The Burden of Proof in Taxation Disputes: Does Section 170 or Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Offend the Rule of Law?

For the purposes of assessing tax, section 170 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) permits the Commissioner to determine that the taxpayer has committed fraud or evasion. The taxpayer then bears the onus of showing that they have not. There is no requirement that the Commissioner show that such determination is correct, nor to support it with evidence. The Commissioner may, if they wish, do nothing more than put the taxpayer to proof by tendering their assessment as evidence. This article sets out in detail how the reversal of the onus of proof in cases arising from the Commissioner’s determination of fraud or evasion offends the principle of procedural fairness, as well as the principles of certainty and prospectivity. This paper also extends that analysis to disputes arising out of the commissioner’s determination of tax avoidance under Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). This paper further considers whether general administrative law principles, in particular the Briginshaw Principle, may obviate some of the concerns regarding the reversal of the onus of proof. It is contended that the reversal of the onus of proof in cases arising out of the Commissioner’s determination of fraud or evasion under section 170 and tax avoidance under Part IVA significantly offend fundamental tenets of the rule of law, namely, the principles of procedural fairness, certainty and prospectivity. It is further contended that requiring the Commissioner to adduce evidence to support the opinion or allowing the Commissioner’s determination to be judicially examined would obviate the offence to the rule of law.