无怨无悔地贴现效用:避免古典功利主义的苛求

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Stijn Bruers
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引用次数: 0

摘要

古典功利主义要求很高,在道德困境中有一些反直觉的含义,如义务论伦理学中的电车问题和人口伦理学中的令人反感的结论。本文介绍了功利主义的一种特殊修正如何避免这些反直觉的含义。在这种被称为“贴现”或“温和”功利主义的改良功利主义理论中,人们有权贴现他人的效用,条件是效用被贴现的人不能有效地抱怨这种贴现。效用折现者的投诉是无效的如果该选项中折现者的存在在特定意义上是必要的或者折现者的存在在某种意义上是不必要的。根据温和功利主义,我们应该选择有效贴现或无投诉贴现效用最大化的选项,即每个人的效用减去无投诉折扣的总和。由于有两个条件使申诉无效,这种折扣权可以翻译为两个版本:身体自主权和生育自主权。前一种权利涉及义务伦理学中的单纯手段原则,后一种权利有助于避免人口伦理学中的排斥结论问题。讨论了民主地给允许的折扣量设定上界的可能性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Discounting Utility Without Complaints: Avoiding the Demandingness of Classical Utilitarianism
Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
41
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