精神力量:一种经验强度理论

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Jorge Morales
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的痛苦可以或多或少地强烈,我们的心理意象可以或多或少地生动,我们的感知体验可以或多或少地引人注目。这些意识体验的强度程度都是一种现象属性的表现,我称之为精神力量。在这篇文章中,我认为精神力量是一个领域-一般现象量级;换句话说,这是所有意识体验共有的现象量,解释了它们感受到的强度程度。由于心理状态的类型、表征内容、特定领域现象学或注意等过程,心理强度在很大程度上被忽视了。在我们对心灵的反思中考虑到精神力量,可以阐明关于表征意旨和现象性特征之间关系的争论,也有助于解决关于意识的结构和功能的问题。精神力量为不同类型的意识体验的现象学提供了一个统一的模型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mental strength: A theory of experience intensity
Abstract Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength . In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain‐general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain‐specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences.
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CiteScore
1.50
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