{"title":"在社会困境中,正义策略可以促进动态愿望的联合合作","authors":"Baifeng Li, Xiao Zhang, Zhenyu Shi, Wei Wei","doi":"10.1209/0295-5075/ad0998","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate the concurrent effect of the justice strategy and dynamic aspirations on cooperation in evolutionary game theory. The justice strategy refers to a game in which players play the role of cooperators in the case of cooperation, the role of punishers in the face of defection, and receive the same payoff as their opponents. Players compare the payoffs with their own dynamic aspirations to decide whether to change their strategy. Through simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model in promoting cooperation and reducing or completely eliminating defections. A higher initial aspiration has a significant impact on reducing defection. Additionally, we find that diverse evolutionary dynamics arise from various initial settings. Remarkably, in specific situations, even a tiny initial fraction of justicers can rapidly retaliate and eventually dominate the entire system. Reflecting real-life scenarios, the influence of punishment typically lags behind the occurrence of defection, allowing justicers to gradually counteract defection upon its cluster emergence.","PeriodicalId":11738,"journal":{"name":"EPL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma\",\"authors\":\"Baifeng Li, Xiao Zhang, Zhenyu Shi, Wei Wei\",\"doi\":\"10.1209/0295-5075/ad0998\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We investigate the concurrent effect of the justice strategy and dynamic aspirations on cooperation in evolutionary game theory. The justice strategy refers to a game in which players play the role of cooperators in the case of cooperation, the role of punishers in the face of defection, and receive the same payoff as their opponents. Players compare the payoffs with their own dynamic aspirations to decide whether to change their strategy. Through simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model in promoting cooperation and reducing or completely eliminating defections. A higher initial aspiration has a significant impact on reducing defection. Additionally, we find that diverse evolutionary dynamics arise from various initial settings. Remarkably, in specific situations, even a tiny initial fraction of justicers can rapidly retaliate and eventually dominate the entire system. Reflecting real-life scenarios, the influence of punishment typically lags behind the occurrence of defection, allowing justicers to gradually counteract defection upon its cluster emergence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11738,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"EPL\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"EPL\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ad0998\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"物理与天体物理\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"EPL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ad0998","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"物理与天体物理","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma
Abstract We investigate the concurrent effect of the justice strategy and dynamic aspirations on cooperation in evolutionary game theory. The justice strategy refers to a game in which players play the role of cooperators in the case of cooperation, the role of punishers in the face of defection, and receive the same payoff as their opponents. Players compare the payoffs with their own dynamic aspirations to decide whether to change their strategy. Through simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model in promoting cooperation and reducing or completely eliminating defections. A higher initial aspiration has a significant impact on reducing defection. Additionally, we find that diverse evolutionary dynamics arise from various initial settings. Remarkably, in specific situations, even a tiny initial fraction of justicers can rapidly retaliate and eventually dominate the entire system. Reflecting real-life scenarios, the influence of punishment typically lags behind the occurrence of defection, allowing justicers to gradually counteract defection upon its cluster emergence.
期刊介绍:
General physics – physics of elementary particles and fields – nuclear physics – atomic, molecular and optical physics – classical areas of phenomenology – physics of gases, plasmas and electrical discharges – condensed matter – cross-disciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology.
Letters submitted to EPL should contain new results, ideas, concepts, experimental methods, theoretical treatments, including those with application potential and be of broad interest and importance to one or several sections of the physics community. The presentation should satisfy the specialist, yet remain understandable to the researchers in other fields through a suitable, clearly written introduction and conclusion (if appropriate).
EPL also publishes Comments on Letters previously published in the Journal.