新西兰情报界和影响行动:秘密行动的困境

IF 0.8 3区社会学 Q1 HISTORY

Intelligence and National Security Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI:10.1080/02684527.2023.2274142

Murray Place, Rhys Ball

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Supported by 2022 research which surveyed New Zealand public perceptions of the NZIC and the tolerances of Effects Operations, we seek to establish, through an examination of Covert Action policy amongst Five Eyes partners and New Zealand intelligence literature, an understanding of a working definition of Effects Operations, and show that despite previous thinking linked to ethical challenges related to the conduct of such activity, the wider New Zealand public is likely to be supportive of some form of NZIC Effects Operations mandate in the service of national security policy goals. This research thus further reinforces recent independent assessments that the current NZIC legislation, the 2017 Intelligence and Security Act, is not completely fit for purpose and remains overly restrictive in a way that limits future policy options like Effects Operations and needs to be further considered. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.2. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.3. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 249.4. R George, Intelligence and Strategy, 2013, 156; see also, Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” 2013, 678–93,; DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities” 2019,; Erwin, “Covert Action: Legislative Background,” 2013,; Cormac et al.,, “What Constitutes Successful Covert Action?” 2022, 111–28,; Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black” 2018,: 477–94,; Cormac, ”Disruption and Deniable Interventionism” 2017, 169–91,; Warner, ‘A Matter of Trust’, 2019, 33–42.5. Christopher Andrew, The Secret World, 2018, 690.6. Ibid., 690–91.7. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Chapter 8.9. Ibid., 263.10. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.11. Ibid., 487–88.12. Ibid., 488.13. Ibid., 480; Joseph and Poznansky, “Media Technology, Covert Action,” 2018, 320–35.14. Cormac and Aldrich, Grey Is the New Black; see also, Graphika and Stanford, ‘Unheard Voice’, 2022.15. Grey Zone activity is contemporary terminology for activity short of warfare. Covert Action is an activity within the theory of the Grey Zone.16. Monaghan, “Bad Idea,” 2021.17. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 2016, 3–14; Intelligence and Security Act 2017.18. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84; Gee and Patman, ‘Small State or Minor Power?’, 2021, 38.19. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84.20. Intelligence and Security Act 2017.21. Ibid.22. Gilbert and Elley, “Shaved Heads and Sonnenrads,” 2020, 280–94; Rogers, “Extraditing Kim Dotcom,” 2015, 46–57; Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial”; Smith, “The Urgent Versus the Important,” 2019, 13–37; Gillespie and Breen, “The Security Intelligence Agencies,” 2021, 676–95.23. Brady, “Magic Weapons,” 2017, 43.24. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2021,” 2021, 35.25. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 2019, 45.26. Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002.27. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, pt. 10.28. Ibid.; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, chap. 2.5.29. The creation of the NZSIS was largely influenced by successive reports by the Director-Generals of both MI5, in 1948, and ASIO, in 1956, out of concerns regarding the unchecked Soviet influence within New Zealand.30. Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 2012.31. Rogers, “Intelligence and Security Act,” 2018, 657–92; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 100.32. Hunt, Spies and Revolutionaries“, 2007;Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” chap. 6.33. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand.”34. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969.35. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Evolving Nature of the NZSIS’s Tasks”36. Battersby and Ball, “The Phantom Eye: New Zealand and the five eyes“, 9.37. Tonkin-Covell, “The Collectors,” 2000.38. Filer, ‘Signals Intelligence in New Zealand’, 2019, 2.39. Known then as the New Zealand Security Service.40. Filer, “Signals Intelligence in New Zealand,” 3.41. Ibid., 5–6.42. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8.43. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8A(b).44. Satter and Bing, “FBI says it has sabotaged hacking tool,” 10 May 2023.45. Kitteridge, “Review of Compliance,” 2013.46. Intelligence and Security Committee Amendment Act 2013, sec. 9.47. The legislative gaps for espionage, foreign interference and terrorism are what this report is referring to. Noting that the Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002 amendments post-Lynn Mall attack had not been made at the time of the Cullen-Reddy Report.48. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 13 and 16.49. Review of ISA 2017, 2023, 213.50. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 16(c).51. US Code: Title 50 § 3093, United States.52. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.53. Ibid., 4.54. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 263.55. Intelligence Services Act 1994.56. Ibid.57. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1(b).58. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 492.59. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1.60. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(1)(a).61. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(2).62. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 6(1)(e).63. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).64. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).65. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 2018.66. Hanson and Uren, 6–8; and Australian Signals Directorate, REDSPICE, 6.67. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 7(e)(ii).68. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 9.69. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, sec. 17(2).70. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, pts. III; Division 3.71. Chubb, “Perceptions of terrorism in Australia: 1978–2019,” 2020.72. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’, 2020, 2.73. Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act 1985, sec. 12.1.74. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’.75. Ibid., 2.76. Cooper, “Indian Consulate networks targeting Sikhs in Vancouver continued ‘unabated’ when Ottawa gutted CSIS probe in 2017,” 2023.77. Ibid.78. Communications Security Establishment Act 2019, sec. 19.79. Ibid., sec. 30.80. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 36.81. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020.82. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 45.83. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 47.84. Patman and Southgate, ‘National Security and Surveillance’.85. The survey was distributed among the social network of the researchers and on a popular New Zealand-based intelligence and defence-focused Instagram page – Instagram: Alcon.S2 with a following of over 25,000 subscribers – as well as some Facebook community groups to seek as random a New Zealand population distribution as possible.86. The inference development model findings provided an additional avenue for the research. Two follow-up questionnaires were given to key individuals identified from their initial responses to survey questions based on two distinct themes identified in the survey’s comments; 1) that the NZIC needs to improve the transparency of information with the New Zealand public and 2) the NZDF should be solely responsible for intelligence and Covert Action. Fifteen identified respondents were provided with the option of a face-to-face interview or the submission of a written questionnaire response. All opted for the latter.87. The survey achieved a gender split of 56.23 per cent Male and 42.71 per cent Female, with 1.06 per cent Other. According to information from the 2018 New Zealand Census, the age distribution found within the survey results is also similar in demographic to the New Zealand population. See Statistics NZ, ‘Age Distribution of People Residing in New Zealand’, 2020. It is also acknowledged that not all results total to the n = 1021 figure. Respondents were not forced to answer all questions if they did not wish to.88. Ipsos, ‘2022 National Security Public Survey’, 2022.89. Hampton, ‘Speech: Cyber Security in a COVID-19 World’, 2020; International Cyber Policy Centre, ‘Covid-19 Disinformation’, 2020; Jordan, “International Competition,” 2020, 1–24; Mueller III, ‘Investigation Into Russian Interference’, 2019; Ryan et al., ‘TikTok and WeChat’, 2020; Thomas and Zhang, ‘COVID-19 Attracts Patriotic Troll Campaigns’, 2020.90. Active Measures is synonymous with Targeted Disinformation and is a Covert Operation/Action in its own right.91. Rid, Active Measures”, 2020, 11.92. Person A, “Questionnaire Response A,” 2022.93. A potential source of bias for these questions was the recent Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which commenced in February 2022. However, due to the high levels of New Zealand public support for Ukraine and the mission by the NZDF to train Ukrainian troops in the United Kingdom, the argument could be made that these responses indicate a level of New Zealand understanding as to the likely utilisation for future NZIC-led paramilitary operations.94. Roberts, “State preferences,” 2020, 502.95. Curia Market Research, “Security Issues Poll,” 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016.96. Ibid.97. Ibid.98. Patman and Southgate, “National Security and Surveillance,” 2016, 871–87.99. The stated objective was to provide a better understanding of domestic views and attitudes to national security risks and a sample size of just over 1100 was collected. For New Zealanders in 2022, the key national security threat is natural disasters, while the least likely to happen is ‘New Zealand being involved in armed conflict with another country’. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2022, 4, 6, 19, 49.100. Ibid., 12, 31.101. Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, ‘The Royal Commission of Inquiry’, 2020.102. Person B, “Questionnaire Response B,” 2022.103. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.104. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2023, 30.105. Ibid., 34.106. Arnold and Matanuku, Taumaru: Protecting Aotearoa New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society, 2023, 248.107. US Code: Title 50 (United States of America).108. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 4; Kibbe, ‘Covert Action and the Pentagon’, 2007.109. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.110. The authors also separate Covert Action in support of military operations because, in this situation, the military remains in ultimate control over the operation.111. National Security Long-term Insights Briefing, 2023, 4.112. Fisher, “National security not as safe now,” 2023.113. Arnold and Matanuku, 214.114. Ibid., 211.115. Ibid., 211–12.116. Blyth, “Building Trust and Confidence,” 2023, 7.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMurray PlaceMurray Place is a former serving member of the Australian Defence Force and has previously served as an officer in the New South Wales Police Force, where he worked in a covert operational role within the State Intelligence Command, focusing on Counter Terrorism and Major Crime. He holds a Master of International Security (Intelligence) from Massey University, New Zealand.Rhys BallRhys Ball is a former intelligence officer with the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service now lecturing at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Albany Campus, New Zealand. He is a member of the New Zealand Institute of Intelligence Professionals (NZIIP) and US Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO).","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"28 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The New Zealand intelligence community and effects operations: the covert action dilemma\",\"authors\":\"Murray Place, Rhys Ball\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02684527.2023.2274142\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTBounded by current legislation, the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) is explicitly limited from conducting any form of Covert Action, or what is increasingly being called within New Zealand, Effects Operations. This article aims to understand whether this policy remains both operationally fit for purpose and consistent with the New Zealand public’s understanding and expectations in a time of significant geopolitical and domestic security uncertainty. Supported by 2022 research which surveyed New Zealand public perceptions of the NZIC and the tolerances of Effects Operations, we seek to establish, through an examination of Covert Action policy amongst Five Eyes partners and New Zealand intelligence literature, an understanding of a working definition of Effects Operations, and show that despite previous thinking linked to ethical challenges related to the conduct of such activity, the wider New Zealand public is likely to be supportive of some form of NZIC Effects Operations mandate in the service of national security policy goals. This research thus further reinforces recent independent assessments that the current NZIC legislation, the 2017 Intelligence and Security Act, is not completely fit for purpose and remains overly restrictive in a way that limits future policy options like Effects Operations and needs to be further considered. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.2. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.3. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 249.4. R George, Intelligence and Strategy, 2013, 156; see also, Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” 2013, 678–93,; DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities” 2019,; Erwin, “Covert Action: Legislative Background,” 2013,; Cormac et al.,, “What Constitutes Successful Covert Action?” 2022, 111–28,; Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black” 2018,: 477–94,; Cormac, ”Disruption and Deniable Interventionism” 2017, 169–91,; Warner, ‘A Matter of Trust’, 2019, 33–42.5. Christopher Andrew, The Secret World, 2018, 690.6. Ibid., 690–91.7. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Chapter 8.9. Ibid., 263.10. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.11. Ibid., 487–88.12. Ibid., 488.13. Ibid., 480; Joseph and Poznansky, “Media Technology, Covert Action,” 2018, 320–35.14. Cormac and Aldrich, Grey Is the New Black; see also, Graphika and Stanford, ‘Unheard Voice’, 2022.15. Grey Zone activity is contemporary terminology for activity short of warfare. Covert Action is an activity within the theory of the Grey Zone.16. Monaghan, “Bad Idea,” 2021.17. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 2016, 3–14; Intelligence and Security Act 2017.18. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84; Gee and Patman, ‘Small State or Minor Power?’, 2021, 38.19. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84.20. Intelligence and Security Act 2017.21. Ibid.22. Gilbert and Elley, “Shaved Heads and Sonnenrads,” 2020, 280–94; Rogers, “Extraditing Kim Dotcom,” 2015, 46–57; Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial”; Smith, “The Urgent Versus the Important,” 2019, 13–37; Gillespie and Breen, “The Security Intelligence Agencies,” 2021, 676–95.23. Brady, “Magic Weapons,” 2017, 43.24. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2021,” 2021, 35.25. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 2019, 45.26. Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002.27. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, pt. 10.28. Ibid.; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, chap. 2.5.29. The creation of the NZSIS was largely influenced by successive reports by the Director-Generals of both MI5, in 1948, and ASIO, in 1956, out of concerns regarding the unchecked Soviet influence within New Zealand.30. Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 2012.31. Rogers, “Intelligence and Security Act,” 2018, 657–92; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 100.32. Hunt, Spies and Revolutionaries“, 2007;Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” chap. 6.33. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand.”34. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969.35. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Evolving Nature of the NZSIS’s Tasks”36. Battersby and Ball, “The Phantom Eye: New Zealand and the five eyes“, 9.37. Tonkin-Covell, “The Collectors,” 2000.38. Filer, ‘Signals Intelligence in New Zealand’, 2019, 2.39. Known then as the New Zealand Security Service.40. Filer, “Signals Intelligence in New Zealand,” 3.41. Ibid., 5–6.42. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8.43. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8A(b).44. Satter and Bing, “FBI says it has sabotaged hacking tool,” 10 May 2023.45. Kitteridge, “Review of Compliance,” 2013.46. Intelligence and Security Committee Amendment Act 2013, sec. 9.47. The legislative gaps for espionage, foreign interference and terrorism are what this report is referring to. Noting that the Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002 amendments post-Lynn Mall attack had not been made at the time of the Cullen-Reddy Report.48. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 13 and 16.49. Review of ISA 2017, 2023, 213.50. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 16(c).51. US Code: Title 50 § 3093, United States.52. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.53. Ibid., 4.54. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 263.55. Intelligence Services Act 1994.56. Ibid.57. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1(b).58. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 492.59. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1.60. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(1)(a).61. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(2).62. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 6(1)(e).63. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).64. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).65. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 2018.66. Hanson and Uren, 6–8; and Australian Signals Directorate, REDSPICE, 6.67. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 7(e)(ii).68. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 9.69. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, sec. 17(2).70. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, pts. III; Division 3.71. Chubb, “Perceptions of terrorism in Australia: 1978–2019,” 2020.72. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’, 2020, 2.73. Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act 1985, sec. 12.1.74. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’.75. Ibid., 2.76. Cooper, “Indian Consulate networks targeting Sikhs in Vancouver continued ‘unabated’ when Ottawa gutted CSIS probe in 2017,” 2023.77. Ibid.78. Communications Security Establishment Act 2019, sec. 19.79. Ibid., sec. 30.80. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 36.81. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020.82. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 45.83. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 47.84. Patman and Southgate, ‘National Security and Surveillance’.85. The survey was distributed among the social network of the researchers and on a popular New Zealand-based intelligence and defence-focused Instagram page – Instagram: Alcon.S2 with a following of over 25,000 subscribers – as well as some Facebook community groups to seek as random a New Zealand population distribution as possible.86. The inference development model findings provided an additional avenue for the research. Two follow-up questionnaires were given to key individuals identified from their initial responses to survey questions based on two distinct themes identified in the survey’s comments; 1) that the NZIC needs to improve the transparency of information with the New Zealand public and 2) the NZDF should be solely responsible for intelligence and Covert Action. Fifteen identified respondents were provided with the option of a face-to-face interview or the submission of a written questionnaire response. All opted for the latter.87. The survey achieved a gender split of 56.23 per cent Male and 42.71 per cent Female, with 1.06 per cent Other. According to information from the 2018 New Zealand Census, the age distribution found within the survey results is also similar in demographic to the New Zealand population. See Statistics NZ, ‘Age Distribution of People Residing in New Zealand’, 2020. It is also acknowledged that not all results total to the n = 1021 figure. Respondents were not forced to answer all questions if they did not wish to.88. Ipsos, ‘2022 National Security Public Survey’, 2022.89. Hampton, ‘Speech: Cyber Security in a COVID-19 World’, 2020; International Cyber Policy Centre, ‘Covid-19 Disinformation’, 2020; Jordan, “International Competition,” 2020, 1–24; Mueller III, ‘Investigation Into Russian Interference’, 2019; Ryan et al., ‘TikTok and WeChat’, 2020; Thomas and Zhang, ‘COVID-19 Attracts Patriotic Troll Campaigns’, 2020.90. Active Measures is synonymous with Targeted Disinformation and is a Covert Operation/Action in its own right.91. Rid, Active Measures”, 2020, 11.92. Person A, “Questionnaire Response A,” 2022.93. A potential source of bias for these questions was the recent Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which commenced in February 2022. However, due to the high levels of New Zealand public support for Ukraine and the mission by the NZDF to train Ukrainian troops in the United Kingdom, the argument could be made that these responses indicate a level of New Zealand understanding as to the likely utilisation for future NZIC-led paramilitary operations.94. Roberts, “State preferences,” 2020, 502.95. Curia Market Research, “Security Issues Poll,” 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016.96. Ibid.97. Ibid.98. Patman and Southgate, “National Security and Surveillance,” 2016, 871–87.99. The stated objective was to provide a better understanding of domestic views and attitudes to national security risks and a sample size of just over 1100 was collected. For New Zealanders in 2022, the key national security threat is natural disasters, while the least likely to happen is ‘New Zealand being involved in armed conflict with another country’. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2022, 4, 6, 19, 49.100. Ibid., 12, 31.101. Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, ‘The Royal Commission of Inquiry’, 2020.102. Person B, “Questionnaire Response B,” 2022.103. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.104. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2023, 30.105. Ibid., 34.106. Arnold and Matanuku, Taumaru: Protecting Aotearoa New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society, 2023, 248.107. US Code: Title 50 (United States of America).108. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 4; Kibbe, ‘Covert Action and the Pentagon’, 2007.109. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.110. The authors also separate Covert Action in support of military operations because, in this situation, the military remains in ultimate control over the operation.111. National Security Long-term Insights Briefing, 2023, 4.112. Fisher, “National security not as safe now,” 2023.113. Arnold and Matanuku, 214.114. Ibid., 211.115. Ibid., 211–12.116. Blyth, “Building Trust and Confidence,” 2023, 7.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMurray PlaceMurray Place is a former serving member of the Australian Defence Force and has previously served as an officer in the New South Wales Police Force, where he worked in a covert operational role within the State Intelligence Command, focusing on Counter Terrorism and Major Crime. He holds a Master of International Security (Intelligence) from Massey University, New Zealand.Rhys BallRhys Ball is a former intelligence officer with the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service now lecturing at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Albany Campus, New Zealand. He is a member of the New Zealand Institute of Intelligence Professionals (NZIIP) and US Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO).\",\"PeriodicalId\":47048,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Intelligence and National Security\",\"volume\":\"28 8\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Intelligence and National Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2274142\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Intelligence and National Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2274142","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}

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摘要

摘要受现行立法的限制，新西兰情报界(NZIC)被明确限制进行任何形式的秘密行动，或者在新西兰越来越多地被称为“影响行动”。本文旨在了解在地缘政治和国内安全存在重大不确定性的情况下，这一政策在操作上是否符合目的，是否符合新西兰公众的理解和期望。2022年的一项研究调查了新西兰公众对NZIC的看法和对效果行动的容忍程度，我们试图通过对五眼合作伙伴之间的秘密行动政策和新西兰情报文献的审查，建立对效果行动工作定义的理解，并表明尽管之前的想法与此类活动的行为相关的道德挑战有关，更广泛的新西兰公众可能会支持某种形式的NZIC影响行动授权，为国家安全政策目标服务。因此，这项研究进一步强化了最近的独立评估，即目前的NZIC立法，即2017年的情报和安全法，并不完全符合目的，并且在某种程度上仍然过于严格，限制了未来的政策选择，如影响操作，需要进一步考虑。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰。罗杰斯和莫兹利，《拨动拨号盘》，2021.3。《情报:从秘密到政策》，第249.4页。R George，《情报与战略》，2013,156;另见Alan Breakspear，《智能的新定义》，2013，第678-93页;迪瓦恩，《秘密行动和秘密活动》，2019;Erwin，《秘密行动:立法背景》，2013;Cormac等人，《成功的秘密行动是什么?》“2022,111-28，;科马克和奥尔德里奇，《灰色生活》(Grey Is the New Black) 2018，第477-94页;科马克，“破坏与可否认的干预主义”，2017,169-91;华纳，《信任问题》，2019,33-42.5。克里斯托弗·安德鲁，《秘密世界》，2018年，690.6。出处同上,690 - 91.7。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》《情报:从秘密到政策》，第8.9章。如上,263.10。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》出处同上,487 - 88.12。如上,488.13。出处同上,480;Joseph和Poznansky，“媒体技术，秘密行动”，2018,320-35.14。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》;另见Graphika和Stanford，《未被听到的声音》，2022.15。灰色地带活动是指战争以外的活动。秘密行动是灰色地带理论中的一种活动。莫纳汉，《坏主意》，2021.17。Cullen和Reddy，“情报与安全”，2016,3-14;《2017.18情报与安全法》卡伦和雷迪，《情报与安全》，83-84页;吉和帕特曼，“小国还是小国?”， 2021, 38.19。卡伦和雷迪，《情报与安全》，83-84.20页。《2017.21情报与安全法》Ibid.22。吉尔伯特和埃利，“剃光头和Sonnenrads”，2020,280-94;罗杰斯，《引渡Kim Dotcom》，2015年，第46-57页;罗杰斯和莫兹利，《拨动拨号盘》;史密斯，“紧急与重要”，2019年，第13-37页;Gillespie和Breen，“安全情报机构”，2021,676-95.23。布雷迪，《魔法武器》，2017年，43.24。新西兰安全情报局，“年度报告2021”，2021,35.25。巴特斯比，《新西兰恐怖主义幽灵》，2019年，第45.26页。反恐镇压法新西兰皇家调查委员会，引文2020，第10.28页。同前。新西兰皇家调查委员会，Citation2020，章节2.5.29。30.出于对苏联在新西兰境内无限制的影响的关切，军情五处总干事于1948年和ASIO总干事于1956年相继提出报告，这在很大程度上影响了NZSIS的建立。沃顿，“新西兰安全情报的发展”，2012.31。罗杰斯，《情报与安全法》，2018,657-92;沃顿，《新西兰安全情报的发展》，1993年。亨特，间谍和革命者”，2007;沃顿，“新西兰安全情报的发展”，第6.33章。1969年新西兰安全情报服务法;沃顿，《新西兰安全情报的发展》34。新西兰安全情报服务法1969.35。新西兰安全情报局，“NZSIS任务的演变性质”36。巴特斯比和鲍尔，《幽灵之眼:新西兰和五只眼睛》，9.37。Tonkin-Covell，《收藏家》，2000.38。Filer，《新西兰的信号情报》，2019,2.39。当时被称为新西兰安全部门。Filer，“新西兰的信号情报”，3.41。出处同上,5 - 6.42。2003年政府通信安全局法案，第8.43条。2003年政府通信安全局法案，第8A(b)条。萨特和必应，“联邦调查局表示它已经破坏了黑客工具”，2023.45年5月10日。Kitteridge，《合规审查》，2013年6月。《2013年情报与安全委员会修正案》第9.47条。针对间谍活动、外国干涉和恐怖主义的立法漏洞正是本报告所指的。48.注意到在《卡伦-雷迪报告》发表时，《林恩·玛尔袭击案》后的《2002年反恐法引用修正案》尚未制定。《2017年情报与安全法》第13条和16.49条。ISA综述，2017,2023,213.50。《2017年情报与安全法》第16(c).51条。美国法典:美国法典第50卷第3093条。迪瓦恩，“秘密行动和秘密活动”，2019年，4.53。如上,4.54。《情报:从秘密到政策》第263.55页。1994年情报服务法。Ibid.57。《1994年情报服务法》第1(b)条。《情报:从秘密到政策》，492.59。1994年情报服务法，第1.60条。《1994年情报服务法》第3(1)(a)条。《1994年情报服务法》第3(2)条。《2001年情报服务法》第6(1)(e)条。2001年情报服务法，第6(2)条。2001年情报服务法，第6(2)条。Hanson and Uren，《政策简报》，2018.66。Hanson and Uren, 6-8;和澳大利亚信号局，REDSPICE, 6.67。《2001年情报服务法》第7(e)(ii)条。Hanson and Uren， <政策简报>，9.69。1979年澳大利亚安全情报组织法，第17(2)条。1979年澳大利亚安全情报组织法。三世;3.71部门。Chubb，“对澳大利亚恐怖主义的看法:1978-2019”，2020.72。国家安全和情报审查机构，《战略与国际研究中心减少威胁活动审查》，2020年，第2.73期。1985年加拿大安全情报服务法，第12.1.74条。国家安全和情报审查机构，《战略与国际研究中心减少威胁活动的审查》，75页。如上,2.76。库珀，“2017年渥太华破坏CSIS调查时，针对温哥华锡克教徒的印度领事馆网络继续‘有增无减’，”2023.77。Ibid.78。《2019年通信安全建立法案》第19.79条。同上，第30.80段。巴特斯比，《新西兰恐怖主义幽灵》，36.81分。新西兰皇家调查委员会，Citation2020.82。如上,分。10;章2.5;45.83段。如上,分。10;章2.5;47.84段。帕特曼和索斯盖特，《国家安全和监视》，85页。这项调查在研究人员的社交网络上发布，并在新西兰一个关注情报和国防的热门Instagram页面上发布——Instagram: Alcon。S2拥有超过25,000名订阅者的追随者-以及一些Facebook社区小组，以尽可能随机地寻找新西兰的人口分布。推理发展模型的发现为研究提供了一条新的途径。根据调查评论中确定的两个不同主题，根据调查问题的初步回答，向关键个人发放了两份后续问卷;1) NZIC需要提高对新西兰公众信息的透明度，2)NZDF应该单独负责情报和秘密行动。15名已确定的受访者可选择面对面访谈或提交书面问卷答复。大家都选择了后者。调查结果显示，男性占56.23%，女性占42.71%，其他占1.06%。根据2018年新西兰人口普查的信息，调查结果中发现的年龄分布在人口统计学上也与新西兰人口相似。参见新西兰统计局，《新西兰居民年龄分布》，2020年。也承认并非所有结果的总和都等于n = 1021。如果被访者不愿意，他们不会被强迫回答所有的问题。Ipsos，《2022年国家安全公众调查》，2022.89。汉普顿，“演讲:COVID-19世界的网络安全”，2020年;国际网络政策中心，“2019冠状病毒病虚假信息”，2020;约旦，“国际竞赛”，2020,1-24;穆勒三世，《对俄罗斯干预的调查》，2019年;Ryan等人，“抖音和微信”，2020;Thomas和Zhang，“COVID-19吸引爱国喷子运动”，2020.90。主动措施是有针对性的虚假信息的同义词，它本身就是一个秘密行动/行动。《积极对策》，2020,11.92。A，“问卷回答A”，2022.93。对这些问题产生偏见的一个潜在来源是俄罗斯最近于2022年2月开始入侵乌克兰。然而，由于新西兰公众对乌克兰的高度支持以及新西兰国防军在联合王国训练乌克兰部队的任务，可以提出的论点是，这些反应表明新西兰对未来可能利用新西兰国防军领导的准军事行动有一定程度的理解。罗伯茨，“国家偏好”，2020,502.95。 Curia Market Research，“安全问题调查”，2014;Curia Market Research，“Security Issues Poll”，2016.96。Ibid.97。Ibid.98。帕特曼和索斯盖特，“国家安全和监视”，2016,871-87.99。所述的目标是更好地了解国内对国家安全风险的看法和态度，收集的样本数量刚刚超过1100人。对于2022年的新西兰人来说，主要的国家安全威胁是自然灾害，而最不可能发生的是“新西兰卷入与另一个国家的武装冲突”。IPSOS新西兰，国家安全公众调查，2022,4,6,19,49.100。同上，12,31.101。Curia Market Research，“安全问题调查”，2014;Curia Market Research，“安全问题调查”，2016;新西兰皇家调查委员会，“皇家调查委员会”，20120.102。B，“问卷回答B”，2022.103。罗杰斯和莫兹利，《拨动拨号盘》，2021.104。IPSOS新西兰，国家安全公众调查，2023,30.105。如上,34.106。阿诺德和马塔努库:《保护新西兰作为一个自由、开放和民主的社会》，2023,248.107。美国法典:第50卷(美利坚合众国)。迪瓦恩，《秘密行动与秘密活动》，第4期;Kibbe，“秘密行动与五角大楼”，2007.109。迪瓦恩，“秘密行动和秘密活动”，2019年，4.110。作者还将秘密行动与支持军事行动分开，因为在这种情况下，军方仍然对行动拥有最终控制权。国家安全长期洞察简报，2023,4.112。Fisher，“国家安全现在不那么安全了”，2023.113。阿诺德和马塔努库，214.114。如上,211.115。出处同上,211 - 12.116。Blyth，《建立信任和信心》，2023年第7期。附加信息:作者简介:murray Place murray Place是澳大利亚国防军的前现役成员，此前曾在新南威尔士州警察部队担任警官，在国家情报司令部担任秘密行动角色，专注于反恐和重大犯罪。他拥有新西兰梅西大学国际安全(情报)硕士学位。Rhys Ball是新西兰安全情报局的前情报官员，目前在新西兰梅西大学奥尔巴尼校区国防与安全研究中心任教。他是新西兰情报专业人员协会(NZIIP)和美国前情报官员协会(AFIO)的成员。

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The New Zealand intelligence community and effects operations: the covert action dilemma

ABSTRACTBounded by current legislation, the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) is explicitly limited from conducting any form of Covert Action, or what is increasingly being called within New Zealand, Effects Operations. This article aims to understand whether this policy remains both operationally fit for purpose and consistent with the New Zealand public’s understanding and expectations in a time of significant geopolitical and domestic security uncertainty. Supported by 2022 research which surveyed New Zealand public perceptions of the NZIC and the tolerances of Effects Operations, we seek to establish, through an examination of Covert Action policy amongst Five Eyes partners and New Zealand intelligence literature, an understanding of a working definition of Effects Operations, and show that despite previous thinking linked to ethical challenges related to the conduct of such activity, the wider New Zealand public is likely to be supportive of some form of NZIC Effects Operations mandate in the service of national security policy goals. This research thus further reinforces recent independent assessments that the current NZIC legislation, the 2017 Intelligence and Security Act, is not completely fit for purpose and remains overly restrictive in a way that limits future policy options like Effects Operations and needs to be further considered. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.2. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.3. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 249.4. R George, Intelligence and Strategy, 2013, 156; see also, Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” 2013, 678–93,; DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities” 2019,; Erwin, “Covert Action: Legislative Background,” 2013,; Cormac et al.,, “What Constitutes Successful Covert Action?” 2022, 111–28,; Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black” 2018,: 477–94,; Cormac, ”Disruption and Deniable Interventionism” 2017, 169–91,; Warner, ‘A Matter of Trust’, 2019, 33–42.5. Christopher Andrew, The Secret World, 2018, 690.6. Ibid., 690–91.7. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Chapter 8.9. Ibid., 263.10. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.11. Ibid., 487–88.12. Ibid., 488.13. Ibid., 480; Joseph and Poznansky, “Media Technology, Covert Action,” 2018, 320–35.14. Cormac and Aldrich, Grey Is the New Black; see also, Graphika and Stanford, ‘Unheard Voice’, 2022.15. Grey Zone activity is contemporary terminology for activity short of warfare. Covert Action is an activity within the theory of the Grey Zone.16. Monaghan, “Bad Idea,” 2021.17. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 2016, 3–14; Intelligence and Security Act 2017.18. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84; Gee and Patman, ‘Small State or Minor Power?’, 2021, 38.19. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84.20. Intelligence and Security Act 2017.21. Ibid.22. Gilbert and Elley, “Shaved Heads and Sonnenrads,” 2020, 280–94; Rogers, “Extraditing Kim Dotcom,” 2015, 46–57; Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial”; Smith, “The Urgent Versus the Important,” 2019, 13–37; Gillespie and Breen, “The Security Intelligence Agencies,” 2021, 676–95.23. Brady, “Magic Weapons,” 2017, 43.24. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2021,” 2021, 35.25. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 2019, 45.26. Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002.27. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, pt. 10.28. Ibid.; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020, chap. 2.5.29. The creation of the NZSIS was largely influenced by successive reports by the Director-Generals of both MI5, in 1948, and ASIO, in 1956, out of concerns regarding the unchecked Soviet influence within New Zealand.30. Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 2012.31. Rogers, “Intelligence and Security Act,” 2018, 657–92; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” 100.32. Hunt, Spies and Revolutionaries“, 2007;Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand,” chap. 6.33. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969; Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand.”34. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969.35. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Evolving Nature of the NZSIS’s Tasks”36. Battersby and Ball, “The Phantom Eye: New Zealand and the five eyes“, 9.37. Tonkin-Covell, “The Collectors,” 2000.38. Filer, ‘Signals Intelligence in New Zealand’, 2019, 2.39. Known then as the New Zealand Security Service.40. Filer, “Signals Intelligence in New Zealand,” 3.41. Ibid., 5–6.42. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8.43. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, sec. 8A(b).44. Satter and Bing, “FBI says it has sabotaged hacking tool,” 10 May 2023.45. Kitteridge, “Review of Compliance,” 2013.46. Intelligence and Security Committee Amendment Act 2013, sec. 9.47. The legislative gaps for espionage, foreign interference and terrorism are what this report is referring to. Noting that the Terrorism Suppression Act Citation2002 amendments post-Lynn Mall attack had not been made at the time of the Cullen-Reddy Report.48. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 13 and 16.49. Review of ISA 2017, 2023, 213.50. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sec. 16(c).51. US Code: Title 50 § 3093, United States.52. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.53. Ibid., 4.54. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 263.55. Intelligence Services Act 1994.56. Ibid.57. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1(b).58. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 492.59. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 1.60. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(1)(a).61. Intelligence Services Act 1994, sec. 3(2).62. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 6(1)(e).63. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).64. Intelligence services act 2001, sec. 6(2).65. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 2018.66. Hanson and Uren, 6–8; and Australian Signals Directorate, REDSPICE, 6.67. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sec. 7(e)(ii).68. Hanson and Uren, “Policy Brief,” 9.69. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, sec. 17(2).70. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, pts. III; Division 3.71. Chubb, “Perceptions of terrorism in Australia: 1978–2019,” 2020.72. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’, 2020, 2.73. Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act 1985, sec. 12.1.74. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, ‘Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities’.75. Ibid., 2.76. Cooper, “Indian Consulate networks targeting Sikhs in Vancouver continued ‘unabated’ when Ottawa gutted CSIS probe in 2017,” 2023.77. Ibid.78. Communications Security Establishment Act 2019, sec. 19.79. Ibid., sec. 30.80. Battersby, “The Ghost of New Zealand Terrorism,” 36.81. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Citation2020.82. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 45.83. Ibid., pts. 10; Chapter 2.5; Paragraph 47.84. Patman and Southgate, ‘National Security and Surveillance’.85. The survey was distributed among the social network of the researchers and on a popular New Zealand-based intelligence and defence-focused Instagram page – Instagram: Alcon.S2 with a following of over 25,000 subscribers – as well as some Facebook community groups to seek as random a New Zealand population distribution as possible.86. The inference development model findings provided an additional avenue for the research. Two follow-up questionnaires were given to key individuals identified from their initial responses to survey questions based on two distinct themes identified in the survey’s comments; 1) that the NZIC needs to improve the transparency of information with the New Zealand public and 2) the NZDF should be solely responsible for intelligence and Covert Action. Fifteen identified respondents were provided with the option of a face-to-face interview or the submission of a written questionnaire response. All opted for the latter.87. The survey achieved a gender split of 56.23 per cent Male and 42.71 per cent Female, with 1.06 per cent Other. According to information from the 2018 New Zealand Census, the age distribution found within the survey results is also similar in demographic to the New Zealand population. See Statistics NZ, ‘Age Distribution of People Residing in New Zealand’, 2020. It is also acknowledged that not all results total to the n = 1021 figure. Respondents were not forced to answer all questions if they did not wish to.88. Ipsos, ‘2022 National Security Public Survey’, 2022.89. Hampton, ‘Speech: Cyber Security in a COVID-19 World’, 2020; International Cyber Policy Centre, ‘Covid-19 Disinformation’, 2020; Jordan, “International Competition,” 2020, 1–24; Mueller III, ‘Investigation Into Russian Interference’, 2019; Ryan et al., ‘TikTok and WeChat’, 2020; Thomas and Zhang, ‘COVID-19 Attracts Patriotic Troll Campaigns’, 2020.90. Active Measures is synonymous with Targeted Disinformation and is a Covert Operation/Action in its own right.91. Rid, Active Measures”, 2020, 11.92. Person A, “Questionnaire Response A,” 2022.93. A potential source of bias for these questions was the recent Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which commenced in February 2022. However, due to the high levels of New Zealand public support for Ukraine and the mission by the NZDF to train Ukrainian troops in the United Kingdom, the argument could be made that these responses indicate a level of New Zealand understanding as to the likely utilisation for future NZIC-led paramilitary operations.94. Roberts, “State preferences,” 2020, 502.95. Curia Market Research, “Security Issues Poll,” 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016.96. Ibid.97. Ibid.98. Patman and Southgate, “National Security and Surveillance,” 2016, 871–87.99. The stated objective was to provide a better understanding of domestic views and attitudes to national security risks and a sample size of just over 1100 was collected. For New Zealanders in 2022, the key national security threat is natural disasters, while the least likely to happen is ‘New Zealand being involved in armed conflict with another country’. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2022, 4, 6, 19, 49.100. Ibid., 12, 31.101. Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2014; Curia Market Research, ‘Security Issues Poll’, 2016; New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, ‘The Royal Commission of Inquiry’, 2020.102. Person B, “Questionnaire Response B,” 2022.103. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.104. IPSOS New Zealand, National Security Public Survey, 2023, 30.105. Ibid., 34.106. Arnold and Matanuku, Taumaru: Protecting Aotearoa New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society, 2023, 248.107. US Code: Title 50 (United States of America).108. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 4; Kibbe, ‘Covert Action and the Pentagon’, 2007.109. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities,” 2019, 4.110. The authors also separate Covert Action in support of military operations because, in this situation, the military remains in ultimate control over the operation.111. National Security Long-term Insights Briefing, 2023, 4.112. Fisher, “National security not as safe now,” 2023.113. Arnold and Matanuku, 214.114. Ibid., 211.115. Ibid., 211–12.116. Blyth, “Building Trust and Confidence,” 2023, 7.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMurray PlaceMurray Place is a former serving member of the Australian Defence Force and has previously served as an officer in the New South Wales Police Force, where he worked in a covert operational role within the State Intelligence Command, focusing on Counter Terrorism and Major Crime. He holds a Master of International Security (Intelligence) from Massey University, New Zealand.Rhys BallRhys Ball is a former intelligence officer with the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service now lecturing at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Albany Campus, New Zealand. He is a member of the New Zealand Institute of Intelligence Professionals (NZIIP) and US Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO).

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来源期刊

Intelligence and National Security Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

41.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Intelligence has never played a more prominent role in international politics than it does now in the early years of the twenty-first century. National intelligence services are larger than ever, and they are more transparent in their activities in the policy making of democratic nations. Intelligence and National Security is widely regarded as the world''s leading scholarly journal focused on the role of intelligence and secretive agencies in international relations. It examines this aspect of national security from a variety of perspectives and academic disciplines, with insightful articles research and written by leading experts based around the globe. Among the topics covered in the journal are: • the historical development of intelligence agencies • representations of intelligence in popular culture • public understandings and expectations related to intelligence • intelligence and ethics • intelligence collection and analysis • covert action and counterintelligence • privacy and intelligence accountability • the outsourcing of intelligence operations • the role of politics in intelligence activities • international intelligence cooperation and burden-sharing • the relationships among intelligence agencies, military organizations, and civilian policy departments. Authors for Intelligence and National Security come from a range of disciplines, including international affairs, history, sociology, political science, law, anthropology, philosophy, medicine, statistics, psychology, bio-sciences, and mathematics. These perspectives are regularly augmented by research submitted from current and former intelligence practitioners in several different nations. Each issue features a rich menu of articles about the uses (and occasional misuses) of intelligence, supplemented from time to time with special forums on current intelligence issues and interviews with leading intelligence officials.