增选董事会是否影响保险公司的财务表现?

IF 1.5 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Services Research Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI:10.1007/s10693-023-00418-2

Michael Adams, Zafeira Kastrinaki

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了英国财产险公司首席执行官增选董事会的绩效效应。我们报告称，在CEO继任后任命的董事会内部人士会降低盈利能力，但会增强偿付能力。当首席执行官是财务专家，并且按比例由财务专家的首席执行官选择更多的内部董事时，偿债能力也会增强。我们进一步发现，保险经验丰富的外聘董事增强了盈利效应，而大投资者提高了偿付能力。然而，CEO的内部或外部出身并不影响财务结果。我们认为我们的研究结果可能对商业和/或公共政策产生影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Do Co-opted Boards Affect the Financial Performance of Insurance Firms?

Abstract We examine the performance-effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) co-opted boards in United Kingdom (UK) property-casualty insurers. We report that board insiders appointed in the aftermath of CEO succession reduce profitability, but bolster solvency. Enhanced solvency also results when the CEO is a financial expert and when proportionately more inside directors are selected by a CEO who is a financial expert. We further find enhanced profitability-effects for insurance experienced co-opted outside directors, while large investors improve solvency. However, the internal or external origin of the CEO does not affect financial outcomes. We consider that our results could have commercial and/or public policy implications.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Services Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

3.00

自引率

7.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Services Research publishes high quality empirical and theoretical research on the demand, supply, regulation, and pricing of financial services. Financial services are broadly defined to include banking, risk management, capital markets, mutual funds, insurance, venture capital, consumer and corporate finance, and the technologies used to produce, distribute, and regulate these services. Macro-financial policy issues, including comparative financial systems, the globalization of financial services, and the impact of these phenomena on economic growth and financial stability, are also within the JFSR’s scope of interest. The Journal seeks to promote research that enriches the profession’s understanding of financial services industries, to elevate industry and product efficiencies, as well as to inform the debate and promote the formulation of sound public policies. Officially cited as: J Financ Serv Res