{"title":"属性的披露和定价","authors":"Alex Smolin","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12451","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.","PeriodicalId":2,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Disclosure and pricing of attributes\",\"authors\":\"Alex Smolin\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1756-2171.12451\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":2,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12451\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12451","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.
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