Revolving around political connections: the negative effect of government venture capital backing on IPO valuation

Abstract We examine how government venture capital (GVC)—a specific type of political connection—affected initial public offering (IPO) valuation. Contrary to the well-recognized benefits of political connections in channeling access to financial resources in China, our analysis of 959 IPOs between 2008 and 2014 suggests that GVC backing lowers IPO valuation. This baseline effect is moderated by other sources of political connection (e.g. government ownership, state sector experience of top management team members, private sector partner status, and institutional environments). We argue that it is the negative signaling mechanism revolving around political connections that accounts for this observable pattern. This research enriches the signaling theory by uncovering signal emergence and analyzing the interactions between several signaling sources of political connection. Specifically, it contributes to a better understanding of political connections by specifying an undesirable consequence of state-led financialization, which has timely practical relevance as China’s capital market is steering toward a rule-based system.