先例与公平

IF 1.2 Q1 LAW
Adam Perry
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引用次数: 0

摘要

英美法系的法院判决案件的方式与过去类似——即使他们认为自己对过去的案件的判决是错误的。什么,如果有的话,证明这种做法是正当的?我为两个主要观点辩护。首先,如果公平意味着正确地对待同类案件,那么公平有利于一视同仁。第二,一般来说,法院正确判决当前案件的可能性与正确判决先前和类似案件的可能性是一样的。总之,这些说法告诉我们,背离先例和遵循先例同样可能产生正确的决定,而遵循先例也可能产生公平的决定。因此,遵循先例是主要的选择。因此,公平为先例的实践提供了理由。虽然这个结论不是原创的,但我的论点是原创的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Precedent and Fairness
Abstract Courts in common law systems decide cases as they decided like cases in the past—even if they believe they decided those past cases wrongly. What, if anything, justifies this practice? I defend two main claims. The first is that fairness favors treating like cases alike if that means treating them correctly. The second is that, in general, a court is as likely to decide an instant case correctly as it was to decide a previous and like case correctly. Together, these claims tell us that departing from and following precedent are equally likely to yield a correct decision, whereas following precedent may also yield a fair decision. Adhering to precedent is the dominant alternative, as a result. Fairness therefore justifies the practice of precedent. While this conclusion is not original, my argument for it is.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
16.70%
发文量
15
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