错误的信息

IF 2.8 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-05-11 DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12440

Aditya Kuvalekar, João Ramos, Johannes Schneider

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引用次数: 0

摘要

代理人(有些带有偏见)会根据项目效率的信息，在承担有风险的项目和选择安全的项目之间做出决定。这些信息中只有一部分是可以证实的。无偏见的代理人只希望承接有效率的项目，而有偏见的代理人则希望承接任何项目。如果项目造成损害，法院审查可核实的信息，形成对代理人类型的信念，并决定处罚。在阻止效率低下的项目和使用无法验证的信息产生寒蝉效应之间产生了紧张关系。对不可验证信息的改进总是能提高整体效率，但对可验证信息的改进可能会降低效率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The wrong kind of information

Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, while biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and a chilling effect on using the unverifiable information. Improving the unverifiable information always increases overall efficiency, but improving the verifiable information may reduce efficiency.

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来源期刊

Rand Journal of Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.60

自引率

4.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.