and citations.34. See appendix 1 for a full list of reviewed papers.35. See appendix 1 for an overview of the categorization.36. Zegart, Eyes on Spies.37. See for example Born and Wetzling, ‘Intelligence Accountability’; Leigh, ‘Changing the rules of the game’; Matei, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization’; Hardy and Williams, ‘Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia’; Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services’; Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services’; Defty, ‘Educating Parliamentarians about Intelligence’; Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, ‘New Mechanisms of Independent Accountability’; Sirrs, ‘Reforming Egyptian Intelligence’; Robarge, ‘CIA in the Spotlight’; Phythian, ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability’; Gonçalves, ‘The Spies Came from the Tropics’; Chesterman, ‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’; and Africa, ‘Financial Oversight of the Civilian Intelligence Services’.38. Johnson, “Congress and the American Experiment,” 496. There are exceptions to this notion such as Hillebrand, ‘The Role of News Media’; Aldrich and Richterova, ‘Ambient Accountability’; and Yauri-Miranda, ‘Principles to Assess Accountability’.39. See for example Defty, ‘Familiar but not intimate’; Johnson, ‘The Contemporary Presidency’; Johnson, ‘Accountability and America’s Secret Foreign Policy’; Johnson, ‘Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians’; Johnson, ‘Intelligence shocks, media coverage, and congressional accountability’; Johnson, ‘Congress and the American Experiment’, Barber, ‘Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence’; Phythian, ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability’; Bakir, ‘Political-intelligence elites, Strategic Political Communication and the Press’; Dobson, ‘The last forum of accountability?’; Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups’; Robarge, ‘CIA in the Spotlight’; Hillebrand, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’; Deeks, ‘Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraint and the Law’; and Leigh, ‘Rebalancing Rights and National Security’.40. See Klaaren, ‘The Judicial Role in Defining National Security’; and Hardy and Williams, ‘Executive Oversight of Intelligence Services’.41. Greenwood and Huisman, Transparency of Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence Services; Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence’; and Barber, ‘Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence’.42. Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups’; Eriksen, ‘Governance between Expertise and Democracy’; Aden, ‘Information sharing, secrecy and trust’; and Jansson, ‘Building resilience, demolishing accountability?’.43. Eijkman and Weggemans, “Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas,” 296.44. Dobson, ‘The last forum of accountability?’ for example states that accountability includes oversight, whistle-blowers and journalists. Deeks, ‘Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law’ argues for peer constraint as oversight in international cooperation between intelligence services.45. Müller-Wille, “Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence,” 103.46. The arguments are derived from the main emphasis of the papers. A significant group of authors refers to democratic accountability as a central argument for oversight. Yet, included in the notion of democratic accountability are the elements of effectiveness, legal norms, human rights, public trust, politicisation and legitimacy. Authors referring to democratic accountability as the main argument of oversight is among others Aden, ‘Information sharing, secrecy and trust’; Defty, ‘Educating Parliamentarians about Intelligence’; Dobson, ‘The last forum of accountability?’; Johnson, ‘Accountability and America’s Secret Foreign Policy’; Leigh, ‘Changing the rules of the game’; Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence’; Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence, Democratic Accountability, and the Media’; Jansson, ‘Building resilience, demolishing democracy?’; Segell, ‘Infogate Influence on Reforms’; Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services’; Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services’; Eriksen, ‘Governance Between Expertise and Democracy’; Greenwood and Huismann, Transparency and Accountability; Hardy and Williams, ‘Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies’; Hillebrand, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’; Matei, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization’; Koch, ‘Demokratisk Kontrol med Efterretningstjenesterne [Democratic Control of the Intelligence Services]’; and Born and Johnson, ‘Balancing Operational Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy’.47. Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence’, 103.48. Eijkman and Weggemans, ‘Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas’; Leigh, ‘Changing the rules of the game’; Leigh, ‘Rebalancing rights and national security’; Sirrs, ‘Reforming Egyptian intelligence’; Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight’; and Born and Wetzling, ‘Intelligence Accountability’.49. Gonçalves, ‘The Spies Came from the Tropics’; Martin, ‘The lessons of Eastern Europe’; and Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, ‘New Mechanisms of Independent Accountability’.50. Leigh, “More Closely Watching the Spies”.51. Defty, ‘From committees of parliamentarians to parliamentary committees’; Martin, ‘The lessons of Eastern Europe’; Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence’; Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence Democratic Accountability’; Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, ‘New Mechanisms of Independent Accountability’; Yauri-Miranda, ‘Principles to Assess Accountability’; and Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services’.52. Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable.53. Hillebrand, ‘Placebo Scrutiny?’; Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence’; Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services’; Leigh, ‘Changing the rules of the game’; Leigh, ‘Rebalancing Rights and National Security’; Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight’; Sirrs, ‘Reforming Egyptian Intelligence’; Hughes and Stoddart, ‘Hope and Fear’; and Eijkman and Weggemans, ‘Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas’.54. See Born and Wills, ‘Beyond the Oxymoron’ and Setty, ‘Surveillance, Secrecy and the Search for Meaningful Accountability’ and his discussion of the Section 215 of the Patriot Act; and Koch, ‘Demokratisk Kontrol med Efterretningstjenesterne [Democratic Control of the Intelligence Services]’ and her discussion of the Danish intelligence services’ legal mandates.55. Born and Wetzling, “Intelligence Accountability”.56. Martin, “The lessons of Eastern Europe for modern intelligence reform,” 561.57. Martin, “The lessons of Eastern Europe for modern intelligence reform,” 561.58. For a discussion on public trust in intelligence services in high-trust societies, see Hansen, ‘Offentlighedens tillid til efterretningstjenesterne [Public trust in the intelligence services]’.59. Greenwood and Huisman, Transparency and Accountability, 12.60. Greenwood and Huisman, Transparency and Accountability, 221; and Klaaren, ‘The Judicial Role in Defining National Security’.61. Aden, ‘Information sharing, secrecy and trust’, 983; and Gill, ‘Of intelligence oversight and the challenge of surveillance corporatism’.62. Gill, “Of intelligence oversight and the challenge of surveillance corporatism,” 981.63. Leigh, “Changing the rules of the game,” 955.64. Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable, 15.65. See e.g., Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight’; Müller-Wille, ‘Improving the Democratic Accountability of EU Intelligence’; and Matei, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization’.66. Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization”.67. Defty, “Familiar but not intimate,” 65.68. Matei, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization’, 89; and Born, ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight’.69. Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization”.70. Ibid.71. Quoted in Manjikian, “Two types of intelligence community accountability,” 687.72. Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability,” 56.73. Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services,” 14.74. Johnson, ‘Intelligence shocks, media coverage, and congressional accountability’; Johnson, ‘Congress and the American Experiment’; and Manjikian, ‘Two types of intelligence community accountability’.75. Johnson, “Intelligence shocks, media coverage, and congressional accountability”.76. Johnson, ‘Intelligence shocks, media coverage, and congressional accountability’; Johnson, ‘Congress and the American Experiment’; and Manjikian, ‘Two types of intelligence community accountability’.77. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 52.78. Farson and Whitaker, “Accounting for the Future or the Past?,” 679.79. Peterson and Tjalve, “Intelligence expertise in the age of information sharing”.80. Manjikian, “Two types of intelligence community accountability”.81. Peterson and Tjalve, “Intelligence expertise in the age of information sharing”.82. Manjikian, “Two types of intelligence community accountability,”.83. Manjikian, “Two types of intelligence community accountability,” 687.84. Ibid., 691.85. Leon-Reyes, “Towards a Reflexive Study of Intelligence Accountability,” 1–2.86. See also Kniep et al., ‘Towards democratic intelligence oversight’; Hoffmann, Chalati and Dogan, ‘Rethinking intelligence practices and processes’; and Ben Jaffel et al., ‘Collective Discussion’.87. Hoffmann, Chalati and Dogan, “Rethinking intelligence practices and processes,” 1.88. Klein Goldewijk, ‘Why still critical?’.89. DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’; and Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, The Institutional Logics Perspective.90. Bigo, ‘Shared secrecy in a digital age and a transnational world’; and Ben Jaffel, ‘Britain’s European connection in counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation’.91. Reay and Hinings, ‘The Recomposition of an Organizational Field“.92. Scott, “Conceptualizing Organizational Fields’.93. Lounsbury et al., “New Directions in the Study of Institutional Logics“.94. See e.g., Reay and Hinings, ‘Managing the Rivalry of Competing Institutional Logics’; and Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective;95. Horn, “Logics of Political Secrecy“.96. Ibid., 109.97. Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services“.98. Reay and Jones, “Qualitatively capturing institutional logics“.99. Leon-Reyes, “Towards a Reflexive Study of Intelligence Accountability“.100. Ben Jaffel and Larsson, “Introduction“; and Kniep et al., ‘Towards democratic intelligence oversight’.101. Thompson, “Democratic Secrecy”.102. Kniep et al., ‘Towards democratic intelligence oversight’, 10.103. Ibid.104. See e.g., Cooper and Johnston, ‘Vulgate Accountability’; Hathazy, ‘Fighting for Democratic Police’; Killian, ‘For lack of accountability’; Kuruppu and Lodhia, ‘Shaping Accountability at an NGO’; and Shenkin and Coulson, ‘Accountability through activism’.105. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology.106. Bigo “Shared secrecy in a digital age and a transnational world”.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Carlsberg Foundation under Grant Semper Ardens: AccelerateNotes on contributorsMelanie Sofia HartvigsenMelanie Sofia Hartvigsen is a PhD fellow in the INTELHUB research group at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark.