通货紧缩真理，普通真理和相对真理

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY

Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI:10.6018/daimon.480391

Ramiro Caso

{"title":"通货紧缩真理，普通真理和相对真理","authors":"Ramiro Caso","doi":"10.6018/daimon.480391","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed.","PeriodicalId":51979,"journal":{"name":"Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth\",\"authors\":\"Ramiro Caso\",\"doi\":\"10.6018/daimon.480391\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51979,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.480391\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.480391","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

Horwich (Mind 123(491)， 2014)认为，只有具有通货膨胀倾向的人才会倾向于支持真理相对主义。在此过程中，他认为关于真理的通货紧缩主义意味着对相对主义的否定。如果是正确的，Horwich的论证可以推导出真理相对主义与我们普通真理谓词的任何概念都是不相容的，根据这个概念，在基础语言中p的断言和相应的p为真的断言之间存在某种等价。可以论证的是，相对论者对于我们的普通真值谓词所作的任何叙述，都应该包含一些这样的等价。因此，真理相对主义有一个需要解决的问题。Horwich (Mind 123(491)， 2014)认为，只有具有通货膨胀倾向的人才会倾向于支持真理相对主义。在此过程中，他认为关于真理的通货紧缩主义意味着对相对主义的否定。如果是正确的，Horwich的论证可以推导出真理相对主义与我们普通真理谓词的任何概念都是不相容的，根据这个概念，在基础语言中p的断言和相应的p为真的断言之间存在某种等价。可以论证的是，相对论者对于我们的普通真值谓词所作的任何叙述，都应该包含一些这样的等价。因此，真理相对主义有一个需要解决的问题。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth

Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Daimon-Revista Internacional de Filosofia PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

53 weeks

期刊介绍： La finalidad de Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía, es abrir un espacio para la publicación de trabajos de investigación en las diversas disciplinas del saber denominado filosofía. Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía, es, desde 2001, una publicación cuatrimestral. Algunos de los números de cada año son monográficos y otros no lo son. Los monográficos son anunciados con la debida antelación (un año antes de su publicación, como mínimo), mediante la correspondiente llamada para aportaciones (call for papers), en la que se indica el tema y la persona responsable de coordinar el número. Si una llamada para monográfico no recibe originales suficientes para completar un número completo (actualmente tenemos fijado un límite de páginas en torno a doscientas por número), se completará con una sección de artículos variados. Se pueden enviar originales en cualquiera de los idiomas europeos más habituales. Se admiten Artículos, Notas Críticas y Reseñas de libros recientes. Los trabajos enviados han de ser investigaciones originales: trabajos que aborden, desde una perspectiva filosófica, las múltiples dimensiones o esferas de la existencia humana. Daimon es, pues, una revista que se dirige especialmente a investigadores, pero también a todo el que se interesa por el pensamiento filosófico en sentido amplio, desde la frontera de la ciencia hasta la de la literatura. En las páginas de Daimon, el especialista puede encontrar nuevos enfoques de un determinado problema o autor; el investigador, un espacio en el que publicar, contrastar o confirmar sus trabajos; y el lector aficionado, artículos, traducciones, revisiones críticas y reseñas de libros que pueden alimentar su curiosidad y ampliar su formación.