具有连续策略空间的非对称博弈对间接入侵的鲁棒性

IF 0.4 Q4 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在对称博弈的文献中已经研究了抗间接入侵(RAII)的鲁棒策略。在本文中,我们引入了具有连续策略空间的非对称博弈的RAII轮廓的概念。对于这些对策,我们证明了RAII配置文件的所有间接中立突变体的集合等价于最小进化稳定集。此外,全局强不可侵犯配置文件显示为RAII配置文件。我们还讨论了进化稳定集与严格平衡集之间的联系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces
Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.
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来源期刊
International Game Theory Review
International Game Theory Review MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: Rapid developments in technology, communication, industrial organization, economic integration, political reforms and international trade have made it increasingly imperative to recognize the causes and effects of strategic interdependencies and interactions. A strategic approach to decision-making is crucial in areas such as trade negotiations, foreign and domestic investments, capital accumulation, pollution control, market integration, regional cooperation, development and implementation of new technology, arms control, international resource extraction, network sharing, and competitive marketing. Since its inception, game theory has contributed significantly to the foundations of decision-making.
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