Lucas Mayr, Lucas Palma, Gustavo Zambonin, Wellington Silvano, Ricardo Custódio
{"title":"通过分布式账本和一次性签名监控密钥对的使用","authors":"Lucas Mayr, Lucas Palma, Gustavo Zambonin, Wellington Silvano, Ricardo Custódio","doi":"10.3390/info14100523","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Private key management is a complex obstacle arising from the traditional public key infrastructure model. However, before any related security breach can be addressed, it must first be reliably detected. Certificate Transparency (CT) is an example of a certificate issuance monitoring strategy, developed to detect the possible malfeasance of certification authorities (CAs). To the best of our knowledge, CT and other detection mechanisms do not cover digitally signed documents made by an end user, which are also susceptible to CA misbehavior. We modify the CT framework to handle signed documents via logging certificates in the blockchain to enable the secure and user-friendly monitoring of one-time signatures, backdating protection, and effective CA misbehavior detection. Moreover, to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, we present distinct deployment scenarios and analyze the storage, performance, and monetary costs.","PeriodicalId":38479,"journal":{"name":"Information (Switzerland)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Monitoring Key Pair Usage through Distributed Ledgers and One-Time Signatures\",\"authors\":\"Lucas Mayr, Lucas Palma, Gustavo Zambonin, Wellington Silvano, Ricardo Custódio\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/info14100523\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Private key management is a complex obstacle arising from the traditional public key infrastructure model. However, before any related security breach can be addressed, it must first be reliably detected. Certificate Transparency (CT) is an example of a certificate issuance monitoring strategy, developed to detect the possible malfeasance of certification authorities (CAs). To the best of our knowledge, CT and other detection mechanisms do not cover digitally signed documents made by an end user, which are also susceptible to CA misbehavior. We modify the CT framework to handle signed documents via logging certificates in the blockchain to enable the secure and user-friendly monitoring of one-time signatures, backdating protection, and effective CA misbehavior detection. Moreover, to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, we present distinct deployment scenarios and analyze the storage, performance, and monetary costs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38479,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Information (Switzerland)\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Information (Switzerland)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/info14100523\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information (Switzerland)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/info14100523","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Monitoring Key Pair Usage through Distributed Ledgers and One-Time Signatures
Private key management is a complex obstacle arising from the traditional public key infrastructure model. However, before any related security breach can be addressed, it must first be reliably detected. Certificate Transparency (CT) is an example of a certificate issuance monitoring strategy, developed to detect the possible malfeasance of certification authorities (CAs). To the best of our knowledge, CT and other detection mechanisms do not cover digitally signed documents made by an end user, which are also susceptible to CA misbehavior. We modify the CT framework to handle signed documents via logging certificates in the blockchain to enable the secure and user-friendly monitoring of one-time signatures, backdating protection, and effective CA misbehavior detection. Moreover, to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, we present distinct deployment scenarios and analyze the storage, performance, and monetary costs.