薪酬委员会主席的职能背景:CEO薪酬中绩效指标的选择与权重

IF 2.3 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Rachana Kalelkar, Emeka Nwaeze
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的分析薪酬委员会主席的职能背景与CEO薪酬之间的关系。关于高管薪酬模式的合理性的持续辩论,以及对薪酬委员会作用的日益强调,推动了这一分析。作者定义了三个专家类别——会计、财务和通才,并收集了2008年至2018年标准普尔500指数公司薪酬委员会(CC)主席的数据。本文采用普通最小二乘模型,对三种专家类别的CEO总薪酬和现金薪酬进行回归。作者发现,CC主席在会计、金融和一般业务方面拥有专业知识的公司,更倾向于分别与会计、金融和一般业务更一致的绩效衡量标准。几乎没有证据表明,担任其他公司首席执行官的CC主席会支持给东道主首席执行官更高的薪酬;作者发现一些证据表明,CC主席的任期相对于东道国首席执行官的任期与首席执行官的薪酬水平呈负相关。本研究建议公司和监管机构应考虑薪酬委员会主席的背景,以了解高管的差异。希望将高管薪酬与特定战略领域联系起来的公司还必须考虑将薪酬委员会主席的职能背景与目标战略领域相匹配。从监管的角度来看,要求薪酬委员会独立于内部董事运作,可以减少内部董事回避薪酬过程的企图,但如果不考虑薪酬委员会在薪酬设定过程中的自由裁量权的影响,可能会扭曲高管的薪酬绩效关系。这是第一个考察薪酬委员会主席职能背景对CEO薪酬影响的研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The functional background of the compensation committee chair: the choice and weight of performance measures in CEO compensation
Purpose The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees. Design/methodology/approach The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories. Findings The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay. Research limitations/implications This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive. Practical implications Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation. Originality/value This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.
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来源期刊
Asian Review of Accounting
Asian Review of Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
25.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Covering various fields of accounting, Asian Review of Accounting publishes research papers, commentary notes, review papers and practitioner oriented articles that address significant international issues as well as those that focus on Asia Pacific in particular.Coverage includes but is not limited to: -Financial accounting -Managerial accounting -Auditing -Taxation -Accounting information systems -Social and environmental accounting -Accounting education Perspectives or viewpoints arising from regional, national or international focus, a private or public sector information need, or a market-perspective or social and environmental perspective are greatly welcomed. Manuscripts that present viewpoints should address issues of wide interest among accounting scholars internationally and those in Asia Pacific in particular.
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