对企业网站上分析师报道列表的审查

Mark T. Bradshaw, Lian Fen Lee, Kyle Peterson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:我们研究公司决定在企业投资者关系(IR)网站上提供卖方分析师报道列表。这些上市涉及金融研究的三个主要领域——自愿披露、投资者关系和分析师。我们手工收集的数据允许横断面和时间序列分析。当分析师是更重要的信息中介时,当公司直接参与管理其IR网站时,公司更有可能有这样的列表。对于上市公司来说,分析师被列入上市名单的可能性随着公司对分析师的认识和熟悉程度、分析师的活跃程度和受欢迎程度以及分析师的声誉而增加。额外的分析表明,自托管与第三方托管IR网站的结果相似,但一个明显的例外是,自托管公司对发表对公司更有利研究的分析师表现出更强的偏好。增加或减少分析师的决定强化了主要结果。数据可用性:数据可从文本中确定的公共来源获得。JEL分类:G17;G24;M41。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Examination of the Listing of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Websites
ABSTRACT We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst’s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G17; G24; M41.
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