人与机器:自动化监管执行的技术前景和政治限制

Oliver R. Browne, Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone, Olga Rostapshova
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引用次数: 0

摘要

新技术可以以接近于零的边际成本完美地检测环境违法行为,但使用率很低。我们在加利福尼亚州弗雷斯诺市进行了一项实地实验,以评估智能水表对节水规则的执行情况。家庭被随机分配了执行方法(自动或亲自检查)和罚款的组合。自动化执法使家庭受罚率从0.1%提高到14%,减少了3%的夏季用水量,减少了17%的违规行为,而更高的罚款水平收效甚微。然而,自动执法也使客户投诉增加了1102%,最终导致其取消,并突出表明政治考虑限制了技术解决方案对执法挑战的解决。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement
Abstract New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households' punishment rates from 0.1 to 14%, decreased summer water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.
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