先发制人的去政治化:欧盟委员会和欧盟外国投资审查条例

IF 4.6 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Anna Vlasiuk Nibe, Sophie Meunier, Christilla Roederer-Rynning
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引用次数: 3

摘要

2019年3月,欧盟通过了首个泛欧洲投资审查框架,从而加入了全球不断发展的投资审查机制的行列。本文探讨了为什么欧洲审查框架被迅速采用,而没有政治化,即使谈判是在贸易和投资政策政治化加剧的背景下展开的。本文提出了三个预期:(1)成员国偏好趋同;(2)投资政策证券化;(3)委托创业。然后,它通过过程追踪,利用对相关参与者的广泛采访,从经验上对它们进行了探索。我们认为欧盟委员会发挥了关键作用。为了避免陷入另一股政治化并消除政治地雷,委员会采取了“先发制人的非政治化”战略,缩短了政策过程,限制了所涉行为者的数量,并在法律框架内证明了政策选择的合理性。关键词:去政治化;欧洲委员会;外商直接投资;投资筛选;此外,该论文已在第17届EUSA双年会议(迈阿密,2022年5月)、2022年11月在普林斯顿大学举行的“投资筛选机制的政治和监管”会议和第18届EUSA双年会议(匹兹堡,2023年5月)上发表。我们要感谢Dirk De bi vre和Andreas d r在论文工作期间提供的有益反馈,感谢匿名审稿人对手稿的建设性意见,以及我们所有的受访者与我们分享他们的见解。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1欧洲议会和理事会2019年3月19日第(EU) 2019/452号条例,关于建立审查进入欧盟的外国直接投资框架https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC2奥地利、丹麦、芬兰、法国、德国、意大利、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、波兰、葡萄牙、西班牙。3法国、德国和意大利致欧盟委员会的信函中所附的关于确保改善贸易和投资公平竞争环境的建议。2017年2月10名欧洲人民党议员:Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld,欧洲人民党。例如欧盟在能源领域关于外资控股公司认证的法律欧洲议会和理事会关于扭曲内部市场的外国补贴的条例提案{SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}8欧洲议会和理事会2022年6月23日关于第三国经济运营商准入的条例(EU) 2022/1031,9 .向欧盟的公共采购和特许市场提供货物和服务,以及支持就欧盟经济经营者、货物和服务进入第三国的公共采购和特许市场进行谈判的程序欧洲议会和理事会关于保护欧盟及其成员国免受第三国市场经济胁迫的法规提案{SEC(2021) 418 final} - {SWD(2021) 371 final} - {SEC(2021) 372 final}补充信息本文已在Dirk De bi组织的“对跨大西洋地区贸易政策争论的反应”研讨会上发表。Andreas d r和Scott Hamilton将分别于2021年11月和2022年5月在安特卫普大学和萨尔茨堡大学进行研究,由让·莫内跨大西洋贸易政治网络通过欧盟伊拉斯谟+计划(资助号620450-EPP-1-2020-1-CA-EPPJMO-NETWORK)提供资金支持。这项研究是由丹麦独立研究基金(1028-00003B)资助的“选美比赛:外国投资在欧洲的政治变化”项目的一部分。作者简介anna Vlasiuk NibeAnna Vlasiuk NibeAnna Vlasiuk Nibe是南丹麦大学(丹麦)政治科学与公共管理系的博士候选人。Sophie Meunier,美国普林斯顿大学公共与国际事务学院高级研究学者。Christilla Roederer-Rynning是南丹麦大学(丹麦)政治科学与公共管理系比较欧洲政治学教授(担负特殊职责)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pre-emptive depoliticisation: the European Commission and the EU foreign investment screening regulation
ABSTRACTIn March 2019 the European Union adopted the first pan-European investment screening framework, thus joining the bandwagon of growing investment screening mechanisms around the world. This article explores why the European screening framework was adopted swiftly and with no politicisation, even as the negotiations unfolded against the background of heightened politicisation of trade and investment policy. The paper develops three expectations: (1) converging member state preferences; (2) securitisation of investment policy; and (3) Commission entrepreneurship. It then explores them empirically through process-tracing, drawing on extensive interviews with the actors involved. We argue that the European Commission played a pivotal role. To avoid falling into another strand of politicisation and to defuse political mines, the Commission engaged in a ‘pre-emptive depoliticization’ strategy that shortened the policy process, limited the number of actors involved, and justified the policy options in a legalistic framing.KEYWORDS: Depoliticisation; European Commission; FDI; investment screening; ISM AcknowledgementsIn addition, the paper has been presented at the 17th Biennial EUSA Conference (Miami, May 2022), the conference ‘The Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms’ held at Princeton University in November 2022, and the 18th Biennial EUSA Conference (Pittsburgh, May 2023). We would like to thank Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dür for their helpful feedback during the work on the paper, the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments to the manuscript, as well as to all our interviewees for sharing their insights with us.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC2 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain.3 Proposal for ensuring an improved level playing field in trade and investment attached to the Letter to the Commission by France, Germany and Italy, February 2017.4 10 MEPs from European People’s Party: Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld, European People’s Party.5 For example EU’s laws in energy sector on certification of foreign-owned / controlled companies.6 Respective policy proposal was submitted in May 20217 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market {SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}8 Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries.9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries market {SEC (2021) 418 final} - {SWD(2021) 371 final} - {SEC(2021) 372 final}Additional informationFundingThis paper has been presented at the workshops ‘Reacting to the Contestation of Trade Policy in the Transatlantic Area’ organised by Dirk De Bièvre, Andreas Dür and Scott Hamilton at the University of Antwerp in November 2021 and University of Salzburg in May 2022 under financial support by the Jean Monnet Network for Transatlantic Trade Politics via the Erasmus + programme of the European Union (Grant Number 620450-EPP-1-2020-1-CA-EPPJMO-NETWORK). This research is part of the project ‘Beauty Contests: The Changing Politics of Foreign Investment in Europe’ financed by the Independent Research Fund Denmark (1028-00003B).Notes on contributorsAnna Vlasiuk NibeAnna Vlasiuk Nibe is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark (Denmark).Sophie MeunierSophie Meunier is a Senior Research Scholar at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University (USA).Christilla Roederer-RynningChristilla Roederer-Rynning is a professor (with special responsibilities) in comparative European politics in the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark (Denmark).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.80
自引率
9.50%
发文量
83
期刊介绍: The primary aim of the Journal of European Public Policy is to provide a comprehensive and definitive source of analytical, theoretical and methodological articles in the field of European public policy. Focusing on the dynamics of public policy in Europe, the journal encourages a wide range of social science approaches, both qualitative and quantitative. JEPP defines European public policy widely and welcomes innovative ideas and approaches. The main areas covered by the Journal are as follows: •Theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of public policy in Europe and elsewhere •National public policy developments and processes in Europe •Comparative studies of public policy within Europe
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