Geoff Harcourt and the Central Role of Values in Economics

ABSTRACTIt is impossible to separate Geoff Harcourt’s economics from his moral values, both professed and practiced. His work exemplifies the view within the political economy approach that values are inevitably embedded in theory. This characteristic is in sharp contrast with the central tenet of the mainstream view of economic science that it is technical and thus value-free. In considering the role of values in economics we focus particularly on the distinction between moral values and epistemological values. We explore their nature, role and interactions at a range of levels in political economy and in mainstream economics: ontology (including scientific motivation), epistemology and methodology. It is shown that, while moral values are inevitably embedded in theorising, their scope can be severely constrained if epistemological values are given priority. The paper is intended as a contribution to meaningful and constructive debate about values in theorising, with an overarching argument for philosophical consistency.KEYWORDS: Geoff Harcourtvaluesphilosophical consistencyJEL CODES: B31B41B50 AcknowledgementsThis paper has benefitted from comments from Amativa Dutt, John Hart and two anonymous referees, and from discussion following the presentation of some of the material to the Séminaire de recherche sur la pensée économique, April 2023.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Hume (Citation1739-Citation40, III.I, pp. 469–470) is popularly associated with scientific objectivism (as expressed for example by mainstream economics) when his aim rather was simply to draw attention to the treatment in argument of values as if they are objective.2 Of particular relevance are the debates between the ‘naturalist’ and ‘interpretivist’ traditions in economics (Hart Citation2022).3 The word ‘science’ is used here to identify systematic enquiry rather than to denote the way in which the enquiry is conducted.4 The motivation was stronger in some people than others, accounting for specialism in (natural or moral) philosophy. This was Smith’s first expression of the division of labour. He argued further that it was circumstances more than innate qualities which explained who specialised in philosophy and who did not (Skinner Citation2001).5 The role of individualistic ideology in the marginalist revolution was complex. For example, Jevons used utilitarian values to justify interventionist policy in pursuit of the greatest happiness, challenging libertarian politics (see e.g. Paul Citation1979).6 ‘The instant at which a scientist becomes certain that his problem is solved, the following days in which details are worked out and consequences unfold, even the preceding weeks or months of research are sources of unsurpassed, addictive intellectual pleasure’.7 Of the two leading figures in that revolution, Lucas was attracted to economics because he ‘liked to think about social problems’ (Klamer Citation1984, p. 30), while Sargent was motivated by his family background to understand the Great Depression; as a student he was ‘critical and radical’ but ‘not a political activist’ (Klamer Citation1984, p. 69). Sent (Citation1998) documents the importance for Sargent of the intellectual challenges posed by a particular form of deductive mathematics applied both to theory and econometric evidence. The theory held strong implications for economic policy, but as for Debreu it seems that it was the internal logical puzzles which provided the main motivation as his work developed, not moral values.8 See Hart (Citation2022, Citation2023) for an explanation of the term ‘scientific naturalism’ in relation to other forms of naturalism and its implications for the ‘interpretivist’ approach in economics.9 Geoff Harcourt (Citation1994, p. 205) was explicit about the religious foundation of his moral values. This religious dimension holds particular epistemological significance insofar as it involves the notion of perfect knowledge (Dow Citation1996). It is part of the human condition not to be able to access such knowledge, yet to strive to seek it.10 However see Elder-Vass (Citation2022) for a discussion of how far the distinction between the actual and the empirical is significant.11 The conflict between the two has been evident in recent debates between pure and applied macroeconomics, with deductive mathematical rigour still being favoured for determining long-term methodological goals; empirical rigour only remains acceptable as a short-term methodological compromise (Dow Citation2021).12 Davis (Citation2022) discusses the ethical content of economic concepts in terms of Williams’s (Citation1985) notion of ‘thick ethical concepts’ under the guise of positive value-free concepts.13 See further Dow (Citation2017). See Van Staveren (Citation2009) on ethics and efficiency.14 The argument was presaged by Kuhn’s (Citation1962) Citation1970 account of how dominant paradigms maintain their dominance.15 Debreu (Citation1983b, p. 99) argued in his Nobel memorial lecture that it was the simplicity and universality of his mathematical structure that made it so useful for application.