其他内幕:经纪人、分析师和基金经理的个人交易

IF 2.2 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Asset Pricing Studies Pub Date : 2023-02-14 DOI:10.1093/rapstu/raad002

Henk Berkman, Paul Koch, P Joakim Westerholm

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引用次数: 0

摘要

当经纪人、分析师和基金经理为自己的账户买卖股票时，这些金融机构的“访问员工”在长达一个月的短期窗口内表现优于散户投资者。当他们在收益公告、分析师建议修订和股价大幅变动之前进行交易时，他们会获得特别高的异常回报。我们还发现，在共同基金执行公司内幕交易和大宗交易的过程中，存在盈利抢先操作和信息泄露的证据，以及供职于同一家经纪公司的分析师发布修订后的建议。(JEL G12, G14, G18)作者提供了一份互联网附录，可以在牛津大学出版社的网站上找到，紧邻在线发表的最终论文的链接。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Other Insiders: Personal Trading by Brokers, Analysts, and Fund Managers

Abstract When brokers, analysts, and fund managers buy or sell stocks for their own accounts, these “access employees” of financial institutions outperform retail investors over short windows up to a month. They earn particularly high abnormal returns when they trade before earnings announcements, revisions of analyst recommendations, and large stock price changes. We also find evidence consistent with profitable front-running and information leakage around the execution of corporate insider trades and block trades by mutual funds, as well as the release of revised recommendations by analysts who work at the same brokerage firm. (JEL G12, G14, G18) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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来源期刊

Review of Asset Pricing Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

19.80

自引率

0.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Asset Pricing Studies (RAPS) is a journal that aims to publish high-quality research in asset pricing. It evaluates papers based on their original contribution to the understanding of asset pricing. The topics covered in RAPS include theoretical and empirical models of asset prices and returns, empirical methodology, macro-finance, financial institutions and asset prices, information and liquidity in asset markets, behavioral investment studies, asset market structure and microstructure, risk analysis, hedge funds, mutual funds, alternative investments, and other related topics. Manuscripts submitted to RAPS must be exclusive to the journal and should not have been previously published. Starting in 2020, RAPS will publish three issues per year, owing to an increasing number of high-quality submissions. The journal is indexed in EconLit, Emerging Sources Citation IndexTM, RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), and Scopus.