基于区块链和CHSM的异构集成供应链完整性

IF 2.2 4区 计算机科学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Paul E. Calzada, Md Sami Ul Islam Sami, Kimia Zamiri Azar, Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的几十年里,电子产品在政府、商业和社会领域已经变得司空见惯。这些设备发展迅速,正如普遍使用的系统芯片(soc)而不是单个电路板上的单独集成电路所看到的那样。随着半导体业界开始讨论摩尔定律的终结,一种通过在一个通用的中间体芯片上使用分离的功能芯片来进一步提高每个区域的功能和产量的方法正受到关注,这种方法被称为系统级封装(SiP)。因此,小晶片和SiP空间已经发展到满足这一需求,创造了一个新的封装范例,先进封装,和一个新的供应链。这种由多个芯片开发商和代工厂组成的新的分布式供应链增加了假冒漏洞。目前在公开市场上可以买到小芯片,因此很难确定它们的来源和真实性。由于缺乏对供应链各个阶段的控制,假冒威胁在小芯片、中间商和SiP级别上表现出来。在本文中,我们识别了SiP域中的假冒威胁,并提出了一个利用区块链对SiP进行有效可追溯性以确定来源的缓解框架。我们的框架利用Chiplet硬件安全模块(CHSM)在SiP的整个生命周期中对其进行身份验证。为了实现这一目标,我们利用SiP信息,包括小芯片的电子芯片id (ECIDs)、抗模具和IC回收(CDIR)传感器信息、文档、测试模式和/或电气测量、等级和SiP的部件号。我们详细介绍了区块链的结构,并建立了将可信信息注册到区块链网络和验证SiP的协议。我们的框架减轻了SiP假冒威胁,包括回收,评论,克隆,过度生产的中间插入物,伪造文件和替换芯片,同时检测不规范和有缺陷的SiP。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Heterogeneous Integration Supply Chain Integrity through Blockchain and CHSM
Over the past few decades, electronics have become commonplace in government, commercial, and social domains. These devices have developed rapidly, as seen in the prevalent use of System on Chips (SoCs) rather than separate integrated circuits on a single circuit board. As the semiconductor community begins conversations over the end of Moore’s Law, an approach to further increase both functionality per area and yield using segregated functionality dies on a common interposer die, labeled a System in Package (SiP), is gaining attention. Thus, the chiplet and SiP space has grown to meet this demand, creating a new packaging paradigm, Advanced Packaging, and a new supply chain. This new distributed supply chain with multiple chiplet developers and foundries has augmented counterfeit vulnerabilities. Chiplets are currently available on an open market, and their origin and authenticity consequently are difficult to ascertain. With this lack of control over the stages of the supply chain, counterfeit threats manifest at the chiplet, interposer, and SiP levels. In this paper, we identify counterfeit threats in the SiP domain, and we propose a mitigating framework utilizing blockchain for the effective traceability of SiPs to establish provenance. Our framework utilizes the Chiplet Hardware Security Module (CHSM) to authenticate a SiP throughout its life. To accomplish this, we leverage SiP information including Electronic Chip IDs (ECIDs) of chiplets, Combating Die and IC Recycling (CDIR) sensor information, documentation, test patterns and/or electrical measurements, grade, and part number of the SiP. We detail the structure of the blockchain and establish protocols for both enrolling trusted information into the blockchain network and authenticating the SiP. Our framework mitigates SiP counterfeit threats including recycled, remarked, cloned, overproduced interposer, forged documentation, and substituted chiplet while detecting of out-of-spec and defective SiPs.
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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems 工程技术-计算机:软件工程
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
105
审稿时长
3 months
期刊介绍: TODAES is a premier ACM journal in design and automation of electronic systems. It publishes innovative work documenting significant research and development advances on the specification, design, analysis, simulation, testing, and evaluation of electronic systems, emphasizing a computer science/engineering orientation. Both theoretical analysis and practical solutions are welcome.
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