Sustaining Democracy: What We Owe to the Other Side

Sustaining Democracy is Robert Talisse’s well-argued follow-up to his previous book, Overdoing Democracy. Talisse has argued that American political polarization endangers democracy. The problem occurs when Americans allow their politics to become their identity and, in doing so, lose crosscutting identities, religious, familial, and civic. We not only lose the intrinsic value of those identities; we overdo democracy, and make it worse.In Sustaining Democracy, Talisse explores the political mindset that can sustain a democratic society. How must a citizen regard her opponents? The requisite attitude requires facing up to what Talisse calls the democrat’s dilemma. This is “the tension between the moral requirement to recognize the equality of political opponents and the moral directive to pursue and promote political justice” (4). This state of mind means allowing injustice to win for a time. If citizens do not allow injustice to rule, they must reject the political equality of their opponents. Our opponents see justice differently than we do. They sometimes win elections. If we insist on our own vision of justice, we will want to restrict the political equality of others. So, democratic citizens either allow injustice or violate political equality. What do we do?Talisse argues that sustaining democracy involves honoring political equality. The good citizen must recognize political equality and his biases about justice. Bearing both in mind, the good citizen can allow injustice to prevail for a time. And in doing so, he honors his opponents and sustains democracy with them.Many people fear that we must sometimes suspend democracy to promote justice, but if people are political equals, we cannot do this. Not always.Chapter 1 stresses that democracy involves political equality: politics is how equal persons govern themselves together. So democracy is a moral proposal, not merely a practical one. Citizens have to see others as part of a collective project, which means everyone gets an equal say. Indeed, they are entitled to one. That does not mean one must give in to their opponents’ views, only honor them in the democratic process. There is no complicity in injustice here. Citizens acknowledge a moral burden to discharge their civic duties to promote justice. Nonetheless, chapter 2 explains why democracy requires letting the opposition govern.Chapter 3 shows how belief polarization can exacerbate the democrat’s dilemma. Talisse suggests ways to overcome belief polarization. If Reba resists belief polarization, she can see the values and views she shared with others. Reba’s reflections may reduce her temptation to view political losses as disastrous. So she must scrutinize her own political thinking to locate her biases and correct them where she can (especially biases that lead her to delegitimize electoral victories). The belief that others misunderstand justice does not undermine the legitimacy of an election.Chapter 4 explores strategies to engage those with competing partisan loyalties. These forms of engagement are helpful but not adequate to sustain democratic politics. Indeed, some forms of political engagement can degrade the polity. Talisse invites readers to recognize that they have belief polarization and should respond by engaging reasonable criticisms of their political opinions.The second solution to belief polarization involves putting “political distance” between ourselves and other citizens. Citizens should sometimes step back from political participation, even retreat into social “solitude” on political matters. In the epilogue, Talisse stresses what citizens owe the other side of the political aisle: to become a more moral and effective political opponent.Talisse’s book is a work of public philosophy. Readers should not expect Talisse to engage every objection a professional democratic theorist might offer. But one can still raise concerns.I find Talisse’s articulation of the democrat’s dilemma illuminating. Democratic citizenship does require balancing two moral considerations: that we are right about justice and that others are our political equals. The tension resolves only if citizens allow those with incorrect views about justice to prevail. At least for an election cycle.True, grave injustices might entail restricting democracy. If a democratic president wins election by promising genocide, someone should stop the public from electing him. But in democratic politics, this scenario is rarer than often thought. Talisse argues that people are often mistaken about why others believe as they do, and in many cases, they simply do not know what they believe. One can impute false arguments and motives to them, making our opponents seem scary. The democrat’s dilemma creates genuine cognitive dissonance. But to honor our opponents, we must learn to live in that state of mind. Otherwise, we will undermine, rather than sustain, democratic institutions.The democrat’s dilemma generalizes to other features of open societies. Liberal societies face a related free speech dilemma. Others engage in offensive and immoral speech, but citizens allow it for the sake of other social goods. Markets raise a similar challenge. People may buy and sell goods some dislike. But if citizens want to honor one another’s property rights, even in a mixed economy, they must show forbearance. So, in one way, the dilemma Talisse identifies arises in many contexts, which Talisse might have acknowledged. His argument strengthens if the dilemma is a kind of familiar cognitive tension.I would not characterize the democrat’s dilemma as concerned primarily with disagreements about justice. The dilemma arises for other disagreements. Some citizens might not think about politics within a justice framework. Some Christians believe the Gospel means politics should transcend justice: public policy should focus on care, mercy, and grace. But these Christians will encounter a similar democrat’s dilemma.In Talisse’s defense, claims of justice might have unique properties. Injustice provokes emotional responses and actions in ways that other disagreements do not. Justice must be done. And when someone commits an injustice, citizens must spring into action. Many social philosophers have recognized this, and so, if we want to defend Talisse, one can argue that injustice renders the dilemma acute.The reader need also consider a broader array of responses to the democrat’s dilemma than Talisse offers. Imagine you find Roe v. Wade just. But you also know that when judges decide contentious issues, they distort our politics. People will vote for otherwise odious politicians based on judicial nominees alone and so ignore other vital issues.Citizens face the democrat’s dilemma in the near term: sometimes a pro-life or pro-choice president will win, and their judges prevail. But one might argue that the democrat’s dilemma dissolves at the federal level if the public decentralizes abortion policy. Citizens can set abortion aside in national elections, and neither side must convince themselves to tolerate an unjust abortion regime. They relocate the dispute to states, which contain more internal consensus on the issue. This is not odd. Democratic societies often decentralize political decisions to resolve conflicts.One might take issue with another matter—namely, Talisse’s focus on personal ethics. Yes, citizens must face the tension between true justice and respect for political equality. And yes, they must learn to live with it. But most people’s ordinary attitudes will not change by reflecting on the democrat’s dilemma. Talisse knows that social factors determine our political attitudes. In light of this, I found it a bit odd that Talisse’s recommendations focus so much on the individual. If the reader buys Talisse’s arguments, she may still find it too challenging to resist tribal forces. Her environment must change to ensure she can develop the necessary mindset.Here Talisse can again recommend that we develop crosscutting identities. Then we can free ourselves from tribalism if we affiliate with another one of our groups. That’s good advice. But I still worry that unilateral action lacks proper realism. Theorists and policy makers must also examine institutional reforms that improve democracy, such as adopting electoral procedures that generate more than two parties. With three or more options, people might develop more nuanced political attitudes. This and other suggestions can add up. The implication is that these institutional reforms may sustain democracy far better than individual action.Talisse’s sage advice may become practical only if it accompanies institutional reforms. Yes, perhaps one must begin with attitude change. But I am not sure. Some polarization-reducing and trust-raising reforms may work even in the current political environment.Some argue that campaign finance reform can reduce polarization. Agenda setters in legislatures engage in negative agenda setting: preventing votes, often to benefit donors and friends. With negative agenda setting, legislatures can resolve disputes through deliberation and voting. They cannot vote on legislation that addresses pressing social problems.But negative agenda setting is not (yet) a polarized issue. Indeed, few people know about it. But reforms here could greatly improve the democratic process.I agree with Talisse’s solution. But Talisse overemphasizes disagreement about justice, and his solution places excess weight on personal ethics. Nonetheless, Sustaining Democracy is an insightful, clear work from a seasoned democratic theorist with much to teach the reflective democratic public.