行政自治

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Paul Daly
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引用次数: 0

摘要

罗莎莉·阿贝拉(Rosalie Abella)法官与对行政决策者的尊重密切相关。我认为她的恭敬方式是多方面的,比通常认为的要复杂得多。阿贝拉·J的行政法法学既关注行政自治,也关注司法服从。在一个层面上,阿贝拉·J的法理学是一种司法约束的法理学,提倡对行政程序进行有限的司法监督。这反映了将行政法中的服从视为一种需要司法约束的学说的传统思维方式:它是保护行政决策者免受司法干预的盾牌。因此,她支持尊重行政决策者的广泛假设,并阐明了相当不干涉的合理性审查概念。但是,在更深层次上,阿贝拉·J的法理学更为激进。正如我所解释的那样,阿贝拉·J不仅致力于采取一种克制的司法审查方式,而且致力于促进公共行政的自治:她向行政决策者提供了剑,允许他们开辟出额外的空间,在其中操作和阐明法律规范的应用版本。她对行政自治的承诺,而不仅仅是对司法约束的承诺,促使人们反思阿贝拉·J的行政法哲学的基础,这最终必须建立在她对行政过程的信任基础上,使她与与进步思想家有关的所谓“功能主义”思想流派保持一致。然后,我转向加拿大最高法院最近在瓦维洛夫案中对加拿大行政法的重新表述- -阿贝拉·J对这种重新表述表示坚决反对。我反思了为什么多数派和阿贝拉J在瓦维洛夫案中出现分歧,并提出阿贝拉J的法理学的关键特征——约束和自治——根植于一种已经失范的行政法思维模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Autonomy of Administration
Justice Rosalie Abella is closely associated with deference to administrative decision makers. I will argue that her deferential approach was multifaceted, much more sophisticated than might typically be assumed. Abella J’s administrative law jurisprudence is as much about administrative autonomy as it is about judicial deference. On one level, Abella J’s jurisprudence is a jurisprudence of judicial restraint, preaching limited judicial oversight of the administrative process. This reflects the conventional way of thinking about deference in administrative law as a doctrine requiring judicial restraint: it is a shield protecting administrative decision makers from judicial interference. Accordingly, she supported a broad presumption of deference to administrative decision makers and articulated a fairly non-interventionist conception of reasonableness review. But, on a deeper level, Abella J’s jurisprudence is more radical. As I explain, Abella J was not committed simply to a restrained approach to judicial review but, rather, to promoting the autonomy of public administration: she furnished swords to administrative decision makers, allowing them to carve out additional space in which to operate and articulate applied versions of legal norms. Her commitment to administrative autonomy, rather than simply to judicial restraint, prompts reflection about the basis of Abella J’s administrative law philosophy, which must ultimately be grounded in her trust of the administrative process, aligning her with the so-called ‘functionalist’ school of thought associated with progressive thinkers. I then turn to the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent rearticulation of Canadian administrative law in the Vavilov case – a rearticulation with which Abella J expressed firm disagreement. I reflect on why the majority and Abella J diverged in Vavilov and suggest that the key features of Abella J’s jurisprudence – restraint and autonomy – are rooted in a mode of thinking about administrative law that has fallen out of favour.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
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