Kant on Language, Communication and Objective Judgment

Abstract This paper explicates the role of language and communication in Kant’s account of objective judgment and objective reference. I take it that the basic units of proper objective reference for Kant are objective judgments, which according to Kant are acts of relating given cognitions to other cognitions in the unity of apperception. The question is, does language play any role in this activity, or is this activity reflected in language somehow? I argue that, unlike early critics such as Herder and Hamann (and many after them) have suggested, Kant does not overall neglect language and communication in his philosophy, but rather can be taken to give an account of how it is possible to use language objectively and communicate objective judgments in the first place. Even though I do not find it a plausible view that according to Kant there is no thinking at all without or prior to language, Kant’s account does not rule out the importance of language for our thinking, judging and communicating. My claim is that Kant’s account of categorical experience as universal and necessary cognition of objects provides a ground for languages and their objective use, that is, for the possibility of objective reference in language.