因果解释和揭示的偏好

IF 1.4 2区哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI:10.1017/psa.2023.112

Kate Vredenburgh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文论述了显性偏好不能解释因果关系的反对意见。我列举了三个条件，在这些条件下，这种偏好可以很好地解释，并使用了一个成功解释行为偏好的例子，以此来为因果解释辩护。当行为偏好是多重可实现的，它们可以很好地解释行为。行为偏好也解释了什么时候代理偏好不能从产生相关行为的环境中分析分离出来(条件2)，以及什么时候环境是一个重要的因果因素(条件3)。因此，没有因果解释的理由完全禁止社会科学揭示的偏好解释。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences

Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.

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来源期刊

Philosophy of Science 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

5.90%

发文量

128

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.