{"title":"具有连续策略空间的非对称博弈对间接入侵的鲁棒性","authors":"Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500123","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces\",\"authors\":\"Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/s0219198923500123\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45451,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Game Theory Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Game Theory Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500123\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Game Theory Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500123","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces
Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.
期刊介绍:
Rapid developments in technology, communication, industrial organization, economic integration, political reforms and international trade have made it increasingly imperative to recognize the causes and effects of strategic interdependencies and interactions. A strategic approach to decision-making is crucial in areas such as trade negotiations, foreign and domestic investments, capital accumulation, pollution control, market integration, regional cooperation, development and implementation of new technology, arms control, international resource extraction, network sharing, and competitive marketing. Since its inception, game theory has contributed significantly to the foundations of decision-making.