The Consequences of Direct Democracy for the Balance of Power between State and Local Governments in the United States

Abstract Contemporary research in American federalism has evaluated the centralizing characteristics of several institutions within state governments—including state statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions—and has shown that these institutions are generally associated with shifting power away from local governments toward state governments. I expand this discussion by assessing the consequences of direct democracy for the balance of power between state and local governments. In particular, I investigate whether ballot measures are associated with decentralizing power away from state governments toward local governments or rather whether these measures are associated with centralizing power in state governments. Leveraging new data across the history of direct democracy in the United States and coding 945 proposed ballot measures according to their de/centralizing impact on local governments, I find that citizen-initiated ballot measures are neither centralizing nor decentralizing, but legislature-referred ballot measures are decentralizing. I also find that regardless of whether citizens or legislators are responsible for placing measures on the ballot, voters generally provide more support for centralizing ballot measures than decentralizing ballot measures. However, voter support is conditioned on state-level partisanship and ideology.