解决关于科学实在论的争论:来自立场的挑战

IF 1.4 2区哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI:10.1017/psa.2023.141

Anjan Chakravartty

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引用次数: 0

摘要

认知立场是与评估证据相关的态度、价值观、目标和政策的集合，最终导致对科学调查结果的信仰或不可知论。如果在某些情况下，分别提倡科学实在论和反实在论的矛盾立场在理性上是允许的，这似乎会破坏解决现实主义者和反现实主义者之间某些争论的可能性。在本文中，我回答了关于这种立场概念的两个问题，其效果是:(1)在给定某些自然假设的情况下，现实主义的立场实际上是现实主义者的理性义务;(2)这种允许主义将证实伪科学和科学否认主义。

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Resolving Debates about Scientific Realism: The Challenge from Stances

Abstract Epistemic stances are collections of attitudes, values, aims, and policies relevant to assessing evidence, eventuating in belief or agnosticism regarding the output of scientific investigations. If in some cases conflicting stances promoting scientific realism and antirealism, respectively, are rationally permissible, this would seem to undermine the possibility of resolving certain debates between realists and antirealists. In this paper I reply to two concerns about this conception of stances, to the effect that: (1) a stance underlying realism is, in fact, rationally obligatory for realists, given certain natural assumptions; and (2) this sort of permissivism would validate pseudoscience and science denialism.

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来源期刊

Philosophy of Science 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

5.90%

发文量

128

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.