采用工业4.0的不平等影响:欧洲生产率增长和融合的证据

IF 3.2 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Fabio Lamperti, Katiuscia Lavoratori, Davide Castellani
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Our results suggest that adopting new digital manufacturing technologies of the I4.0 brings quantitatively important and statistically significant contributions to sectoral TFP growth rates, although these are mostly concentrated in countries close to the technology frontier. In turn, these technologies seem to have hampered the process of convergence between European technological leaders and laggards over the last decade.KEYWORDS: Industry 4.0fourth industrial revolutiontechnology diffusiontotal factor productivity (TFP)technological convergenceJEL CLASSIFICATION: O11O33O47 AcknowledgementsWe thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their most constructive and helpful suggestions. The authors are especially grateful to Marco Grazzi and to Eduardo Ibarra-Olivo for their valuable comments and suggestions, and to the participants of the Italian Trade Study Group meeting (Ancona, November 2020) and of the seminar at the Economics Department (University of Perugia, May 2021) for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Their disruptive potential results from their potential for a widespread application across every manufacturing industry due to their ‘versatility and complementarity’ (Eurofound Citation2018, 3). Furthermore, while we already acknowledged the impact I4.0 technologies have on manufacturing operations – e.g. higher operational flexibility, higher production efficiency and quality, lower set-up costs and integration along the value chain, resulting in higher productivity and better performance overall (see also Skilton and Hovsepian Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018) – additional high-level impact resides in the world of work and, in general, the entire society. On the one hand, a general concern around the ‘risks of new monopolies, mass redundancies, spying on workers, and the extension of precarious digital work’ (Davies Citation2015, 9) emerges. On the other hand, this transformation calls for a policy debate on the upcoming changes in the task content and occupational profiles of manufacturing employment (Frey and Osborne Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018).2 In this work, we focus on studies addressing the implications of ‘physical’ I4.0 technology adoption. We stress the difference between ‘physical’ (i.e. capital embodied) and ‘digital’ (i.e. software-related) I4.0 technologies as such characteristic represents a crucial distinction, as also observed by Foster-McGregor, Nomaler, and Verspagen (Citation2019). In so doing, we intentionally avoid a detailed review of studies addressing the productivity implication of I4.0 technology development and innovation (e.g. patenting artificial intelligence; for a recent contribution, see Venturini Citation2022) as this would fall outside the purpose of our research. Notwithstanding, we redirect the reader to recent studies from Czarnitzki, Fernández, and Rammer (Citation2023) and Müller, Fay, and vom Brocke (Citation2018) who explore the productivity effects of ‘digital’ I4.0 technology adoption, i.e. artificial intelligence and big data, respectively.3 This measure is similar to the robot exposure index proposed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020) to measure robot adoption at the local labour market level, used in several empirical studies, and to the import-weighted measures of I4.0 technology production proposed by Felice, Lamperti, and Piscitello (Citation2022) and Venturini (Citation2022).4 This information is computed by matching the 8-digit CN product codes for I4.0-related capital and intermediate goods with the corresponding 8-digit codes in Prodcom classification. In the Prodcom list, the first 4 digits of each product code coincide with the 4-digit NACE sector producing the good (Eurostat Citation2021).5 Data on I4.0 adoption measures (i.e. flows and stocks, aggregate and for each technology) are available upon request.6 We do not use sectoral PPPs, which would enable a more precise comparison across countries and sectors, since these are hardly available for all countries, sectors and years in our analysis. However, this is a lesser concern for our work as by using the within-groups estimator we should be able to filter out cross-country and cross-sector differences in prices.7 Country list: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Netherland (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Sweden (SWE).8 Manufacturing industries list (NACE rev.2): 1 – Food products, beverages and tobacco (10–12); 2 – Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products (13–15); 3 – Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media (16–18); 4 – Coke and refined petroleum products (19); 5 – Chemicals and chemical products (20); 6 – Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21); 7 – Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products (22–23); 8 – Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (24–25); 9 – Computer, electronic and optical products (26); 10 – Electrical equipment (27); 11 – Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); 12 – Transport equipment (29–30); 13 – Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment (31–33).9 See, for instance, Cardona, Kretschmer, and Strobel (Citation2013) and Schweikl and Obermaier (Citation2020) for recent surveys of the literature on ICT and productivity.10 The model described in Section 3 assumes that it is not the identity of the technology frontier that is relevant in Equation (4), but the distance from the frontier itself, capturing the potential for technological catch-up. As the model allows for any country to switch endogenously from being a frontier to a non-frontier country and vice versa, only requiring that the lnDTF term correlates with the potential for technology transfer and productivity gains from catching-up. Thus, in column (8) we test an alternative specification of our model in which we measure lnDTF using the average TFP level for the two countries featuring the highest value as the frontier, and by computing ΔlnAF as the average growth rate between these two countries.11 While such result may be related to the yet mentioned lack of necessary conditions (e.g. a certain level of absorptive capacity) in the case of Slovakia and, to a certain extent, Portugal, the findings for Denmark may relate to the sectoral composition of the country, with a small and decreasing share of manufacturing as compared to services (similarly to other Nordic countries in our sample, i.e. Sweden and Finland).12 We followed Roodman (Citation2009) guidelines in the choice of the number of instruments.13 Computed following the growth accounting approach as described Stehrer et al. (Citation2019).14 According to estimates from Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020), the average price of AIR ranges between 50,000 and 100,000 USD, while the average price for an industrial AM machine is between 200,000 and 250,000 USD according to our computations based on data from all major AM producers worldwide and reported by Senvol. Senvol’s data are available at http://senvol.com/machine-search/. Concerning IIoT, the total cost of deployment greatly varies depending on the sector and on the scale of the project. Using total cost of ownership (TCO) calculator for IoT applications by NOKIA, we estimate cost for a medium-sized factory to range between 1.6mln and 0.8mln USD. NOKIA’s IoT TCO calculator is available at https://pages.nokia.com/T007K9-Compare-Wireless-Critical-Connectivity-Options.","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The unequal implications of Industry 4.0 adoption: evidence on productivity growth and convergence across Europe\",\"authors\":\"Fabio Lamperti, Katiuscia Lavoratori, Davide Castellani\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10438599.2023.2269089\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTDo new manufacturing technologies of the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) boost TFP growth? By adopting a distance-to-frontier framework, this paper explores whether the adoption of (advanced) digital technologies affect the sectoral TFP growth rates across manufacturing industries of 14 European countries, during the period 2009–2019. We rely on a novel measure of adoption of I4.0 technologies (namely, advanced industrial robots, additive manufacturing and industrial internet of things), exploiting highly detailed (8-digit level) information on imports of capital goods embodying such technologies. Our results suggest that adopting new digital manufacturing technologies of the I4.0 brings quantitatively important and statistically significant contributions to sectoral TFP growth rates, although these are mostly concentrated in countries close to the technology frontier. In turn, these technologies seem to have hampered the process of convergence between European technological leaders and laggards over the last decade.KEYWORDS: Industry 4.0fourth industrial revolutiontechnology diffusiontotal factor productivity (TFP)technological convergenceJEL CLASSIFICATION: O11O33O47 AcknowledgementsWe thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their most constructive and helpful suggestions. The authors are especially grateful to Marco Grazzi and to Eduardo Ibarra-Olivo for their valuable comments and suggestions, and to the participants of the Italian Trade Study Group meeting (Ancona, November 2020) and of the seminar at the Economics Department (University of Perugia, May 2021) for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Their disruptive potential results from their potential for a widespread application across every manufacturing industry due to their ‘versatility and complementarity’ (Eurofound Citation2018, 3). Furthermore, while we already acknowledged the impact I4.0 technologies have on manufacturing operations – e.g. higher operational flexibility, higher production efficiency and quality, lower set-up costs and integration along the value chain, resulting in higher productivity and better performance overall (see also Skilton and Hovsepian Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018) – additional high-level impact resides in the world of work and, in general, the entire society. On the one hand, a general concern around the ‘risks of new monopolies, mass redundancies, spying on workers, and the extension of precarious digital work’ (Davies Citation2015, 9) emerges. On the other hand, this transformation calls for a policy debate on the upcoming changes in the task content and occupational profiles of manufacturing employment (Frey and Osborne Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018).2 In this work, we focus on studies addressing the implications of ‘physical’ I4.0 technology adoption. We stress the difference between ‘physical’ (i.e. capital embodied) and ‘digital’ (i.e. software-related) I4.0 technologies as such characteristic represents a crucial distinction, as also observed by Foster-McGregor, Nomaler, and Verspagen (Citation2019). In so doing, we intentionally avoid a detailed review of studies addressing the productivity implication of I4.0 technology development and innovation (e.g. patenting artificial intelligence; for a recent contribution, see Venturini Citation2022) as this would fall outside the purpose of our research. Notwithstanding, we redirect the reader to recent studies from Czarnitzki, Fernández, and Rammer (Citation2023) and Müller, Fay, and vom Brocke (Citation2018) who explore the productivity effects of ‘digital’ I4.0 technology adoption, i.e. artificial intelligence and big data, respectively.3 This measure is similar to the robot exposure index proposed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020) to measure robot adoption at the local labour market level, used in several empirical studies, and to the import-weighted measures of I4.0 technology production proposed by Felice, Lamperti, and Piscitello (Citation2022) and Venturini (Citation2022).4 This information is computed by matching the 8-digit CN product codes for I4.0-related capital and intermediate goods with the corresponding 8-digit codes in Prodcom classification. In the Prodcom list, the first 4 digits of each product code coincide with the 4-digit NACE sector producing the good (Eurostat Citation2021).5 Data on I4.0 adoption measures (i.e. flows and stocks, aggregate and for each technology) are available upon request.6 We do not use sectoral PPPs, which would enable a more precise comparison across countries and sectors, since these are hardly available for all countries, sectors and years in our analysis. However, this is a lesser concern for our work as by using the within-groups estimator we should be able to filter out cross-country and cross-sector differences in prices.7 Country list: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Netherland (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Sweden (SWE).8 Manufacturing industries list (NACE rev.2): 1 – Food products, beverages and tobacco (10–12); 2 – Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products (13–15); 3 – Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media (16–18); 4 – Coke and refined petroleum products (19); 5 – Chemicals and chemical products (20); 6 – Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21); 7 – Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products (22–23); 8 – Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (24–25); 9 – Computer, electronic and optical products (26); 10 – Electrical equipment (27); 11 – Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); 12 – Transport equipment (29–30); 13 – Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment (31–33).9 See, for instance, Cardona, Kretschmer, and Strobel (Citation2013) and Schweikl and Obermaier (Citation2020) for recent surveys of the literature on ICT and productivity.10 The model described in Section 3 assumes that it is not the identity of the technology frontier that is relevant in Equation (4), but the distance from the frontier itself, capturing the potential for technological catch-up. As the model allows for any country to switch endogenously from being a frontier to a non-frontier country and vice versa, only requiring that the lnDTF term correlates with the potential for technology transfer and productivity gains from catching-up. Thus, in column (8) we test an alternative specification of our model in which we measure lnDTF using the average TFP level for the two countries featuring the highest value as the frontier, and by computing ΔlnAF as the average growth rate between these two countries.11 While such result may be related to the yet mentioned lack of necessary conditions (e.g. a certain level of absorptive capacity) in the case of Slovakia and, to a certain extent, Portugal, the findings for Denmark may relate to the sectoral composition of the country, with a small and decreasing share of manufacturing as compared to services (similarly to other Nordic countries in our sample, i.e. Sweden and Finland).12 We followed Roodman (Citation2009) guidelines in the choice of the number of instruments.13 Computed following the growth accounting approach as described Stehrer et al. (Citation2019).14 According to estimates from Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020), the average price of AIR ranges between 50,000 and 100,000 USD, while the average price for an industrial AM machine is between 200,000 and 250,000 USD according to our computations based on data from all major AM producers worldwide and reported by Senvol. Senvol’s data are available at http://senvol.com/machine-search/. Concerning IIoT, the total cost of deployment greatly varies depending on the sector and on the scale of the project. Using total cost of ownership (TCO) calculator for IoT applications by NOKIA, we estimate cost for a medium-sized factory to range between 1.6mln and 0.8mln USD. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

工业4.0的新制造技术是否促进了全要素生产率的增长?通过采用前沿距离框架,本文探讨了(先进)数字技术的采用是否影响了2009-2019年期间14个欧洲国家制造业的部门全要素生产率增长率。我们依靠采用工业4.0技术(即先进的工业机器人、增材制造和工业物联网)的新措施,利用体现这些技术的资本货物进口的非常详细(8位数水平)信息。我们的研究结果表明,采用工业4.0的新型数字制造技术对部门TFP增长率的贡献在数量上和统计上都很重要,尽管这些贡献主要集中在靠近技术前沿的国家。反过来,在过去十年中,这些技术似乎阻碍了欧洲技术领先者和落后者之间的融合进程。关键词:工业4.0第四次工业革命技术扩散全要素生产率(TFP)技术融合分类:O11O33O47致谢我们感谢编辑和两位匿名审稿人提出的最有建设性和有益的建议。作者特别感谢Marco Grazzi和Eduardo Ibarra-Olivo提出的宝贵意见和建议,感谢意大利贸易研究小组会议(2020年11月,安科纳)和经济系研讨会(2021年5月,佩鲁贾大学)的参与者对本文早期版本的评论。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1由于其“多功能性和互补性”,其颠覆性潜力源于其在每个制造业中广泛应用的潜力(Eurofound Citation2018, 3)。此外,虽然我们已经认识到工业4.0技术对制造运营的影响,例如更高的运营灵活性、更高的生产效率和质量、更低的设置成本和价值链整合,导致更高的生产力和更好的整体性能(另见Skilton和Hovsepian Citation2017;Eurofound Citation2018) -其他高水平的影响存在于工作领域,总的来说,整个社会。一方面,人们普遍担心“新的垄断、大规模裁员、对工人的监视以及不稳定数字工作的延伸”(Davies Citation2015, 9)。另一方面,这种转变要求就制造业就业任务内容和职业概况即将发生的变化进行政策辩论(Frey and Osborne citation, 2017;Eurofound Citation2018)。2在这项工作中,我们专注于研究解决“物理”工业4.0技术采用的影响。我们强调“物理”(即资本体现)和“数字”(即与软件相关)工业4.0技术之间的差异,因为这种特征代表了一个关键的区别,正如福斯特-麦格雷戈、诺迈勒和Verspagen (Citation2019)所观察到的那样。在此过程中,我们有意避免详细回顾有关工业4.0技术开发和创新对生产力影响的研究(例如为人工智能申请专利;有关最近的贡献,请参阅文丘里尼引文(2022),因为这超出了我们的研究目的。尽管如此,我们还是将读者引向Czarnitzki, Fernández和Rammer (Citation2023)以及m<s:1> ller, Fay和vom Brocke (Citation2018)的最新研究,他们分别探讨了采用“数字”工业4.0技术(即人工智能和大数据)对生产力的影响这一措施类似于Acemoglu和Restrepo (Citation2020)提出的机器人暴露指数,该指数用于衡量当地劳动力市场层面的机器人采用情况,并在几项实证研究中使用,以及Felice, Lamperti和Piscitello (Citation2022)和Venturini (Citation2022)提出的工业4.0技术生产的进口加权措施此信息是通过将与4.0相关的资本和中间产品的8位数CN产品代码与Prodcom分类中相应的8位数代码进行匹配来计算的。在Prodcom列表中,每个产品代码的前4位数字与生产该产品的4位NACE部门相吻合(Eurostat Citation2021)关于工业4.0采用措施的数据(即流量和库存、合计和每种技术的数据)可应要求提供我们没有使用部门购买力平价,因为在我们的分析中很难获得所有国家、部门和年份的购买力平价,这将使各国和部门之间的比较更加精确。然而,这对我们的工作来说是一个较小的问题,因为通过使用组内估计器,我们应该能够过滤掉跨国和跨部门的价格差异。 7国家名单:奥地利(AUT)、比利时(BEL)、捷克共和国(CZE)、德国(DEU)、丹麦(DNK)、西班牙(ESP)、芬兰(FIN)、法国(FRA)、英国(GBR)、意大利(ITA)、荷兰(NLD)、葡萄牙(PRT)、斯洛伐克共和国(SVK)、瑞典(SWE)制造业清单(NACE rev.2): 1 -食品、饮料和烟草(10-12);2 -纺织品、服装、皮革及相关产品(13-15);3 -木材和纸制品;印刷和复制记录媒体(16-18);4 -焦炭和精炼石油产品(19);5 -化学品和化学产品(20);6 -基本药品和制剂(21);7 .橡胶和塑料制品及其他非金属矿产品(22-23);8 -基本金属和金属制品,机械和设备除外(24-25);9 -计算机、电子和光学产品(26);10 -电气设备(27);11 -新机械和设备(28);12 -运输设备(29-30);13 -其他制造;修理和安装机器和设备(31-33)例如,参见Cardona, Kretschmer, and Strobel (Citation2013)和Schweikl and Obermaier (Citation2020)最近对ICT和生产力的文献调查第3节中描述的模型假设与方程(4)相关的不是技术前沿的身份,而是与前沿本身的距离,从而捕捉到技术追赶的潜力。由于该模型允许任何国家从边界国家内生地转变为非边界国家,反之亦然,只要求lnDTF术语与技术转让的潜力和从追赶中获得的生产力收益相关联。因此,在第(8)列中,我们测试了我们模型的另一种规范,在该规范中,我们使用两个国家的平均TFP水平来衡量lnDTF,这些国家的最高值作为边界,并通过计算ΔlnAF作为这两个国家之间的平均增长率虽然这样的结果可能与斯洛伐克和葡萄牙在一定程度上缺乏必要条件(例如,一定水平的吸收能力)有关,但丹麦的结果可能与该国的部门构成有关,与服务业相比,制造业的份额很小,而且在不断减少(类似于我们样本中的其他北欧国家,即瑞典和芬兰)我们遵循Roodman (Citation2009)指南选择仪器的数量根据Stehrer等人(Citation2019)描述的增长会计方法计算根据Acemoglu和Restrepo (Citation2020)的估计,AIR的平均价格在5万到10万美元之间,而根据我们基于全球所有主要AM生产商的数据和Senvol报告的计算,工业AM机的平均价格在20万到25万美元之间。Senvol的数据可在http://senvol.com/machine-search/上获得。就工业物联网而言,部署的总成本因行业和项目规模的不同而有很大差异。使用诺基亚物联网应用的总拥有成本(TCO)计算器,我们估计中型工厂的成本在160万至80万美元之间。诺基亚的物联网TCO计算器可在https://pages.nokia.com/T007K9-Compare-Wireless-Critical-Connectivity-Options上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The unequal implications of Industry 4.0 adoption: evidence on productivity growth and convergence across Europe
ABSTRACTDo new manufacturing technologies of the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) boost TFP growth? By adopting a distance-to-frontier framework, this paper explores whether the adoption of (advanced) digital technologies affect the sectoral TFP growth rates across manufacturing industries of 14 European countries, during the period 2009–2019. We rely on a novel measure of adoption of I4.0 technologies (namely, advanced industrial robots, additive manufacturing and industrial internet of things), exploiting highly detailed (8-digit level) information on imports of capital goods embodying such technologies. Our results suggest that adopting new digital manufacturing technologies of the I4.0 brings quantitatively important and statistically significant contributions to sectoral TFP growth rates, although these are mostly concentrated in countries close to the technology frontier. In turn, these technologies seem to have hampered the process of convergence between European technological leaders and laggards over the last decade.KEYWORDS: Industry 4.0fourth industrial revolutiontechnology diffusiontotal factor productivity (TFP)technological convergenceJEL CLASSIFICATION: O11O33O47 AcknowledgementsWe thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their most constructive and helpful suggestions. The authors are especially grateful to Marco Grazzi and to Eduardo Ibarra-Olivo for their valuable comments and suggestions, and to the participants of the Italian Trade Study Group meeting (Ancona, November 2020) and of the seminar at the Economics Department (University of Perugia, May 2021) for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Their disruptive potential results from their potential for a widespread application across every manufacturing industry due to their ‘versatility and complementarity’ (Eurofound Citation2018, 3). Furthermore, while we already acknowledged the impact I4.0 technologies have on manufacturing operations – e.g. higher operational flexibility, higher production efficiency and quality, lower set-up costs and integration along the value chain, resulting in higher productivity and better performance overall (see also Skilton and Hovsepian Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018) – additional high-level impact resides in the world of work and, in general, the entire society. On the one hand, a general concern around the ‘risks of new monopolies, mass redundancies, spying on workers, and the extension of precarious digital work’ (Davies Citation2015, 9) emerges. On the other hand, this transformation calls for a policy debate on the upcoming changes in the task content and occupational profiles of manufacturing employment (Frey and Osborne Citation2017; Eurofound Citation2018).2 In this work, we focus on studies addressing the implications of ‘physical’ I4.0 technology adoption. We stress the difference between ‘physical’ (i.e. capital embodied) and ‘digital’ (i.e. software-related) I4.0 technologies as such characteristic represents a crucial distinction, as also observed by Foster-McGregor, Nomaler, and Verspagen (Citation2019). In so doing, we intentionally avoid a detailed review of studies addressing the productivity implication of I4.0 technology development and innovation (e.g. patenting artificial intelligence; for a recent contribution, see Venturini Citation2022) as this would fall outside the purpose of our research. Notwithstanding, we redirect the reader to recent studies from Czarnitzki, Fernández, and Rammer (Citation2023) and Müller, Fay, and vom Brocke (Citation2018) who explore the productivity effects of ‘digital’ I4.0 technology adoption, i.e. artificial intelligence and big data, respectively.3 This measure is similar to the robot exposure index proposed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020) to measure robot adoption at the local labour market level, used in several empirical studies, and to the import-weighted measures of I4.0 technology production proposed by Felice, Lamperti, and Piscitello (Citation2022) and Venturini (Citation2022).4 This information is computed by matching the 8-digit CN product codes for I4.0-related capital and intermediate goods with the corresponding 8-digit codes in Prodcom classification. In the Prodcom list, the first 4 digits of each product code coincide with the 4-digit NACE sector producing the good (Eurostat Citation2021).5 Data on I4.0 adoption measures (i.e. flows and stocks, aggregate and for each technology) are available upon request.6 We do not use sectoral PPPs, which would enable a more precise comparison across countries and sectors, since these are hardly available for all countries, sectors and years in our analysis. However, this is a lesser concern for our work as by using the within-groups estimator we should be able to filter out cross-country and cross-sector differences in prices.7 Country list: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Netherland (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Sweden (SWE).8 Manufacturing industries list (NACE rev.2): 1 – Food products, beverages and tobacco (10–12); 2 – Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products (13–15); 3 – Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media (16–18); 4 – Coke and refined petroleum products (19); 5 – Chemicals and chemical products (20); 6 – Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21); 7 – Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products (22–23); 8 – Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (24–25); 9 – Computer, electronic and optical products (26); 10 – Electrical equipment (27); 11 – Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); 12 – Transport equipment (29–30); 13 – Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment (31–33).9 See, for instance, Cardona, Kretschmer, and Strobel (Citation2013) and Schweikl and Obermaier (Citation2020) for recent surveys of the literature on ICT and productivity.10 The model described in Section 3 assumes that it is not the identity of the technology frontier that is relevant in Equation (4), but the distance from the frontier itself, capturing the potential for technological catch-up. As the model allows for any country to switch endogenously from being a frontier to a non-frontier country and vice versa, only requiring that the lnDTF term correlates with the potential for technology transfer and productivity gains from catching-up. Thus, in column (8) we test an alternative specification of our model in which we measure lnDTF using the average TFP level for the two countries featuring the highest value as the frontier, and by computing ΔlnAF as the average growth rate between these two countries.11 While such result may be related to the yet mentioned lack of necessary conditions (e.g. a certain level of absorptive capacity) in the case of Slovakia and, to a certain extent, Portugal, the findings for Denmark may relate to the sectoral composition of the country, with a small and decreasing share of manufacturing as compared to services (similarly to other Nordic countries in our sample, i.e. Sweden and Finland).12 We followed Roodman (Citation2009) guidelines in the choice of the number of instruments.13 Computed following the growth accounting approach as described Stehrer et al. (Citation2019).14 According to estimates from Acemoglu and Restrepo (Citation2020), the average price of AIR ranges between 50,000 and 100,000 USD, while the average price for an industrial AM machine is between 200,000 and 250,000 USD according to our computations based on data from all major AM producers worldwide and reported by Senvol. Senvol’s data are available at http://senvol.com/machine-search/. Concerning IIoT, the total cost of deployment greatly varies depending on the sector and on the scale of the project. Using total cost of ownership (TCO) calculator for IoT applications by NOKIA, we estimate cost for a medium-sized factory to range between 1.6mln and 0.8mln USD. NOKIA’s IoT TCO calculator is available at https://pages.nokia.com/T007K9-Compare-Wireless-Critical-Connectivity-Options.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
3.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Economics of Innovation and New Technology is devoted to the theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants and effects of innovation, new technology and technological knowledge. The journal aims to provide a bridge between different strands of literature and different contributions of economic theory and empirical economics. This bridge is built in two ways. First, by encouraging empirical research (including case studies, econometric work and historical research), evaluating existing economic theory, and suggesting appropriate directions for future effort in theoretical work. Second, by exploring ways of applying and testing existing areas of theory to the economics of innovation and new technology, and ways of using theoretical insights to inform data collection and other empirical research. The journal welcomes contributions across a wide range of issues concerned with innovation, including: the generation of new technological knowledge, innovation in product markets, process innovation, patenting, adoption, diffusion, innovation and technology policy, international competitiveness, standardization and network externalities, innovation and growth, technology transfer, innovation and market structure, innovation and the environment, and across a broad range of economic activity not just in ‘high technology’ areas. The journal is open to a variety of methodological approaches ranging from case studies to econometric exercises with sound theoretical modelling, empirical evidence both longitudinal and cross-sectional about technologies, regions, firms, industries and countries.
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