关于“我”的一个不那么简单的规则

IF 1.1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-03-27 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad025

Tadeusz Ciecierski, Jakub Rudnicki

{"title":"关于“我”的一个不那么简单的规则","authors":"Tadeusz Ciecierski, Jakub Rudnicki","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad025","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’\",\"authors\":\"Tadeusz Ciecierski, Jakub Rudnicki\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/pq/pqad025\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47749,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad025\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad025","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

马克西米利安·德·盖恩斯福德反对第一人称代词“我”的指称是由一个规则决定的，该规则将指称者与使用语境的某些特征联系起来。在本文中，我们认为de Gaynesford的论点是不确定的。然而，我们的主要目标是为“我”制定一个新版本的参考规则。我们认为这个版本可以处理几个有问题的情况。我们的策略包括分析所谓的语境代理人，即对特定言语行为负责的人。从这个分析中，我们排除了一类特殊的“我”的用法，我们认为这些用法最好被理解为指示性的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’

Abstract Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.