Finality, Res Judicata, and Counter-Epistemic Values in Civil Proceedings

Abstract This article proposes a perspective on res judicata whereby it can be approached as an epistemic barrier to the fact-finding process in subsequent civil proceedings. Being a well-recognized principle, it is enshrined as a strong and respected legal doctrine, recognized in every contemporary modern justice system, allowing courts to apply it confidently and commonly. Res judicata impedes the reiteration of litigation among the same parties on the same topic, and, in so doing, it will not allow further discussion on the issues adjudicated, notwithstanding the fact that new and better evidence might come to be available, and consequently result in a more accurate judgment. Thus, the private and public rationale for res judicata and its preclusive effects can be defined as a non-epistemic value of the public policy that diverts from the truth-seeking purpose of the judicial process toward finality and conclusiveness.