CEO权力对企业避税的影响:机构所有权的调节作用

IF 5.5 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI:10.1108/cg-02-2023-0067

Ahmed Atef Oussii, Mohamed Faker Klibi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究旨在探讨突尼斯上市公司首席执行官(CEO)权力与避税水平之间的关系。它还考察了机构所有权在这种关联中的调节作用。样本包括2013-2020年期间在突尼斯证券交易所上市的306家公司的年度观察结果。研究结果表明，CEO权力降低了企业的避税水平。此外，在存在机构所有权的情况下，CEO权力与避税之间的关系更为明显，这表明在机构投资者的监督下，CEO的机会主义行为会减少，从而导致避税行为的减少。研究表明，CEO权力和机构股东影响力是决定企业规避行为的重要因素。本研究对股东和监管机构具有重要意义。事实上，股东们担心任命一位强大的首席执行官会对避税行为产生影响。本研究也可为监管者提供CEO权力维度和机构所有权对税收侵略性的影响的新见解。本研究通过调查CEO权力如何影响避税行为填补了会计文献的空白，并提供了在以投资者保护弱为特征的新兴经济背景下，机构所有权对这种关系的调节作用的经验证据。

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The impact of CEO power on corporate tax avoidance: the moderating role of institutional ownership

Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association. Design/methodology/approach The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period. Findings The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance. Practical implications This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness. Originality/value This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

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来源期刊

Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society BUSINESS-

CiteScore

11.20

自引率

33.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： Providing a consistent source of in-depth information, analysis and advice considering corporate governance on an international scale, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society focuses on knowledge development, practice and performance standards for scholars and Boards of Directors/ Governors of companies throughout the world. The journal publishes a diverse range of substantive theoretical and methodological debates as well as practical developments in the field of corporate governance worldwide. The journal particularly encourages attention to the impact of changes of business/corporate governance forms and practices on people, and the sustainability of different governance models. Articles that highlight models and structures that advance the interests, dignity and well being of all stakeholders, in a sustainable manner, are particularly welcome. The journal covers a broad spectrum of governance-related themes including: -Effective boardroom performance -Control and regulation -Executive leadership -The role and contribution of external (non-executive) directors -The growing importance of governance in the wake of ever-greater corporate scandals -Redefinitions and reassessments of corporate governance models -The role of business in society -The changing nature of the relationship and responsibilities of the firm towards various stakeholders -The incentives required to encourage more socially- and environmentally-responsible corporate action -The role and impact of local and international regulatory agencies and regimes on corporate behaviour.