Retrospective analysis and prospects for further development of NATO operational thinking

This article reviews Z. Lautsch’s monograph “The Foundations of NATO Operational Thinking. A Retrospective Analysis of Operational Thinking in the 80s and Assessment of Development Prospects”. A brief introduction to the author is given. His approaches to the basic concepts defining operational thinking as a complex phenomenon are reviewed. It is noted that the author uses the points of view of both Western and Soviet military science in his reflections. The author analyses Z. Lautsch’s reflections on Germany’s role in the multinational alliance structure during the last decade of the Cold War. The evolution of NATO operational thinking from air-to-ground combat doctrine in the 1980s to cognitive warfare in the sixth operational domain in the 21st century is examined. The concept of „petty warfare” in the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the role of operational command in its conduct are touched upon. Particular attention is paid to analyzing the relationships between the framework states of the North Atlantic Alliance and their role in the development of operational thinking at the present stage. In particular, the role of Germany as a logistics centre for the entire alliance in Europe is emphasised. The importance of rearming the Bundeswehr and enhancing its credibility in the eyes of the population and at European level is noted. It underscores the need to forge links between the military doctrines of all alliance members and to adopt uniform standards for combat and operational training. This direction of development is of primary importance for the USA, France, the UK, Germany and Italy. The author notes that the Western and Eastern models of operational thinking had conceptual similarities in content and scope.