{"title":"什么是真实的?","authors":"Lajos L. Brons","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2023.30210","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction , and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera ) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction . While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be ‘real’, ‘fun-damental’, or ‘really existing’ is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Is Real?\",\"authors\":\"Lajos L. Brons\",\"doi\":\"10.31577/orgf.2023.30210\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction , and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera ) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction . While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be ‘real’, ‘fun-damental’, or ‘really existing’ is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us\",\"PeriodicalId\":43025,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Organon F\",\"volume\":\"89 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Organon F\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organon F","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
: Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction , and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera ) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction . While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be ‘real’, ‘fun-damental’, or ‘really existing’ is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us
期刊介绍:
Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.