Predictability: a mistreated virtue of competition law

Abstract Lacking predictability of enforcement hinders the deterrent function of competition law. This article shows that academic analyses of optimal competition rules do not always treat this factor adequately, paying instead excessive attention to the problem of error. Sometimes, predictability is completely ignored as a relevant factor. At other times, it is taken into account but its effects are framed in a way that undermines their significance. This article further discusses three possible reasons why a part of competition law and economics scholarship engages in such mistreatment of predictability. First, it may be a result of writing convenience. Secondly, the role of predictability in selecting the optimal competition rule may simply be misunderstood. Thirdly, the role of predictability may be belittled intentionally in order to advocate rules benefiting the interests of competition practitioners and/or defendants. This article also briefly explores how problematic each reason is and what solutions might be available.