Berge均衡和利他博弈的均衡

IF 1.5 4区 管理学 Q3 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Top Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI:10.1007/s11750-023-00659-3
A. Zapata, A. M. Mármol, L. Monroy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在对社会经济行为和人类互动进行建模时,Berge的均衡概念代表了纳什均衡的补充选择。纳什均衡的概念是基于自身利益的,当参与者寻求最大化自己的收益时,考虑到其他参与者的行为,贝尔热均衡背后的思想是相互支持,因为给定一个参与者的行为,所有其他参与者都会选择他们的行为来寻找她的最佳利益。然而,由于所涉及的苛刻条件,Berge均衡的存在性很少得到保证。在本文中,我们提出了向量值规范化对策作为研究和扩展Berge均衡概念的统一框架。基于所谓利他博弈的均衡,我们引入了新的均衡概念,这些概念构成了Berge概念的不同松弛,尽管它们仍然保留了相互支持的基本思想。我们建立了这些新的均衡,纳什均衡,贝尔热均衡,和其他相关的概念已经存在于文献之间的联系。我们的方法的优势在于,它允许结合偏好信息来确定与参与者的不同利他态度相一致的均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Berge equilibria and the equilibria of the altruistic game
Abstract Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.
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来源期刊
Top
Top 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: TOP publishes original papers that significantly contribute to the theory and methodology of Operations Research, or to the practice of Data Driven Decision Making through innovative applications of Operations Research.
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