Salabat Khan;Fei Luo;Zijian Zhang;Farhan Ullah;Farhan Amin;Syed Furqan Qadri;Md Belal Bin Heyat;Rukhsana Ruby;Lu Wang;Shamsher Ullah;Meng Li;Victor C. M. Leung;Kaishun Wu
{"title":"X.509公钥基础设施、证书撤销及其在区块链和分类账技术上的现代实现的调查","authors":"Salabat Khan;Fei Luo;Zijian Zhang;Farhan Ullah;Farhan Amin;Syed Furqan Qadri;Md Belal Bin Heyat;Rukhsana Ruby;Lu Wang;Shamsher Ullah;Meng Li;Victor C. M. Leung;Kaishun Wu","doi":"10.1109/COMST.2023.3323640","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cyber-attacks are becoming more common against Internet users due to the increasing dependency on online communication in their daily lives. X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKIX) is the most widely adopted and used system to secure online communications and digital identities. However, different attack vectors exist against the PKIX system, which attackers exploit to breach the security of the reliant protocols. Recently, various projects (e.g., Let’s Encrypt and Google Certificate Transparency) have been started to encrypt online communications, fix PKIX vulnerabilities, and guard Internet users against cyber-attacks. This survey focuses on classical PKIX proposals, certificate revocation proposals, and their implementation on blockchain as well as ledger technologies. First, we discuss the PKIX architecture, the history of the World Wide Web, the certificate issuance process, and possible attacks on the certificate issuance process. Second, a taxonomy of PKIX proposals, revocation proposals, and their modern implementation is provided. Then, a set of evaluation metrics is defined for comparison. Finally, the leading proposals are compared using 15 evaluation metrics and 13 cyber-attacks before presenting the lessons learned and suggesting future PKIX and revocation research.","PeriodicalId":55029,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials","volume":"25 4","pages":"2529-2568"},"PeriodicalIF":34.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Survey on X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure, Certificate Revocation, and Their Modern Implementation on Blockchain and Ledger Technologies\",\"authors\":\"Salabat Khan;Fei Luo;Zijian Zhang;Farhan Ullah;Farhan Amin;Syed Furqan Qadri;Md Belal Bin Heyat;Rukhsana Ruby;Lu Wang;Shamsher Ullah;Meng Li;Victor C. M. Leung;Kaishun Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/COMST.2023.3323640\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cyber-attacks are becoming more common against Internet users due to the increasing dependency on online communication in their daily lives. X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKIX) is the most widely adopted and used system to secure online communications and digital identities. However, different attack vectors exist against the PKIX system, which attackers exploit to breach the security of the reliant protocols. Recently, various projects (e.g., Let’s Encrypt and Google Certificate Transparency) have been started to encrypt online communications, fix PKIX vulnerabilities, and guard Internet users against cyber-attacks. This survey focuses on classical PKIX proposals, certificate revocation proposals, and their implementation on blockchain as well as ledger technologies. First, we discuss the PKIX architecture, the history of the World Wide Web, the certificate issuance process, and possible attacks on the certificate issuance process. Second, a taxonomy of PKIX proposals, revocation proposals, and their modern implementation is provided. Then, a set of evaluation metrics is defined for comparison. Finally, the leading proposals are compared using 15 evaluation metrics and 13 cyber-attacks before presenting the lessons learned and suggesting future PKIX and revocation research.\",\"PeriodicalId\":55029,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials\",\"volume\":\"25 4\",\"pages\":\"2529-2568\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":34.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10285344/\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10285344/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Survey on X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure, Certificate Revocation, and Their Modern Implementation on Blockchain and Ledger Technologies
Cyber-attacks are becoming more common against Internet users due to the increasing dependency on online communication in their daily lives. X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKIX) is the most widely adopted and used system to secure online communications and digital identities. However, different attack vectors exist against the PKIX system, which attackers exploit to breach the security of the reliant protocols. Recently, various projects (e.g., Let’s Encrypt and Google Certificate Transparency) have been started to encrypt online communications, fix PKIX vulnerabilities, and guard Internet users against cyber-attacks. This survey focuses on classical PKIX proposals, certificate revocation proposals, and their implementation on blockchain as well as ledger technologies. First, we discuss the PKIX architecture, the history of the World Wide Web, the certificate issuance process, and possible attacks on the certificate issuance process. Second, a taxonomy of PKIX proposals, revocation proposals, and their modern implementation is provided. Then, a set of evaluation metrics is defined for comparison. Finally, the leading proposals are compared using 15 evaluation metrics and 13 cyber-attacks before presenting the lessons learned and suggesting future PKIX and revocation research.
期刊介绍:
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials is an online journal published by the IEEE Communications Society for tutorials and surveys covering all aspects of the communications field. Telecommunications technology is progressing at a rapid pace, and the IEEE Communications Society is committed to providing researchers and other professionals the information and tools to stay abreast. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials focuses on integrating and adding understanding to the existing literature on communications, putting results in context. Whether searching for in-depth information about a familiar area or an introduction into a new area, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials aims to be the premier source of peer-reviewed, comprehensive tutorials and surveys, and pointers to further sources. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials publishes only articles exclusively written for IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials and go through a rigorous review process before their publication in the quarterly issues.
A tutorial article in the IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials should be designed to help the reader to become familiar with and learn something specific about a chosen topic. In contrast, the term survey, as applied here, is defined to mean a survey of the literature. A survey article in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials should provide a comprehensive review of developments in a selected area, covering its development from its inception to its current state and beyond, and illustrating its development through liberal citations from the literature. Both tutorials and surveys should be tutorial in nature and should be written in a style comprehensible to readers outside the specialty of the article.