问题董事与公司风险承担

IF 4.5 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan, Jia Liu, Ashraful Alam
{"title":"问题董事与公司风险承担","authors":"Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan,&nbsp;Jia Liu,&nbsp;Ashraful Alam","doi":"10.1111/1467-8551.12770","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the impact of a ‘problem director’ on the risk-taking propensity of a firm and its consequences for firm value. Analysing a sample of US companies, we find that corporate risk-taking propensity increases when a firm appoints a problem director. Our results are of economic significance, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in problem director's score leads to a 2.33% to 4.17% increase in corporate risk-taking. Mediation analysis reveals that a problem director increases firm risk-taking through reducing financial reporting quality. Further, a firm's risk-taking increases when a new problem director joins the board, and the damaging effect persists even after the problem director has left. Moreover, if a chief executive officer (CEO) is a problem director, s/he displays a greater predisposition for risk-taking. Moreover, when a problem director also sits on a board led by a problem CEO, we determine that the former will have an even greater propensity to take risks. Further analysis determines that the presence of problem directors damages long-term firm value in the aftermath of risk-taking behaviour. Overall, this study provides fresh evidence revealing a web of connections between a problem director, ineffective corporate governance and a decline in firm value.</p>","PeriodicalId":48342,"journal":{"name":"British Journal of Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8551.12770","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Problem Directors and Corporate Risk-Taking\",\"authors\":\"Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan,&nbsp;Jia Liu,&nbsp;Ashraful Alam\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1467-8551.12770\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This study investigates the impact of a ‘problem director’ on the risk-taking propensity of a firm and its consequences for firm value. Analysing a sample of US companies, we find that corporate risk-taking propensity increases when a firm appoints a problem director. Our results are of economic significance, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in problem director's score leads to a 2.33% to 4.17% increase in corporate risk-taking. Mediation analysis reveals that a problem director increases firm risk-taking through reducing financial reporting quality. Further, a firm's risk-taking increases when a new problem director joins the board, and the damaging effect persists even after the problem director has left. Moreover, if a chief executive officer (CEO) is a problem director, s/he displays a greater predisposition for risk-taking. Moreover, when a problem director also sits on a board led by a problem CEO, we determine that the former will have an even greater propensity to take risks. Further analysis determines that the presence of problem directors damages long-term firm value in the aftermath of risk-taking behaviour. Overall, this study provides fresh evidence revealing a web of connections between a problem director, ineffective corporate governance and a decline in firm value.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48342,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"British Journal of Management\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8551.12770\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"British Journal of Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12770\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"British Journal of Management","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12770","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了 "问题董事 "对公司风险承担倾向的影响及其对公司价值的影响。通过对美国公司样本的分析,我们发现当公司任命问题董事时,公司的风险承担倾向会增加。我们的研究结果具有重要的经济意义,表明问题董事得分每增加一个标准差,公司的风险承担倾向就会增加 2.33% 至 4.17%。中介分析表明,问题董事通过降低财务报告质量来增加公司的风险承担。此外,当新的问题董事加入董事会时,公司的风险承担会增加,即使在问题董事离职后,这种破坏性影响也会持续存在。此外,如果首席执行官(CEO)是问题董事,那么他/她就会表现出更大的冒险倾向。此外,当问题董事同时也是问题首席执行官领导的董事会成员时,我们确定前者会有更大的冒险倾向。进一步分析表明,问题董事的存在会在冒险行为发生后损害公司的长期价值。总之,这项研究提供了新的证据,揭示了问题董事、无效公司治理和公司价值下降之间的联系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Problem Directors and Corporate Risk-Taking

This study investigates the impact of a ‘problem director’ on the risk-taking propensity of a firm and its consequences for firm value. Analysing a sample of US companies, we find that corporate risk-taking propensity increases when a firm appoints a problem director. Our results are of economic significance, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in problem director's score leads to a 2.33% to 4.17% increase in corporate risk-taking. Mediation analysis reveals that a problem director increases firm risk-taking through reducing financial reporting quality. Further, a firm's risk-taking increases when a new problem director joins the board, and the damaging effect persists even after the problem director has left. Moreover, if a chief executive officer (CEO) is a problem director, s/he displays a greater predisposition for risk-taking. Moreover, when a problem director also sits on a board led by a problem CEO, we determine that the former will have an even greater propensity to take risks. Further analysis determines that the presence of problem directors damages long-term firm value in the aftermath of risk-taking behaviour. Overall, this study provides fresh evidence revealing a web of connections between a problem director, ineffective corporate governance and a decline in firm value.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
12.50%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Management provides a valuable outlet for research and scholarship on management-orientated themes and topics. It publishes articles of a multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature as well as empirical research from within traditional disciplines and managerial functions. With contributions from around the globe, the journal includes articles across the full range of business and management disciplines. A subscription to British Journal of Management includes International Journal of Management Reviews, also published on behalf of the British Academy of Management.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信