投资多少,获得什么学位?教育作为劳动力市场规模的战略

Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI:10.7160/eriesj.2023.160302
Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Perla Lomelí
{"title":"投资多少,获得什么学位?教育作为劳动力市场规模的战略","authors":"Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Perla Lomelí","doi":"10.7160/eriesj.2023.160302","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When workers hear about a possible promotion, it is common for them to get training, and they can do so through education. However, there is the possibility that the worker needs to receive a salary according to the knowledge acquired in such training. In this study, considering a population of employed workers with incomplete secondary school, we apply game theory concepts to explore whether workers can train through study. If so, the model shows the percentage of the salary the worker is willing to invest in his education. Furthermore, the cost of studying implicitly involves an opportunity cost, deduced quantitatively in the model. In conclusion, our article defines specific thresholds to decide if the worker should study, the economic investment, and the time he would spend on it, depending on how strict the company is in auditing. The analysis does not define a Nash equilibrium since the company’s reaction is not considered.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How Much to Invest and What Degree to Get? Education As a Strategy on the Labour Market Scale\",\"authors\":\"Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas, Perla Lomelí\",\"doi\":\"10.7160/eriesj.2023.160302\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When workers hear about a possible promotion, it is common for them to get training, and they can do so through education. However, there is the possibility that the worker needs to receive a salary according to the knowledge acquired in such training. In this study, considering a population of employed workers with incomplete secondary school, we apply game theory concepts to explore whether workers can train through study. If so, the model shows the percentage of the salary the worker is willing to invest in his education. Furthermore, the cost of studying implicitly involves an opportunity cost, deduced quantitatively in the model. In conclusion, our article defines specific thresholds to decide if the worker should study, the economic investment, and the time he would spend on it, depending on how strict the company is in auditing. The analysis does not define a Nash equilibrium since the company’s reaction is not considered.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7160/eriesj.2023.160302\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7160/eriesj.2023.160302","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

当员工听到可能升职的消息时,他们通常会去接受培训,而且可以通过教育来实现。然而,有可能工人需要根据在这种培训中获得的知识来获得工资。本研究以未完成中学教育的在职工人为研究对象,运用博弈论的概念探讨工人能否通过学习进行培训。如果是这样,该模型显示了工人愿意将工资的百分比投资于他的教育。此外,学习成本隐含着机会成本,这在模型中得到了定量的推导。总之,我们的文章定义了具体的阈值来决定工人是否应该学习,经济投资,以及他将花费在学习上的时间,这取决于公司在审计方面的严格程度。该分析没有定义纳什均衡,因为没有考虑公司的反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
分享
查看原文
How Much to Invest and What Degree to Get? Education As a Strategy on the Labour Market Scale
When workers hear about a possible promotion, it is common for them to get training, and they can do so through education. However, there is the possibility that the worker needs to receive a salary according to the knowledge acquired in such training. In this study, considering a population of employed workers with incomplete secondary school, we apply game theory concepts to explore whether workers can train through study. If so, the model shows the percentage of the salary the worker is willing to invest in his education. Furthermore, the cost of studying implicitly involves an opportunity cost, deduced quantitatively in the model. In conclusion, our article defines specific thresholds to decide if the worker should study, the economic investment, and the time he would spend on it, depending on how strict the company is in auditing. The analysis does not define a Nash equilibrium since the company’s reaction is not considered.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信