{"title":"在传统主义与修正主义之间:埃斯特伦德与伦佐论非正义战争中服从命令的义务","authors":"Luciano Venezia, Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brígido","doi":"10.1111/raju.12393","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Between Traditionalism and Revisionism: Estlund and Renzo on the Obligation to Obey Orders to Fight in Unjust Wars\",\"authors\":\"Luciano Venezia, Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brígido\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/raju.12393\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45892,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12393\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ratio Juris","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12393","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
David Estlund和Massimo Renzo认为,在适当的背景条件下,战斗人员有义务在非正义战争中服从命令,尽管他们认识到这涉及严重的道德错误。因此,他们的观点是介于传统主义和修正主义之间的正义战争理论。我们认为,埃斯特伦德和伦佐都未能充分区分具有约束力和非约束性的严重道德错误命令,他们的观点与他们对道德的假设事实相对理解不相容,他们未能确立战斗人员有义务在非正义战争中服从命令。我们的结论是,传统主义的观点和这两种中间立场一样站不住脚。
Between Traditionalism and Revisionism: Estlund and Renzo on the Obligation to Obey Orders to Fight in Unjust Wars
Abstract David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view.