{"title":"分析师会提前发布负面意见吗？","authors":"Yanhua Sunny Yang , Chris Yung","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100856","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine analysts’ forecast timing when issuing negative opinions. When management withholds bad news, good news become more abundant but relatively uninformative. We theoretically predict and empirically document that analysts treat observed bad news as having higher precision and respond to it by issuing forecasts more quickly and accurately than for good news forecasts. These results hold to various robustness checks. This study improves our understanding of negative information dissemination in capital markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":2,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100856"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do analysts distribute negative opinions earlier?\",\"authors\":\"Yanhua Sunny Yang , Chris Yung\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100856\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine analysts’ forecast timing when issuing negative opinions. When management withholds bad news, good news become more abundant but relatively uninformative. We theoretically predict and empirically document that analysts treat observed bad news as having higher precision and respond to it by issuing forecasts more quickly and accurately than for good news forecasts. These results hold to various robustness checks. This study improves our understanding of negative information dissemination in capital markets.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":2,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"volume\":\"67 \",\"pages\":\"Article 100856\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300054X\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300054X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine analysts’ forecast timing when issuing negative opinions. When management withholds bad news, good news become more abundant but relatively uninformative. We theoretically predict and empirically document that analysts treat observed bad news as having higher precision and respond to it by issuing forecasts more quickly and accurately than for good news forecasts. These results hold to various robustness checks. This study improves our understanding of negative information dissemination in capital markets.
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