了解Web浏览器权限机制的不一致性

Q4 Computer Science
Kazuki Nomoto, Takuya Watanabe, Eitaro Shioji, Mitsuaki Akiyama, Tatsuya Mori
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现代Web服务通过利用用户设备上的硬件资源来提供高级特性。Web浏览器实现了基于用户同意的权限模型,以保护用户隐私。在这项研究中,我们开发了PERMIUM,这是一个web浏览器分析框架,可以自动分析各种浏览器实现的权限机制的行为。我们系统地研究了运行在五种不同操作系统上的22种主要浏览器实现的权限机制行为。我们发现了碎片化的实现。运行在不同操作系统上的浏览器之间的实现并不总是相同的。我们认为,实现上的不一致可能会导致隐私风险。我们从与使用PERMIUM分析相对应的用户研究中发现了浏览器权限实现和用户感知之间的差距。基于实现的不一致性,我们开发了两种概念验证攻击并评估了它们的可行性。第一种攻击利用权限信息秘密跟踪用户。第二种攻击的目的是造成一种情况,即用户无法正确确定权限请求的来源,从而错误地授予权限。最后,我们澄清了在隐私机制中必须标准化的技术问题,并为操作系统/浏览器供应商提供建议,以减轻本研究中确定的威胁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Understanding the Inconsistencies in the Permissions Mechanism of Web Browsers
Modern Web services provide advanced features by utilizing hardware resources on the user's device. Web browsers implement a user consent-based permission model to protect user privacy. In this study, we developed PERMIUM, a web browser analysis framework that automatically analyzes the behavior of permission mechanisms implemented by various browsers. We systematically studied the behavior of permission mechanisms for 22 major browser implementations running on five different operating systems. We found fragmented implementations. Implementations between browsers running on different operating systems are not always identical. We determined that implementation inconsistencies could lead to privacy risks. We identified gaps between browser permission implementations and user perceptions from the user study corresponding to the analyses using PERMIUM. Based on the implementation inconsistencies, we developed two proof-of-concept attacks and evaluated their feasibility. The first attack uses permission information to secretly track the user. The second attack aims to create a situation in which the user cannot correctly determine the origin of the permission request and the user mistakenly grants permission. Finally, we clarify the technical issues that must be standardized in privacy mechanisms and provide recommendations to OS/browser vendors to mitigate the threats identified in this study.
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来源期刊
Journal of Information Processing
Journal of Information Processing Computer Science-Computer Science (all)
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
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