{"title":"论内战后受援国民主援助的有效性","authors":"Leonie Reicheneder, Michael Neureiter","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2268536","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDemocracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.KEYWORDS: Democracy aiddemocracy assistancedemocracy promotioncivil warintrastate conflictpost-conflict societies AcknowledgementsThis article is partly based on the master’s thesis of the first author. Special thanks go to Berthold Rittberger for his support and supervision in the planning and conceptualization of this master’s thesis. We are also grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? 12.2 Nowack and Leininger, “Protecting Democracy from Abroad”; European Commission, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.3 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20; Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7.4 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”5 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.6 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil.”7 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”8 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.9 Strand and Hegre, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020; Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 1.10 OECD, “States of Fragility 2020.”11 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”12 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance; Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?”13 Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”14 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”15 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.16 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.17 Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7; de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20.18 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”19 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”20 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 218.21 Lührmann, McMann and van Ham, Democracy Aid Effectiveness, 6.22 Hyde, “Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion,” 358.23 Ibid.24 Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third”; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 65–76; Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”25 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” 405; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 70; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”26 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” 113; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 166–67; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 69.27 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 234.28 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 842; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780.29 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236.30 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13.31 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 847.32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”33 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?” 164; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 841.34 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”35 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski, “The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions”; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, “Democratic Aid and the Democratization of Recipients.”36 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”37 Gibson et al., The Political Economy of Development Aid; Knack and Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients.”38 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”39 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil”; Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid.”40 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”41 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”42 Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”43 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.44 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities.45 In this study, we use the terms “intrastate war” and “civil war” synonymously.46 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 2.47 UCDP, UCDP Definitions.48 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization”; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization”; for an overview on the determinants of democratisation see Pérez-Liñán, “Democracies,” 91–95.49 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 36; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”50 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization.”51 Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.52 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States”; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.53 Baker, “Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance,” 760; Jarstad and Sisk, “Introduction,” 5–6.54 Cederman, Hug and Krebs, “Democratization and Civil War”; Höglund, “Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions”; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, 5; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Snyder, Democratization and Nationalist Violence; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.55 Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Regan and Bell, “Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”56 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hartzell and Hoddie, “Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” 319; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Sisk, “Peacebuilding as Democratization,” 252.57 Alihodžić et al., Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.58 Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.59 Cf. Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.60 Chauvet and Collier, “Preconditions for Turnarounds in Failing States”; Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies”; Donaubauer, Herzer and Nunnenkamp, “The Effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict Conditions”; Flores and Nooruddin, “Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs”; Garriga and Phillips, “Foreign Aid as a Signal to Investors.”61 Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies; Call, The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence; François and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States”; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.62 Besley and Persson, “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development”; Wright and Winters, “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.”63 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 42.64 Cf. Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 179. Lappin finds post-conflict contexts to vary with regards to the number of warring parties, their desired war outcomes, balance of military power, size of the country, number of combatants, duration of conflict, and type of peace agreement. See also Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” who find that decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, and power sharing decrease the risks of renewed violence after early post-conflict elections. On negotiated settlements and peace agreements, see Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation.65 Cf. Ibid.; Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96; Licht, “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival,” 59.66 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.67 Butterfield, History and Human Relations; Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”68 Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, 157; Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 590.69 Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 588.70 Cf. Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 830.71 Cf. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War.” This study applies the concept of the security dilemma to negotiated settlements after intrastate conflict, such that the former belligerents refuse to disarm out of fear of the other side reneging. As a result, agreements can break down and fighting resumes. Our argument similarly applies the concept of the security dilemma to explain the behavior of former belligerents in post-civil war contexts, but in the context of external democracy assistance.72 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.73 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Lind, “Democratization and Stability in East Asia,” 10; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict.74 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 14.75 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States,” 57; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight; Zürcher et al., Peacebuilding and Democratization after War.76 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”77 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.78 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 181.79 Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 180; Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 134–35; Singh, Corruption in the Afghan Police Force, 47–48.80 Cf. Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” 826.81 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”82 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.83 We chose this sample period for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, it has been argued that the post-2001 period poses a much more difficult environment for democracy assistance than the 1990s, which is why the effectiveness of democracy aid cannot be fruitfully compared across these two periods (Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities). Empirically, missing data is a substantial problem for disbursements from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) prior to 2002; starting in 2002, data coverage increases to more than 90%.84 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities, 6–7.85 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V11, 348.86 Ibid., 46.87 OECD, “DAC and CRS Code Lists.”88 Ibid.89 Detailed information on the coding of and data sources for the control variables is available in the appendix.90 E.g. Donno and Neureiter, “Can Human Rights Conditionality Reduce Repression?”91 We create six region dummies, one for each of the following geographical areas: Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; Western Europe and North America; Asia and the Pacific; and Sub-Saharan Africa.92 One should note that the type of activities supported by top-down aid tends to be more costly than the type of activities bottom-up assistance entails, which somewhat qualifies our statement that the former is a much more prominent form of democracy assistance than the latter. Still, we believe that the general sentiment holds true and that there are opportunities to shift funds to bottom-up activities in post-conflict societies.93 Cf. Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.94 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.95 Ibid.96 Altunbas and Thornton, “The (Small) Blessing of Foreign Aid”; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics.”97 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”98 Arellano and Bond, “Some Test of Specification for Panel Data.”99 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.100 Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsLeonie ReichenederLeonie Reicheneder is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include democratization, aid effectiveness, and post-conflict state-building.Michael NeureiterMichael Neureiter is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Political Science at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His research interests include political behaviour, public opinion, and democratization. His work has been published in journals such as Political Science Research and Methods, West European Politics, and Political Psychology.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"51 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the effectiveness of democracy aid in post-civil war recipient countries\",\"authors\":\"Leonie Reicheneder, Michael Neureiter\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13510347.2023.2268536\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTDemocracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.KEYWORDS: Democracy aiddemocracy assistancedemocracy promotioncivil warintrastate conflictpost-conflict societies AcknowledgementsThis article is partly based on the master’s thesis of the first author. Special thanks go to Berthold Rittberger for his support and supervision in the planning and conceptualization of this master’s thesis. We are also grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? 12.2 Nowack and Leininger, “Protecting Democracy from Abroad”; European Commission, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.3 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20; Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7.4 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”5 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.6 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil.”7 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”8 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.9 Strand and Hegre, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020; Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 1.10 OECD, “States of Fragility 2020.”11 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”12 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance; Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?”13 Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”14 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”15 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.16 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.17 Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7; de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20.18 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”19 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”20 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 218.21 Lührmann, McMann and van Ham, Democracy Aid Effectiveness, 6.22 Hyde, “Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion,” 358.23 Ibid.24 Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third”; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 65–76; Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”25 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” 405; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 70; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”26 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” 113; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 166–67; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 69.27 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 234.28 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 842; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780.29 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236.30 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13.31 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 847.32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”33 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?” 164; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 841.34 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”35 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski, “The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions”; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, “Democratic Aid and the Democratization of Recipients.”36 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”37 Gibson et al., The Political Economy of Development Aid; Knack and Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients.”38 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”39 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil”; Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid.”40 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”41 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”42 Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”43 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.44 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities.45 In this study, we use the terms “intrastate war” and “civil war” synonymously.46 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 2.47 UCDP, UCDP Definitions.48 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization”; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization”; for an overview on the determinants of democratisation see Pérez-Liñán, “Democracies,” 91–95.49 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 36; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”50 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization.”51 Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.52 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States”; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.53 Baker, “Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance,” 760; Jarstad and Sisk, “Introduction,” 5–6.54 Cederman, Hug and Krebs, “Democratization and Civil War”; Höglund, “Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions”; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, 5; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Snyder, Democratization and Nationalist Violence; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.55 Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Regan and Bell, “Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”56 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hartzell and Hoddie, “Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” 319; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Sisk, “Peacebuilding as Democratization,” 252.57 Alihodžić et al., Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.58 Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.59 Cf. Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.60 Chauvet and Collier, “Preconditions for Turnarounds in Failing States”; Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies”; Donaubauer, Herzer and Nunnenkamp, “The Effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict Conditions”; Flores and Nooruddin, “Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs”; Garriga and Phillips, “Foreign Aid as a Signal to Investors.”61 Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies; Call, The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence; François and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States”; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.62 Besley and Persson, “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development”; Wright and Winters, “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.”63 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 42.64 Cf. Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 179. Lappin finds post-conflict contexts to vary with regards to the number of warring parties, their desired war outcomes, balance of military power, size of the country, number of combatants, duration of conflict, and type of peace agreement. See also Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” who find that decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, and power sharing decrease the risks of renewed violence after early post-conflict elections. On negotiated settlements and peace agreements, see Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation.65 Cf. Ibid.; Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96; Licht, “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival,” 59.66 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.67 Butterfield, History and Human Relations; Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”68 Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, 157; Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 590.69 Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 588.70 Cf. Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 830.71 Cf. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War.” This study applies the concept of the security dilemma to negotiated settlements after intrastate conflict, such that the former belligerents refuse to disarm out of fear of the other side reneging. As a result, agreements can break down and fighting resumes. Our argument similarly applies the concept of the security dilemma to explain the behavior of former belligerents in post-civil war contexts, but in the context of external democracy assistance.72 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.73 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Lind, “Democratization and Stability in East Asia,” 10; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict.74 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 14.75 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States,” 57; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight; Zürcher et al., Peacebuilding and Democratization after War.76 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”77 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.78 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 181.79 Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 180; Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 134–35; Singh, Corruption in the Afghan Police Force, 47–48.80 Cf. Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” 826.81 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”82 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.83 We chose this sample period for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, it has been argued that the post-2001 period poses a much more difficult environment for democracy assistance than the 1990s, which is why the effectiveness of democracy aid cannot be fruitfully compared across these two periods (Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities). Empirically, missing data is a substantial problem for disbursements from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) prior to 2002; starting in 2002, data coverage increases to more than 90%.84 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities, 6–7.85 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V11, 348.86 Ibid., 46.87 OECD, “DAC and CRS Code Lists.”88 Ibid.89 Detailed information on the coding of and data sources for the control variables is available in the appendix.90 E.g. Donno and Neureiter, “Can Human Rights Conditionality Reduce Repression?”91 We create six region dummies, one for each of the following geographical areas: Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; Western Europe and North America; Asia and the Pacific; and Sub-Saharan Africa.92 One should note that the type of activities supported by top-down aid tends to be more costly than the type of activities bottom-up assistance entails, which somewhat qualifies our statement that the former is a much more prominent form of democracy assistance than the latter. Still, we believe that the general sentiment holds true and that there are opportunities to shift funds to bottom-up activities in post-conflict societies.93 Cf. Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.94 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.95 Ibid.96 Altunbas and Thornton, “The (Small) Blessing of Foreign Aid”; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics.”97 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”98 Arellano and Bond, “Some Test of Specification for Panel Data.”99 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.100 Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsLeonie ReichenederLeonie Reicheneder is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include democratization, aid effectiveness, and post-conflict state-building.Michael NeureiterMichael Neureiter is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Political Science at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His research interests include political behaviour, public opinion, and democratization. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
摘要民主援助是近30年来美国外交政策的重要手段。然而,目前尚不清楚这种援助是否对受援国的民主发展有任何有意义的影响,因为以前的研究得出的结果有些矛盾。我们认为,受援国的冲突历史是民主援助与民主发展之间关系的重要调节因素,从而为有关民主援助有效性的新兴文献做出了贡献。具体而言,我们开发了一个理论框架,该框架检查了两种不同类型的民主援助-自上而下和自下而上的援助-对冲突后受援国民主发展的影响。通过对147个受援国19年间(2002-2020年)的数据进行分析,我们发现,虽然这两种援助类型对受援国的民主水平都没有显著的总体影响,但自下而上的民主援助确实在冲突后环境中产生了积极而显著的影响,这表明冲突后时期为国内亲民主行动者及其国际支持者提供了推动其国家走向民主发展的机会。这些发现对民主援助和冲突的文献以及对促进国外民主发展感兴趣的政策制定者具有启示意义。关键词:民主援助、民主援助、民主促进、内战、国内冲突、冲突后社会特别感谢Berthold Rittberger在本硕士论文的规划和构思过程中给予的支持和指导。我们也感谢编辑和三位匿名审稿人提供的有益意见和建议。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Boese et al.,独裁化改变自然?12.2诺瓦克和莱宁格:《保护民主不受外来侵害》;欧洲委员会,邻里、发展和国际合作文书,3 de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,20;霍纳特,《跨大西洋民主援助》,7.4波辛,《支持前苏联的民主》;格什曼和艾伦,《对民主援助的攻击》;格林和马西斯,《通过援助实现民主化?》5迪特里希和赖特:《对外援助分配策略》;Finkel等,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2014. Bermeo,“援助不是石油。”7康奈尔,“政权类型对民主援助对民主的影响有影响吗?”8 Finkel et al.,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2014。Strand and Hegre,武装冲突趋势,1946-2020;Strand等人,武装冲突的趋势,1946-2018,1.10 OECD,“脆弱性国家2020”。11 de Zeeuw和Kumar,《对冲突后社会的民主援助》。布什:《民主援助的驯服》;《美国能实现经济自由吗?》13 Kopstein,《跨大西洋对民主促进的分歧》。14 Carothers,《民主援助:政治Vs.发展?》15 zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家”中的民主支持有效性”,30.16 Cornell,“政权类型是否影响民主援助对民主的影响?”;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003”;Finkel等,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2014.17 Hornat,《跨大西洋民主援助》,7;de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,20.18 Carothers,“民主援助:政治Vs.发展?”19 von Borzyskowski,《抵制民主援助》20迪特里希和赖特,《外援分配策略》,218.21 l<s:1>赫曼,麦克曼和范哈姆,《民主援助有效性》,6.22海德,《选举监督和国际规范扩散》,358.23同上。24格林和马西斯,《稳定第一,发展第二,民主第三》;哈利普:《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》,第65-76页;《跨大西洋在促进民主方面的分歧》。25迪特里希和赖特,“外援分配策略”,220;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003,”405;民主能帮助改善民主吗?“780;哈利普:《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》,第70期;Schimmelfennig和Sedelmeier,“条件治理”。26 Carothers,“民主援助:战略问题”,113;Carothers,《援助海外民主》,166-67页;Savun和Tirone,“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”“236;《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》,第69页。 27迪特里希和赖特,“对外援助分配策略”,220;Savun和Tirone,“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”234.28迪特里希和赖特,“对外援助分配策略”,220;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003”;萨维奇,《民主援助的有效性》,842;民主能帮助改善民主吗?780.29 de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,10-13;Savun和Tirone,“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”236.30 de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,10-13.31 Dietrich和Wright,“外援分配策略”,220;萨维奇,“民主援助的有效性”,847.32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003”;萨维奇,《民主援助的有效性》33 Finkel et al.,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2014;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003”;格林和马西斯,《通过援助实现民主化?》“164;萨维奇,“民主援助的有效性”,841.34博辛,“支持前苏联的民主”;格什曼和艾伦,《对民主援助的攻击》;格林和马西斯,《通过援助实现民主化?》35迪特里希和赖特,《对外援助分配策略》;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson,“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2003”;Finkel et al.,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响,1990-2014;Gibson, Hoffman和Jablonski,《技术援助在非洲转型中的作用》;Kalyvitis和Vlachaki, <民主援助和接受者的民主化>。36 zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家”的民主支持有效性”。37 Gibson等人,《发展援助的政治经济学》;Knack和Rahman,“受援国的捐助者分裂和官僚质量”。38 .斯奈德,《美国民主援助与威权国家》。39贝尔梅奥,《援助不是石油》;邓宁,《调节援助的效果》。斯奈德,《美国民主援助与威权国家》。41康奈尔,“政权类型对民主援助对民主的影响重要吗?”42 Savage,《民主援助的有效性》43布什,《民主援助的驯服》。44芬克尔等人,《美国对外援助对民主建设的影响:第三阶段活动报告》。45在本研究中,我们将“国内战争”和“内战”等同使用。46 de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,2.47 UCDP, UCDP定义。Riese, Röhner和z<e:1> rcher,“冲突后民主化的外部战略”;关于民主化决定因素的概述,见Pérez-Liñán,“民主”,91-95.49。Paris和Sisk,国家建设的困境,36;zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家”的民主支持有效性。《50乔希》,内战后的民主化。51 Riese, Röhner and z<e:1> rcher,《冲突后民主化的外部战略》,266.52 Diamond,《在冲突后和失败国家促进民主》;Fiedler et al.,“有效支持受冲突影响国家的和平与民主”;53 Baker,“冲突解决与民主治理”,760;贾斯塔德和西克,《导论》,5-6.54;塞德曼,霍格和克雷布斯,《民主化与内战》;Höglund,“从战争到民主过渡中的暴力”;《从国内冲突到政治参与》,第5期;巴黎,内战后建设和平;斯奈德:民主化与民族主义暴力;曼斯菲尔德和斯奈德:《选择战斗》;格莱迪奇:《所有国际政治都是地方性的》;hegreet al.,《走向民主的国内和平?》;里根和贝尔,《为什么无政府政体更容易发生内战?》56福特纳:《维持和平有效吗?》;Hartzell和Hoddie,“权力分享和内战后的冲突管理”,第319期;贾斯塔德和西克:《从战争到民主》Sisk,“建设和平即民主化”,252.57 Alihodžić et al.,过渡选举的时间和顺序;霍华德,国际媒体援助;赖利,国际选举援助;[10]格林和马西斯:《通过援助实现民主化?》;霍华德,国际媒体援助;赖利,国际选举援助;[10]胡晓明,《冲突后社会的民主与政党援助》,参见zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家的民主支持有效性”,第30期。 60 Chauvet and Collier,“失败国家扭转颓势的先决条件”;Collier and Hoeffler:《冲突后社会的援助、政策与增长》;Donaubauer, Herzer和Nunnenkamp,“冲突后条件下援助的有效性”;Flores和Nooruddin,《评估世界银行冲突后援助项目》;Garriga和Phillips,《对外援助对投资者的一个信号》。[61]布林克霍夫:《冲突后社会的治理》;Call,内战复发的原因及预防;弗朗索瓦和苏德,“促进脆弱和失败国家的稳定与发展”;zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家”中的民主-支持有效性”,30.62 Besley和Persson,“国家能力、冲突和发展”;怀特和温特斯,《有效对外援助的政治》。[63] zulueta - f<s:1> lscher,“脆弱国家的民主支持有效性”,42.64 Cf. Lappin,“冲突后民主援助的挑战”,179。拉平发现,冲突后的环境因交战各方的数量、他们期望的战争结果、军事力量的平衡、国家的规模、战斗人员的数量、冲突的持续时间和和平协议的类型而有所不同。另见布兰卡蒂和斯奈德的《杀戮时刻》(Time to Kill),他们发现决定性的胜利、遣散、维和和权力分享降低了冲突后早期选举后再次发生暴力的风险。关于谈判解决和和平协定,见Jarstad and Sisk的《从战争到民主》;《从国内冲突到政治参与》[c];戴蒙德,《在冲突后和失败国家促进民主》,1996;light,“外援对领导人生存的影响”,59.66 Joshi,“内战后的民主化”,828;Riese, Röhner和z<e:1> rcher,“冲突后民主化的外部战略”,巴特菲尔德,《历史与人类关系》266.67;赫兹:政治现实主义与政治理想主义安全困境下的合作。68赫兹,《政治现实主义与政治理想主义》,157页;唐,“安全困境”,590.69唐,“安全困境”,588.70 Cf.乔希,“内战后的民主化”,830.71 Cf.沃尔特,“设计内战的过渡”。本研究将安全困境的概念应用于国内冲突后的谈判解决,使前交战各方因害怕对方食言而拒绝解除武装。因此,协议可能会破裂,战斗可能会重新开始。我们的论点同样适用安全困境的概念来解释内战后情况下前交战国的行为,但是在外部民主援助的情况下。72 de Zeeuw and Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,7-9.73 de Zeeuw and Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”;亨廷顿:《变化社会中的政治秩序》;乔希,《内战后的民主化》,828;林德,《东亚民主化与稳定》,第10期;de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,14.75 Diamond,“在冲突后和失败国家促进民主”,96-97;Fiedler等人,“对受冲突影响国家的和平与民主的有效支持”,57;曼斯菲尔德和斯奈德,《选择战斗》;z<s:1> rcher等人,战后建设和平与民主化。76格什曼和艾伦,《对民主援助的攻击》。77 de Zeeuw和Kumar,“对冲突后社会的民主援助”,7-9.78 Diamond,“促进冲突后和失败国家的民主”,96-97;拉平,“冲突后民主援助的挑战”,181.79。拉平,“冲突后民主援助的挑战”,180;沃尔特,《设计内战的过渡》,134-35页;辛格,阿富汗警察部队的腐败,47-48.80 Cf.布兰卡蒂和斯奈德,“杀戮的时间”,826.81格什曼和艾伦,“对民主援助的攻击”。82 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.83我们选择这个样本时期有两个原因,一个是理论原因,一个是实证原因。从理论上讲,有人认为2001年后的时期对民主援助的环境比20世纪90年代要困难得多,这就是为什么民主援助的有效性不能在这两个时期进行富有成效的比较(Finkel等人,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响:第三阶段活动报告)。从经验上看,2002年以前经合组织/发展援助委员会债权人报告系统(CRS)的支付数据缺失是一个重大问题;从2002年开始,数据覆盖率增加到90%以上Finkel et al.,美国对外援助对民主建设的影响:第三阶段活动报告,6-7.85 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V11, 348.86同上,46.87 OECD,“DAC和CRS代码列表”。“88同上。89关于控制变量的编码和数据来源的详细资料见附录。90如。
On the effectiveness of democracy aid in post-civil war recipient countries
ABSTRACTDemocracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.KEYWORDS: Democracy aiddemocracy assistancedemocracy promotioncivil warintrastate conflictpost-conflict societies AcknowledgementsThis article is partly based on the master’s thesis of the first author. Special thanks go to Berthold Rittberger for his support and supervision in the planning and conceptualization of this master’s thesis. We are also grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? 12.2 Nowack and Leininger, “Protecting Democracy from Abroad”; European Commission, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.3 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20; Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7.4 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”5 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.6 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil.”7 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”8 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.9 Strand and Hegre, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020; Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 1.10 OECD, “States of Fragility 2020.”11 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”12 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance; Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?”13 Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”14 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”15 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.16 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.17 Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7; de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20.18 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”19 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”20 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 218.21 Lührmann, McMann and van Ham, Democracy Aid Effectiveness, 6.22 Hyde, “Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion,” 358.23 Ibid.24 Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third”; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 65–76; Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”25 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” 405; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 70; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”26 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” 113; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 166–67; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 69.27 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 234.28 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 842; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780.29 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236.30 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13.31 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 847.32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”33 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?” 164; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 841.34 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”35 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski, “The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions”; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, “Democratic Aid and the Democratization of Recipients.”36 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”37 Gibson et al., The Political Economy of Development Aid; Knack and Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients.”38 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”39 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil”; Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid.”40 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”41 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”42 Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”43 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.44 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities.45 In this study, we use the terms “intrastate war” and “civil war” synonymously.46 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 2.47 UCDP, UCDP Definitions.48 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization”; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization”; for an overview on the determinants of democratisation see Pérez-Liñán, “Democracies,” 91–95.49 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 36; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”50 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization.”51 Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.52 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States”; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.53 Baker, “Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance,” 760; Jarstad and Sisk, “Introduction,” 5–6.54 Cederman, Hug and Krebs, “Democratization and Civil War”; Höglund, “Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions”; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, 5; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Snyder, Democratization and Nationalist Violence; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.55 Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Regan and Bell, “Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”56 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hartzell and Hoddie, “Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” 319; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Sisk, “Peacebuilding as Democratization,” 252.57 Alihodžić et al., Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.58 Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.59 Cf. Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.60 Chauvet and Collier, “Preconditions for Turnarounds in Failing States”; Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies”; Donaubauer, Herzer and Nunnenkamp, “The Effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict Conditions”; Flores and Nooruddin, “Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs”; Garriga and Phillips, “Foreign Aid as a Signal to Investors.”61 Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies; Call, The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence; François and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States”; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.62 Besley and Persson, “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development”; Wright and Winters, “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.”63 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 42.64 Cf. Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 179. Lappin finds post-conflict contexts to vary with regards to the number of warring parties, their desired war outcomes, balance of military power, size of the country, number of combatants, duration of conflict, and type of peace agreement. See also Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” who find that decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, and power sharing decrease the risks of renewed violence after early post-conflict elections. On negotiated settlements and peace agreements, see Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation.65 Cf. Ibid.; Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96; Licht, “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival,” 59.66 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.67 Butterfield, History and Human Relations; Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”68 Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, 157; Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 590.69 Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 588.70 Cf. Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 830.71 Cf. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War.” This study applies the concept of the security dilemma to negotiated settlements after intrastate conflict, such that the former belligerents refuse to disarm out of fear of the other side reneging. As a result, agreements can break down and fighting resumes. Our argument similarly applies the concept of the security dilemma to explain the behavior of former belligerents in post-civil war contexts, but in the context of external democracy assistance.72 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.73 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Lind, “Democratization and Stability in East Asia,” 10; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict.74 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 14.75 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States,” 57; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight; Zürcher et al., Peacebuilding and Democratization after War.76 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”77 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.78 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 181.79 Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 180; Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 134–35; Singh, Corruption in the Afghan Police Force, 47–48.80 Cf. Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” 826.81 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”82 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.83 We chose this sample period for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, it has been argued that the post-2001 period poses a much more difficult environment for democracy assistance than the 1990s, which is why the effectiveness of democracy aid cannot be fruitfully compared across these two periods (Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities). Empirically, missing data is a substantial problem for disbursements from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) prior to 2002; starting in 2002, data coverage increases to more than 90%.84 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities, 6–7.85 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V11, 348.86 Ibid., 46.87 OECD, “DAC and CRS Code Lists.”88 Ibid.89 Detailed information on the coding of and data sources for the control variables is available in the appendix.90 E.g. Donno and Neureiter, “Can Human Rights Conditionality Reduce Repression?”91 We create six region dummies, one for each of the following geographical areas: Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; Western Europe and North America; Asia and the Pacific; and Sub-Saharan Africa.92 One should note that the type of activities supported by top-down aid tends to be more costly than the type of activities bottom-up assistance entails, which somewhat qualifies our statement that the former is a much more prominent form of democracy assistance than the latter. Still, we believe that the general sentiment holds true and that there are opportunities to shift funds to bottom-up activities in post-conflict societies.93 Cf. Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.94 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.95 Ibid.96 Altunbas and Thornton, “The (Small) Blessing of Foreign Aid”; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics.”97 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”98 Arellano and Bond, “Some Test of Specification for Panel Data.”99 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.100 Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsLeonie ReichenederLeonie Reicheneder is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include democratization, aid effectiveness, and post-conflict state-building.Michael NeureiterMichael Neureiter is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Political Science at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His research interests include political behaviour, public opinion, and democratization. His work has been published in journals such as Political Science Research and Methods, West European Politics, and Political Psychology.
期刊介绍:
Democratization aims to promote a better understanding of democratization - defined as the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries. While the focus is on democratization viewed as a process, the journal also builds on the enduring interest in democracy itself and its analysis. The emphasis is contemporary and the approach comparative, with the publication of scholarly contributions about those areas where democratization is currently attracting considerable attention world-wide.