Democracy in the digital era

As Yochai Benkler identified almost two decades ago, the internet radically transformed “how we make the information environment we occupy as autonomous individuals, citizens and members of cultural and social groups” (Benkler, 2006, p. 1). This transformation has had critical implications for democratic social and political systems. Our information environment plays an important role in the “health” of a democracy because democratic governance is about more than casting and counting votes—it also involves socially and culturally informed preference formation (Bracha, 2006, p. 1845). According to cultural theory, democratic governance is supported by a culture in which all individuals have the opportunity to participate in social processes of meaning-making and access to diverse viewpoints (see, e.g., Balkin, 2015). In deliberative or participatory democracies, as they are sometimes termed (Pateman, 2012), informed citizens contend with a range of ideas and contribute to important public debates. In both theory and practice, the internet provides near-limitless opportunities for public debate, political deliberation, and participation in social processes of meaning-making. But has an increase in opportunities for cultural participation led to what Benkler and others identified as the “great promise” of the internet, that is, more freedom for democratic participation and human development? The evidence is mixed. With the uptake of social media platforms by billions of people, more than ever before, we are free to share our ideas with each other. Yet, there is also clear evidence that the internet and platform capitalism produces a range of harms to individuals and democratic governance. In previous issues of Policy & Internet, contributors to the journal have studied the problems of democracy in the internet era across a range of context and topics from misinformation to monopoly power, surveillance capitalism, authoritarianism, journalism, information warfare and, of course, the capacity of democratically elected lawmakers to respond with new policy in a timely and effective manner. From these contributions and others, we know that the democratic political process is directly undermined when political actors and foreign governments manipulate and, in some cases, weaponize the flow of information online to influence the outcome of elections (North et al., 2021; Yoon et al., 2022). We have also seen how the spread of misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories, the amplification of partisan voices, and the targeting of marginalized demographics weaken social cohesion by exacerbating societal divisions and eroding the trust that people have in one another, democratic institutions, and elections (Dobreva et al., 2020; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Karlsson et al., 2021; Lee, 2020; Mena, 2020; Ng & Taeihagh, 2021). Authoritarianism, populism, and fascism in some corners of contemporary politics may also work to destabilization of democratic systems of governance (Bolsover, 2018; Heft et al., 2020; Soriano & Gaw, 2022). These political ideologies tend to reject democratic norms and values, such as the rule of law and civil liberties, as well as principles of international cooperation and multilateralism, which can exacerbate geopolitical tensions (Huang & Mayer, 2022) and limit the capacity for states to work together to tackle global challenges (Uldam, 2013). Where the internet has destabilized the economic models underpinning traditional journalism democracies may also be weakened. This is because journalism, in its most idealistic form, seeks to hold power to account and accurately inform citizens on matters of public interest (Zuckerman, 2014). Previous contributors to this journal have also shown how the dominance of the internet by a handful of large monopolistic companies is at odds with a democratic system of governance because it places private actors who are not accountable to the voting public in a position of immense power (Srinivasan & Ghosh, 2023). The “big tech” companies have the power to regulate global socio-technical systems, control the flow of information in society, and manipulate markets, all of which is a concentration of power that is at odds with democratic principles of accountability. Scholars have shown how the phenomenon of surveillance capitalism is similarly at odds with democratic principles when it erodes the privacy and autonomy of individuals, reducing their ability to make informed choices about their lives (Draper, 2017; Laurer & Seidl, 2021). Democratic law-making institutions also appear slow to respond to these problems, effective regulation remains difficult to achieve (Popiel, 2022), and the job of internet policy making is made harder every day by the rapid deployment of AI-enabled technologies. Building on these studies, this issue of Policy & Internet provides a range of new contributions that probe and evaluate different dimensions of the problems of democracy in the digital age. Schwoerer's analysis of Twitter data during a period of negotiations over a proposed change to the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in late 2018 highlights how social media can and continues to play an important role in deliberative and participatory democratic processes. They found evidence of selforganized political activism and coalition building among users on the platform. Jäckle's study of hate speech towards mayors in Germany suggests that this type of harmful online expression towards politicians is not limited to those with a high public profile. Hate speech is also directed toward those working at the local level of governance in Germany. The study has implications for understanding who may or may not be willing to participate in politics at all levels and the challenges political actors face when navigating public interactions on social media. Jost's study of Facebook's disclaimers on digital political advertising shows that these disclaimers are having a suboptimal effect. Political advertising on social media is a serious problem for democracies when it's misused, covert or manipulative, and these types of transparency policies are important for ensuring people are able to make informed decisions about the information they are exposed to online. This study reminds us that enacting a policy change is not enough on its own, steps must also be taken to ensure the policies are implemented in a manner that achieves the policy's intended purpose. Gonzales's study makes a new contribution to the study of digital divides and suggests when policymakers take action to provide more equitable access to digital resources they must be mindful of the potentially harmful environmental and social impacts that come with a proliferation of digital devices. Increased digital participation should not come at the expense of the environment and workforces from developing nations. Gonzales proposes a multi-solving innovations model—under which policies are designed to have beneficial outcomes across sectors—for approaching this complex policy problem. Kenney's analysis of China's platform economy shows how the monopoly logic of multi-sided, data-driven markets is at work in China's state-managed economy and that the problem of concentrated private power in the digital economy can occur even in the context of closely planned economic development and state oversight. Qiu's analysis of China's live-streaming industry shows that in the context of fragmented and sometimes vague or inconsistent policy mandates, Chinese internet companies have developed selfregulation models for complying with government directives and avoiding penalties. As this study indicates, a notable difference between the models of self-regulation undertaken by platforms in China compared to those that have evolved in Western democracies is that Chinese companies have an explicit obligation to protect the public interest and are not treated as neutral intermediaries by the state.