什么将“承担我们的重量”:纽曼关于综合方法

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 LITERATURE
Rowan Willliams
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Newman speaks of an \"integrative habit of mind\" which, like those nebulous terms \"judgment\" or \"taste,\" is something into which we grow over time by an exercise of the mind that is more than plain rational argument—in the sense we ordinarily give to the word \"rational.\" Our intellectual life is a range of skills and habits through which we make connections allowing us to advance, both theoretically and practically. We discover what will, so to speak, bear our weight as we continue to speak intelligibly and in mutual recognizability about the environment we share. And this discovery in the intellectual sphere is more similar than we might imagine to the way in which we grow into practical certainties in our actions: Newman tellingly compares our normal intellectual activity to the educated instinct of the rock climber, testing what will hold, feeling for [End Page 197] a grip, not operating by a clear prescribed plan. Putting it slightly differently—and relating to the second theme—he is reminding us that what counts as a good argument, and thus as a \"reasonable\" decision, varies significantly and interestingly depending on the context. It is always worth asking in any kind of discourse what models of certainty you are taking for granted, what actual work the notion of certainty is doing (as Wittgenstein sets out in his demolition of empty and artificial accounts of the kind of thing we are supposed to \"know\" with certainty in some philosophical traditions) and whether they are appropriate to their setting. One of the most remarkable things Newman does in his discussion in the Grammar is simply to show that the \"integrative habit\" of language and reflection is at work in the sphere of religious conviction and agency in a way quite similar to how it works elsewhere. There is no yawning chasm between faith and reason, no plea for religious language to be exempted from the protocols of reason, simply because our reasoning is diverse, contextually inflected, and never restricted to deductive necessity. Newman is anything but a relativist; the focus is on how our habits of mind and body, taken all together, enable us to find our way reliably around a world which does not depend on our choice and preference. We are responsible for getting it right. If we are wrong about what will \"bear our weight,\" there are consequences. But the fascination of his discussions of religious conviction, educational philosophy, the whole spectrum of intellectual method, is that he offers a notably (and appropriately) \"integrative\" account of how we construct a coherent environment by both physical and mental kinds of learning, how our certainties are shaped by history, relationality, and trust rather than timeless ratiocination. 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Putting it slightly differently—and relating to the second theme—he is reminding us that what counts as a good argument, and thus as a \\\"reasonable\\\" decision, varies significantly and interestingly depending on the context. It is always worth asking in any kind of discourse what models of certainty you are taking for granted, what actual work the notion of certainty is doing (as Wittgenstein sets out in his demolition of empty and artificial accounts of the kind of thing we are supposed to \\\"know\\\" with certainty in some philosophical traditions) and whether they are appropriate to their setting. One of the most remarkable things Newman does in his discussion in the Grammar is simply to show that the \\\"integrative habit\\\" of language and reflection is at work in the sphere of religious conviction and agency in a way quite similar to how it works elsewhere. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

什么将“承担我们的重量”:纽曼的综合方法。纽曼的许多读者都注意到他的一些观点与路德维希·维特根斯坦的观点有重合之处。他们绝不是天生的同床共枕,重要的是不要太匆忙地把他们放在一起,或者把纽曼看作一个技术哲学分析师。但他的笔记和论文以及令人敬畏的同意语法证明了他对两个主题的兴趣——这两个主题在他的时代是不同寻常的——当代哲学不仅受到维特根斯坦的影响,而且受到现象学(甚至最近的神经科学)的影响,越来越多地寻求解决。其一是获取一组真命题与我们习惯上所说的理解之间的对比。纽曼谈到了一种“思维的综合习惯”,就像那些模糊的术语“判断”或“品味”一样,是我们随着时间的推移,通过思维的锻炼而成长起来的东西,而不仅仅是简单的理性论证——在我们通常赋予“理性”这个词的意义上。我们的智力生活是一系列的技能和习惯,通过这些技能和习惯,我们建立联系,使我们在理论和实践上都能进步。当我们继续以可理解和可识别的方式谈论我们所共享的环境时,我们会发现,可以说,什么将承担我们的重量。这种在智力领域的发现,比我们想象的更类似于我们在行动中成长为实际确定性的方式:纽曼生动地将我们的正常智力活动比作攀岩者受过教育的本能,测试什么能坚持下去,感受握力,而不是按照明确规定的计划操作。换一种稍微不同的说法——与第二个主题有关——他提醒我们,什么是好的论点,什么是“合理的”决定,根据上下文的不同,变化很大,也很有趣。在任何类型的论述中,总是值得一问的是,你认为什么样的确定性模型是理所当然的,确定性概念的实际作用是什么(正如维特根斯坦在他对某些哲学传统中我们应该“知道”的事物的空洞和人为描述的拆除中所阐述的那样),以及它们是否适合于它们的背景。纽曼在他的《语法》一书中所做的最值得注意的事情之一就是简单地表明,语言和反思的“综合习惯”在宗教信仰和代理领域发挥作用,其作用方式与其他领域非常相似。信仰和理性之间没有巨大的鸿沟,没有人请求宗教语言免于理性的协议,仅仅因为我们的推理是多样的,上下文的变化,从不局限于演绎的必要性。纽曼绝不是一个相对主义者;重点是我们的思想和身体习惯如何结合在一起,使我们能够在一个不依赖于我们的选择和偏好的世界中可靠地找到我们的道路。我们有责任把事情做好。如果我们对什么能“承受我们的重量”判断错误,就会有后果。但是他对宗教信仰,教育哲学,整个知识方法的讨论的魅力在于,他提供了一个显著的(而且恰当的)“综合”解释了我们如何通过身体和精神的学习来构建一个连贯的环境,我们的确定性是如何被历史、关系和信任而不是永恒的推理所塑造的。正是他对“论证”和“理性”的多样性的敏感,以及对暴露于我们无法控制或遏制的现实的必要性的敏感,赋予了他的作品如此多的持久的智力价值。当一个令人不安的狭隘和机械的教育模型——实际上是作为一个整体的心理过程——继续获得影响力的时候,纽曼对智力的“综合”工作的分析具有特别引人注目和及时的兴趣。[endpage 198] r.d.。剑桥大学罗文·威廉姆斯罗文·威廉姆斯出生在威尔士,早年的大部分时间都在做牧师。
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What Will "Bear Our Weight": Newman on the Integrative Method
What Will "Bear Our Weight":Newman on the Integrative Method The Rt. Revd. and Rt. Hon. Dr. Rowan Willliams (bio) A number of Newman's readers have noted the convergences between some of his ideas and those of Ludwig Wittgenstein. They are not by any means natural bedfellows, and it is important not to push them together too hastily, or to treat Newman as more of a technical philosophical analyst than he was. But his notebooks and essays as well as the formidable Grammar of Assent testify to an interest—unusual for his time—in two themes that contemporary philosophy, influenced not only by Wittgenstein but by phenomenology (and even more recently, neuroscience), has increasingly sought to tackle. One is the contrast between the acquiring of a set of true propositions and what we habitually call understanding. Newman speaks of an "integrative habit of mind" which, like those nebulous terms "judgment" or "taste," is something into which we grow over time by an exercise of the mind that is more than plain rational argument—in the sense we ordinarily give to the word "rational." Our intellectual life is a range of skills and habits through which we make connections allowing us to advance, both theoretically and practically. We discover what will, so to speak, bear our weight as we continue to speak intelligibly and in mutual recognizability about the environment we share. And this discovery in the intellectual sphere is more similar than we might imagine to the way in which we grow into practical certainties in our actions: Newman tellingly compares our normal intellectual activity to the educated instinct of the rock climber, testing what will hold, feeling for [End Page 197] a grip, not operating by a clear prescribed plan. Putting it slightly differently—and relating to the second theme—he is reminding us that what counts as a good argument, and thus as a "reasonable" decision, varies significantly and interestingly depending on the context. It is always worth asking in any kind of discourse what models of certainty you are taking for granted, what actual work the notion of certainty is doing (as Wittgenstein sets out in his demolition of empty and artificial accounts of the kind of thing we are supposed to "know" with certainty in some philosophical traditions) and whether they are appropriate to their setting. One of the most remarkable things Newman does in his discussion in the Grammar is simply to show that the "integrative habit" of language and reflection is at work in the sphere of religious conviction and agency in a way quite similar to how it works elsewhere. There is no yawning chasm between faith and reason, no plea for religious language to be exempted from the protocols of reason, simply because our reasoning is diverse, contextually inflected, and never restricted to deductive necessity. Newman is anything but a relativist; the focus is on how our habits of mind and body, taken all together, enable us to find our way reliably around a world which does not depend on our choice and preference. We are responsible for getting it right. If we are wrong about what will "bear our weight," there are consequences. But the fascination of his discussions of religious conviction, educational philosophy, the whole spectrum of intellectual method, is that he offers a notably (and appropriately) "integrative" account of how we construct a coherent environment by both physical and mental kinds of learning, how our certainties are shaped by history, relationality, and trust rather than timeless ratiocination. It is his sensitivity both to the diversity of what counts as "argument" and "reason," and to the imperative of exposure to a reality we do not control or contain that gives his work so much of its abiding intellectual value. At a time when a disturbingly narrow and mechanical model of education—and indeed of mental process as a whole—continues to gain influence, Newman's analyses of the "integrative" work of intellect have a specially compelling and timely interest. [End Page 198] The Rt. Revd. and Rt. Hon. Dr. Rowan Willliams University of Cambridge Rowan Willliams Rowan Williams was born in Wales and spent much of his early ministry...
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