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引用次数: 0
摘要
在某些情况下，即使公司没有做出任何重大的战略改变，新任CEO也会出现离职，而且新任CEO的能力与前任相似。本文旨在为这种看似不合理的现象提供一个合理的解释。这种“激进”的CEO更替的一个可能原因是，董事会希望减少私下知情的CEO所赚取的信息租金。具体来说，现任首席执行官很容易就盈利前景向董事会“撒沙袋”，以便为未来的执行获得更慷慨的激励薪酬，而(看似激进的)替代政策有助于阻止这种博弈。也就是说，与文献所建议的“基于信息的堑壕”不同(Laux 2008;Inderst and Mueller 2010)，本文显示了一种抵消效应，即CEO的私人信息(结合后期道德风险问题)可能比事后效率基准更容易导致她被解雇。JEL分类:D86;G34;M41。
ABSTRACT There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this “aggressive” CEO turnover is the board’s desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to “sandbag” the board about profitability prospects to secure more generous incentive pay for future implementation, and a (seemingly aggressive) replacement policy helps discourage this kind of gaming. That is, instead of “information-based entrenchment” as suggested by the literature (Laux 2008; Inderst and Mueller 2010), this paper shows a countervailing effect that the CEO’s private information (combined with the later-stage moral hazard problem) may lead to her dismissal more often than the ex post efficient benchmark. JEL Classifications: D86; G34; M41.
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